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Abstract
This report covers the regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2007, including the design, 
construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and 
nuclear materials. It constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear 
energy, which the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry pursuant to section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. 
No events occurred at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants that would have en-
dangered the safe use of nuclear energy. Three reactor scrams occured due to disturbances 
at Olkiluoto 2 in 2007. The number is considerably higher than average over the past few 
years. The safety significance of the events was low. 
No individual occupational radiation dose exceeded the limit set for nuclear power plant 
workers. Radioactive releases were low and the dose calculated on their basis for the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was 
well below the limit laid down by Government Decision.
In 2007, the safety of the Loviisa plant was assessed more intensively and extensively than 
usual due to the renewal of the plant’s operating licence. According to STUK’s assessment, 
the facility is safe and operated well, based on which it supported the extension of its op-
erating licence until each plant unit will have operated for 50 years. The licence conditions 
state that two periodical safety reviews must be conducted at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant during the next licence term by the end of 2015 and 2023. 
The indicators depicting the effectiveness of STUK’s action, i.e. the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants, did not indicate changes that would have called for an 
immediate reaction from STUK. 
In 2007, STUK reviewed the detailed design of Olkiluoto 3, witnessed component manufac-
turing at manufacturers’ premises and oversaw plant construction at Olkiluoto. Based on 
the results of oversight, STUK can state that, despite the design changes and the deficien-
cies detected in construction and manufacturing, the original safety and quality objectives 
for the plant will be achieved.
Posiva Oy is constructing an underground research facility for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. STUK oversees the design and implementation of structures and 
systems important to safety, and has not observed any deviations compromising safety.
No events endangering safety occurred at the FiR 1 research reactor. The radiation doses of 
those working at the research reactor and radioactive releases into the environment were 
clearly below the set limits.
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No events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety. In 
the field of nuclear material safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with 
current regulations and the completeness and the correctness of nuclear material account-
ing were verified.
STUK verified that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been taken care of 
according to legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation in 2007 were €13.2 million. The total costs of 
operations subject to a charge were €12.0 million, the full amount of which was charged to 
the licensees and licence-applicants.
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Foreword 
Jukka Laaksonen
The operational performance of Finnish nuclear power plants in 2007 shows that the licen-
sees have been successful in ensuring the safety and operational reliability of their power 
plants. Indicators of both the condition of the plants and the quality of operation developed 
positively. There were no significant events compromising safety, and the number of com-
ponent malfunctions affecting operation was very low. component upgrades and safety 
system improvements were continued at both power plants based on long-term plans. A 
number of important projects in terms of nuclear safety were in progress in 2007.
In view of the renewal of operating licences, STUK carried out a comprehensive safety 
assessment of the Loviisa nuclear power plant, based on which it was able to support the 
extension of the operating licences until both plant units reach 50 years of age. 
In connection with the assessment, it could be verified on the basis of regulatory observa-
tions and indicators that a potential negative effect related to ageing is not apparent. This 
is an indication of functional lifetime management and successful component maintenance. 
Successful water chemistry has been one of the key factors in maintaining the condition 
of the components. Plant safety has improved continuously since the commissioning of 
the plant, thanks to both improved operation and operating procedures and the increased 
professional skill of the staff. Structural safety has also been developed consistently, first 
by removing risks identified by means of qualitative examinations, and later by utilising 
detailed probabilistic risk analysis. The scope of this analysis has been extended and its ac-
curacy improved continuously since the completion of the first version in 1989. The Loviisa 
power plant has had positive experiences of the quality of Russian nuclear fuel, in particu-
lar: no leaking fuel rods have been detected during this millennium.
During the first years of operation, the collective occupational radiation doses at Finnish 
nuclear power plants were very low in a comparison between nuclear power plants world-
wide. Since then, radiation doses have been reduced considerably in other countries, but 
Finland has not seen a similar development. During 2007, STUK and both of the utilities 
systematically looked for means to reduce occupational radiation doses and carried out 
various measures for this purpose. Indeed, occupational radiation doses in 2007 were the 
lowest in the power plants’ history but, due to the short outages and the relatively small 
amount of work performed during them, it is still premature to conclude that any perma-
nent improvement has taken place in occupational radiation protection.
A generational shift is in progress among the management and expert posts at both of the 
nuclear power plants. This has been found to proceed without problems, and young moti-
vated employees have been hired to be trained alongside senior personnel sufficiently early 
in order to ensure the continuity of operation. A new responsible manager was approved for 
both plants towards the end of the year.
Radioactive waste generated in operational processes at the nuclear power plants accumu-
lated as anticipated. Its processing and final disposal in underground facilities took place 
in a controlled manner.
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STUK’s work input in the regulatory control of each of the operating nuclear power plants 
was equivalent to approximately 10 person-years. The work input has been approximately 
the same for the past four years, or during the period that most of the regulatory resources 
have been occupied with the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction. Before the construc-
tion project started, some more human resources were used for the regulation of operat-
ing plants each year, and the reduction compared with the situation in previous years has 
been 2–3 person-years for each of the power plants. however, the objectives set for regula-
tion were attained equally as well as before. 29 person-years were used for overseeing the 
design, component manufacturing and construction of the Olkiluoto 3 unit, or slightly more 
than previously. The amount of work will continue to increase in 2008 and 2009, which 
will see a lot of component manufacturing and installation operations. The current financ-
ing practice for regulatory operations, i.e. direct invoicing from the licensees according to 
STUK’s actual costs, has proven to function very well, and it has enabled increasing opera-
tions according to actual needs.
The repair of the defects in the manufacture of the reactor containment steel liner slowed 
down the construction of the new plant unit at Olkiluoto. The construction of the contain-
ment, which proved more demanding than anticipated, also lagged behind the target 
schedule. however, the operations at the construction site were organised and managed 
in a controlled manner, and the quality of completed work was found to be appropriate. 
Difficulties continued in the manufacturing of a number of structures and components 
intended for Olkiluoto 3 in compliance with quality standards. Some of these difficulties 
may delay the completion of the plant unit, but no compromises were made in the quality 
of approved completed products. The experiences of the regulation of construction further 
emphasised the importance of comprehensive inspections as a means for ensuring the 
required quality. The oversight of the operations of the client utility was continued accord-
ing to the inspection programme that has been in use since the commencement of construc-
tion. A systematic approach to inspections has proven to be a good tool for assessing the 
utility’s operations. In order to avoid any delays due to regulatory control, procedures were 
improved on the basis of the experiences, and contact with the organisations participating 
in deliveries was intensified. 
Three new environmental impact assessments aiming at the construction of nuclear power 
plants were commenced during the year. STUK reviewed the assessment plans mainly with 
a view to ensuring comprehensiveness and the correctness of the information provided. 
At the same time, STUK started to familiarise itself with the possible plant types at the 
request and cost of the utilities. Preparation is necessary for STUK to be able to promptly 
present its own safety assessments related to potential decisions-in-principle. As part of 
the preparation for potential future nuclear facility projects, STUK continued the prepara-
tion of the reform of nuclear energy legislation together with the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. From the start, the involvement of the users of nuclear energy at all stages of the 
regulatory reform was emphasised.
Due to the amount of work required for the new nuclear facility projects, an organisational 
change was planned for the department in charge of nuclear reactor regulation, to be 
adopted in 2008. Decision-making powers, which have previously mostly been vested with 
the director, will be assigned to three assistant directors, who will form a new organisa-
tional level above the offices. 
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Posiva Oy continued the construction of the research facility needed for developing the 
final disposal of spent nuclear fuel by excavating the tunnel leading to the facility and 
shafts. During 2007, the excavation reached more than half of the final target. STUK over-
saw the work, preparing for the possibility that the tunnel and the shafts will in due course 
lead to the actual final disposal facility. Proving the safety of final disposal will primarily 
be based on the reliability of the barrier structures preventing the spreading of radioactive 
substances. These structures will consist of a gas-tight copper canister and surrounding 
bentonite clay. As the focus of the final disposal project shifted towards technical design 
and construction, STUK organised its regulatory operations to correspond to the increased 
amount of work and the changed tasks. At the same time, it hired a number of experts in 
various fields and intensified the operation of the team of international experts directly 
supporting the regulatory control.
The reform of the preparation for exceptional radiation situations in Finland, which has 
required several years’ effort, was completed. The automatically alerting radiation monitor-
ing network in Finland is now reliable, very tolerant of individual equipment malfunctions 
and sufficiently dense. STUK considers it to be the best in the world and implemented in 
the most cost-efficient manner. The joint actions by the authorities to control a fall-out 
situation have also been planned under STUK’s leadership in a manner that provides an 
internationally-commended example for other countries, as well. The network required for 
measuring foodstuffs, composed of municipal and private laboratories, was provided with 
new equipment, and the staff of these laboratories was trained.
A lot of experiences were gained of nuclear materials regulation according to the amended 
nuclear non-proliferation agreement and, in particular, of the division of labour between 
the IAEA, the EU and national regulatory authorities. STUK made an active contribution 
towards finding an optimal division of labour between the parties concerned and attempted 
to show the way to achieving well-functioning procedures ensuring an adequate level of 
confidence. A model for nuclear safeguards suitable for the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel was developed further, in tandem with the excavation of the tunnel leading to the final 
disposal facility.
10
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory control by STUK is based 
on the Nuclear Energy Act
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory control 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of physical protection and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards of nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation. 
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facilities; from strategy in implementation.
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STUK functions for the oversight of nuclear power plants 
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      Inspection and testing organisations
      Manufacturers of nuclear pressure equipment
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      Nuclear waste management
      Control of radioactive materials transport
      Licences for the nuclear materials and nuclear waste 
STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licences under the Nuclear Energy Act, con-
trols compliance with the licence conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and controls 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory 
activities is to ensure the safety of nuclear 
12
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facilities so that plant operation does not cause 
radiation hazards that could endanger the safety of 
workers or the population in the vicinity or cause 
other harm to the environment or property. The 
most important specific objective is to prevent a re-
actor accident that would cause a release of radio-
active substances or a threat of a release. Another 
objective is to maintain public confidence in regula-
tory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with the requirements
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory activi-
ties that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements and in accordance with a good safety 
culture. 
Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives
The attainment of the objectives laid down in the 
safety regulations is ensured by means of inspec-
tions and reviews. STUK’s operations are guid-
ed by annual follow-up plans, presenting the key 
items and activities for inspection and review. 
STUK reviews plans and the other documenta-
tion of nuclear facilities. various inspections on-
site or at suppliers’ premises ensure that the plans 
are carried out in practice. The licensee is obliged 
to request that STUK reviews certain documents 
and carries out inspections on-site or at suppliers’ 
premises. In addition to these inspections and re-
views, STUK has separate inspection programmes 
for periodic inspections at operating plants and in-
spections during construction. STUK also employs 
resident inspectors at the plants, who supervise 
and witness the construction, operation and condi-
tion of the plant and the operation of the organisa-
tion on a daily basis and report their observations 
to STUK. 
STUK ensures by means of inspections and 
other controls that the operational preconditions 
and operation of the licensee and its subcontrac-
tors and the systems, structures and components of 
nuclear facilities are in compliance with the regu-
latory requirements. An overall safety assessment 
is conducted annually on each nuclear facility, 
dealing with the attainment of radiation protection 
objectives, the development of defence in depth, 
and the operation of organisations constructing or 
operating nuclear facilities and providing services 
to them.
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutual-
ly-redundant functional levels. This approach is 
called the defence in depth principle. Safety en-
suring functions may be divided into preventive, 
protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent 
any deviations from the plant’s normal operation-
al state. Accordingly, high quality standards apply 
to component design, manufacturing, installation 
and maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into a severe accident.
The mitigating level is needed if the first or 
second level functions fail to stop the progress of 
an accident.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
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STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facility projects from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, interme-
diate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal fa-
cility requires a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. In connection with the application for the 
decision-in-principle, the applicant also presents 
a report on the environmental impact assessment. 
when an application for a construction or operat-
ing licence for a nuclear facility has been submit-
ted to the Government, STUK issues a statement 
on it and encloses its safety assessment.
STUK regulates the different nuclear 
facility design and construction stages
STUK regulates the different design and construc-
tion stages of nuclear facilities. The most extensive 
design document is the Safety Analysis Report, 
which presents the safety analyses proving that 
the facility complies with the relevant safety re-
quirements. STUK evaluates whether the cases 
examined in the safety analyses have been appro-
priately selected, whether the analyses have been 
conducted correctly and whether their outcomes 
are acceptable. The purpose of the regulation of 
nuclear facility construction is to ensure compli-
ance with the conditions of the construction licence 
and the regulations and approved plans concerning 
concrete and steel structures, electrical and I&c 
components and pressure equipment. The require-
ments apply to all organisations taking part in 
the project whose activities have an impact on the 
safety of the nuclear facility.
Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment.
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operation of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety 
of nuclear power plants by carrying out inspec-
tions on plant sites and at component manufactur-
ers’ premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory yvL guides, 
deterministic safety analyses refer to the analyses 
of transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear pow-
er plants. The licensees update these analyses in 
connection with the renewal of operating licences, 
periodic safety reviews and any significant modifi-
cations carried out at the plant. STUK reviews the 
analyses submitted by licensees and conducts, or 
contracts out where necessary, its own reference 
analyses to ensure the reliability of the results.
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions.
STUK reviews the probabilistic risk analyses 
related to construction and operating licences and 
the operation of a nuclear power plant. The licen-
sees employ PRA for the maintenance and continu-
ous improvement of the technical safety of nuclear 
facilities.
14
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STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
various modifications are carried out at nuclear fa-
cilities to improve safety, replace aged systems or 
components, facilitate plant operation or mainte-
nance, or improve the efficiency of energy genera-
tion. STUK approves the plans for the extensive and 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on-site or at manufacturers’ premises.
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents change that de-
scribe the plant’s operation and structure – such 
as the Technical Specifications, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the operating and mainte-
nance procedures. STUK supervises the document 
revisions and generally follows the updating of 
plant documentation after the modifications.
Oversight of plant operability
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down 
in the Technical Specifications, and following an-
nual maintenance outages, plant maintenance and 
ageing management, fire safety, radiation safety, 
physical protection and emergency preparedness.
Technical specifications
The Technical Specifications of nuclear facilities 
lay down the detailed requirements and restric-
tions concerning the plant’s various systems and 
components. The licensee is responsible for keeping 
the Technical Specifications up-to-date and ensur-
ing compliance with them. STUK controls compli-
ance with the plants’ Technical Specifications by 
witnessing operations on-site. Special attention is 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the Technical Specifications. 
when annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
with the Technical Specifications prior to start-
up. Any changes to and planned deviations from 
the Technical Specifications must be submitted 
to STUK for approval in advance. In addition, the 
licensee is responsible for reporting to STUK with-
out delay all situations deviating from the require-
ments under the Technical Specifications. In the 
report, the utility presents its corrective action for 
approval by STUK. STUK controls the implemen-
tation of corrective action in periodic inspections, 
for example.
Reporting
Licensees submit event reports to STUK on op-
erational events at nuclear facilities, comprising 
special reports, operational transient reports and 
scram reports. In addition to event reports, the fa-
cilities submit daily reports, quarterly reports, an-
nual reports, outage reports, annual environmental 
safety reports, monthly individual radiation dose 
reports, annual operational experience feedback 
reports and safeguards reports to STUK.
Annual maintenances
The annual maintenances at nuclear facilities com-
prise refuelling, preventive maintenance, periodic 
inspections and testing, as well as fault repairs – 
work that cannot be performed during operation. 
These actions ensure the preconditions for operat-
ing the power plant efficiently and safely during 
the next operating cycles.
STUK is responsible for controlling and ensur-
ing that the nuclear power plant is safe during 
the annual maintenance and the future operating 
cycles and that the annual maintenance does not 
cause a radiation hazard to the workers, the popu-
lation or the environment. STUK ensures this by 
reviewing the documents required by the regula-
tions, such as outage plans and modification docu-
mentation, and by performing on-site inspections 
during annual maintenance. 
Ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the age-
ing management of operating nuclear facilities, 
STUK controls that the plants’ ageing manage-
ment strategy and its implementation ensures the 
maintenance of sufficient safety margins for safe-
ty-significant systems, components and structures 
throughout their lifetime. The organisation of the 
licensee’s operations, the prerequisites for the or-
ganisation to carry out the necessary actions, and 
the condition of components and structures im-
portant to safety are subject to inspections and 
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reviews. Regulatory control ensures that the utili-
ties have the lifetime management programmes 
in place that enable them to detect potential prob-
lems in time. In addition, corrective action must 
be carried out in a way that ensures the integrity 
of safety-significant components and structures 
and the operability of safety functions throughout 
the plant’s lifetime.
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by 
inspecting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation 
measurements, radiation protection procedures, 
radiation conditions and radiation protection ar-
rangements for work processes at each facility. In 
addition, STUK oversees the meteorological disper-
sion measurements of radioactive substances, re-
lease measurements and environmental radiation 
monitoring, and also reviews the relevant result 
reports.
Oversight of organisational operation
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and training 
of the staff of nuclear facilities and operational 
experience feedback activities. The aim is to ensure 
that the organisations of the utility as a whole and 
Radioactive releases from a nuclear power 
plant into the air and sea are precisely measured 
at the plant. The measurement results are verified 
by comprehensive environmental radiation moni-
toring. Radiation monitoring in the environment 
of a power plant comprises radiation measure-
ments and determination of radioactive substanc-
es, conducted to analyse the radioactive substances 
existing in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations are 
transferred to the power plant and to the national 
radiation-monitoring network.
its key suppliers operate in a manner that ensures 
the safety of the plant at all levels and in connec-
tion with safety-related actions.
Operational experience feedback
According to Government Decision 395/1991, the 
advancement of science and technology and oper-
ating experiences must be taken into account for 
the further enhancement of the safety of nuclear 
power plants. This principle is not limited to op-
erational experiences from Finnish nuclear power 
plants, but feedback from abroad must also be ana-
lysed systematically, and action must be taken to 
improve safety as necessary. STUK controls and 
ensures that the utilities’ operational experience 
feedback activities effectively prevent the reoccur-
rence of events. STUK pays particular attention 
to the utilities’ ability to detect and identify the 
causes of the events and to remedy the underlying 
operational weaknesses. In addition, STUK anal-
yses Finnish and foreign operational experience 
data and, as necessary, lays down requirements to 
enhance safety.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when 
the licensee’s own organisation has not operated 
as planned during an event or when the event is 
estimated to lead to significant modifications to 
the plant’s technical layout or procedures. A STUK 
investigation team is also set up if the licensee 
has not adequately clarified the root causes of an 
event.
Inspection and testing organisations
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. The pres-
sure equipment of other safety classes is inspected 
by inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations author-
ised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
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Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act stipulates that users of 
nuclear energy must have acquired liability insur-
ance or other financial guarantee for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
have prepared for damage from a nuclear accident 
as prescribed by law by taking out an insurance 
policy for this purpose, mainly with the Nordic 
Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of an accident, the funds available for 
compensation come from three sources: the licensee, 
the country of location of the facility and the inter-
national liability community. In 2007, a total of 
300,000,000 SDR was available for compensation 
from these sources. SDR refers to Special Drawing 
Right, an international reserve asset defined by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose 
value is based on a basket of key international 
currencies. In 2007, the average value of SDR was 
1.12 euro. As a result of international negotiations 
completed in 2004 concerning the renewal of the 
Paris/Brussels nuclear liability agreements, funds 
available for compensation will be more than tri-
pled compared with the current situation in the 
near future. Finland has also decided to enact a 
law laying down unlimited licensee liability. The 
legislative amendment has not taken effect as yet, 
but is pending the entry into force of the relevant 
international agreements. 
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance arrangements in Finland 
belongs to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the 
transport of nuclear materials. STUK has ascer-
tained that all nuclear material transport has 
had liability insurance approved by the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority or in accordance with the 
Paris Convention and approved by the authorities 
of the sending state.
Nuclear safeguards are a basic 
requirement for using nuclear energy
Nuclear safeguards ensure that nuclear materials 
and other nuclear commodities remain in peace-
ful use in compliance with the relevant licenses 
and notifications. STUK reviews applications for 
licences concerning nuclear materials and other 
nuclear commodities, and maintains the nation-
al safeguards system. Licensees are responsible 
for managing the nuclear materials in their pos-
session, accounting for them and reporting any 
changes to STUK and the European commission. 
Some of the data is forwarded to the IAEA. STUK 
verifies the correctness of the licensees’ accounting 
and reporting through on-site inspections carried 
out by STUK alone or together with international 
inspectors.
STUK’s regulatory oversight extends 
from design to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste man-
agement is to ensure that nuclear waste is proc-
essed, stored and disposed of safely. The control of 
nuclear waste processed at plant sites is part of the 
regulatory control of operating plants mentioned 
above. In addition, STUK approves the clearing 
of waste from control and reviews plants’ nuclear 
waste management and decommissioning plans, 
on the basis of which the licensees’ nuclear waste 
management fees are determined. 
During the past few years, the final disposal 
project for spent fuel has required special atten-
tion. STUK has reviewed Posiva Oy’s project imple-
mentation plans and overseen the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also used for testing suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The aim is for 
Onkalo to later become one of the main entrances 
of the final disposal facility.
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe 
use of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
committee on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed by 
the Government and functions in conjunction with 
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STUK. Its term of office is three years. The Advisory 
committee was appointed on 1 October 2006, and 
its term of office ends on 30 September 2009.
The chairman of the committee is Professor 
Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (Lappeenranta University 
of Technology) and the vice-chairman Rauno 
Rintamaa, vice President, Business Solutions 
(vTT, Technical Research centre of Finland). The 
members are Director Ulla Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa 
Regional Environment centre), Managing Director 
Timo Okkonen (Inspecta Tarkastus Oy), Senior 
Researcher Ilona Lindholm (vTT), Branch 
Manager Runar Blomkvist (the Geological Survey 
of Finland) and Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Antti vuorinen. 
Professor jukka Laaksonen, Director General of 
STUK, is a permanent expert to the committee.
The committee convened 11 times during the 
year. The year was an active one in the sphere of 
legislation and regulations: the committee heard 
STUK’s experts on the reform of nuclear energy 
legislation and the revised yvL guide system. The 
committee issued statements to STUK on a total 
of 10 different draft acts and decrees. It prepared 
statements to STUK on two yvL guides under 
revision. The preparation of statements on three 
other draft yvL guides was initiated. In addition, 
the committee regularly followed the progress of 
the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, the 
operational events at the operating nuclear facili-
ties and participated, together with the Advisory 
committee on Nuclear Energy, in the organising of 
an annual nuclear energy seminar. Furthermore, 
the committee prepared statements on Posiva’s 
research plan for 2008 concerning nuclear waste 
management and the fourth international report 
under the convention on Nuclear Safety. 
The committee convened once at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant, acquainting itself with topical 
safety issues at the Loviisa plant and key issues in 
terms of the renewal of its operating licence. The 
committee issued a statement to STUK on the ap-
plication for the operating licence. The committee 
also visited the construction sites of the new unit 
at Olkiluoto and the underground research facility 
Onkalo of the nuclear waste repository. On both 
visits, the committee heard presentations by the 
licensees’ experts concerning safety issues and the 
progress of the projects. 
The committee has three divisions for pre-
paratory work: a Reactor Safety Division and a 
Nuclear waste Division, as well as an Emergency 
Preparedness and Nuclear Material Division. In 
addition to the committee members proper, dis-
tinguished experts from various fields have been 
invited to the Divisions. A total of sixteen Division 
meetings were held in 2007.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb 1977 9 May 1977 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 510/488 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct1979 890/860 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 890/860 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction licence granted about 1,600 (net) PWR,
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oy owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the Olkiluoto 3 
plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo
Posiva Oy is constructing an 
underground rock charac-
terisation facility (Onkalo) 
in Olkiluoto, where bedrock 
volumes suitable for final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock re-
search at the planned final 
disposal depth is a require-
ment for granting a con-
struction licence for the final 
disposal facility. Posiva has 
designed Onkalo to function 
as one of the entrance routes 
to the planned final disposal 
facility, so STUK applies the 
same regulatory procedures 
to the construction of Onkalo 
as that of a nuclear facility. 
The underground research facility consists of 
a drive tunnel, three shafts and research galleries 
at the depths of 420 m and 520 m. Posiva started 
constructing Onkalo in 2004. At the end of 2007, 
the excavation of the drive tunnel had reached the 
depth of 250 m, and the length of the tunnel was 
2,600 m. In addition, excavation by raise boring 
had reached the depth of 180 m.
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
•  TRIGA Mark II research reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
• Fuel of the core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA reactors have a unique 
fuel type;  
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
Figure 2. Plan of the underground rock characterisation facility (Onkalo) and 
status of the construction on 28 March 2008.
FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by vTT 
Technical Research centre of Finland. The reactor 
is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maximum 
thermal power is 250 kw. It began operation in 
March 1962, and its current operating licence will 
expire at the end of 2011. The reactor is used for 
production of radioactive tracers, activation analy-
sis, student training and Boron Neutron capture 
Therapy (BNcT) treatment of tumours, as well as 
the development of therapeutic methods.
Ventilation shaft
180 m
Personnel shaft
180 m
Intake ventilation
-- m
Length of the drive tunnel
2892 m
Depth of the drive tunnel
274 m
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3 Development and implementation 
of legislation and regulations
Legislative proposals have been prepared 
and the necessary statements submitted
STUK has contributed to the preparation of the 
legislative project under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, aiming at the amendment of the Nuclear 
Energy Act1, the Nuclear Energy Decree2, and 
Government Decisions3. The project brings stat-
utes, most of which are 16 years old, up-to-date. In 
addition, the status of the regulations in the legal 
system is brought in line with the new constitution 
that took effect in 2000. 
The reform of the nuclear energy legislation 
has proceeded to a stage where the statutes will be 
implemented. The Government Bill on the amend-
ment of the Nuclear Energy Act is being debated 
in Parliament committees. The amended Nuclear 
Energy Decree and four new Government decrees 
are being finalised at the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.
The amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act 
will be debated in Parliament in 2008. The Nuclear 
Energy Decree and other Government decrees can 
be implemented after the Nuclear Energy Act has 
been passed. STUK submitted its statement on 
the decrees in question to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in December 2007, enclosing the 
statement of the Advisory committee on Nuclear 
Safety. 
Updates of YVL guides have been 
prepared and implemented
STUK prepared the last updates of the yvL guides 
in their current form and issued decisions on their 
implementation. yvL guides are detailed safety 
regulations for nuclear facilities, issued by STUK 
on the basis of the Nuclear Energy Act and the rel-
1 990/1987
2 161/1988
3 395–398/1991, 478/1999
evant Government Decision. The guides describe 
STUK’s regulatory procedures as well. STUK is-
sues a separate decision on how a new or revised 
yvL guide applies to operating nuclear facilities, 
or those under construction and to licensee opera-
tions.
No new yvL guides were completed in 2007, 
but the work on all of the guides being processed 
proceeded so that they can be implemented before 
the entry into force of the Government decrees. 
In the application decision for Guide yvL 1.1, 
STUK specified for Teollisuuden voima Oy when 
the following plant documents delivered to STUK 
for approval can be adopted:
•	 The	Probabilistic	Risk	Assessment	(PRA)	can	be	
adopted after it has been approved according to 
the licensee’s internal procedure and delivered 
to STUK for approval.
•	 The	 Final	 Safety	Analysis	 Report	 (FSAR)	 can	
be adopted after delivery to STUK to the extent 
that the changed data have been approved by 
STUK separately.
•	 Amendments	 to	 the	 classification	 document	
must be approved by STUK prior to adoption.
In the implementation decision for Guide yvL 3.3, 
STUK required document updates by the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant, such as those related to up-
Figure 4. Number of yearly published YVL guides.
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Table 1. Implementation decisions of previously published YVL guides issued by STUK  
per nuclear facility in 2007.
Guide
Loviisa 
1&2
Olkiluoto 
1&2 Olkiluoto 3
FiR 1  
research 
reactor
YVL 1.1, Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities, 10 Feb 2006 • • • •
YVL 3.3, Pipings at nuclear facilities, 26 Jun 2006 • • •
YVL 7.1, Limitation of public exposure in the environment of and limitation of 
radioactive releases from a nuclear power plant, 22 Mar 2006
• • •
YVL 7.6, Monitoring of discharges of radioactive substances from a nuclear power 
plant, 22 Mar 2006
• • •
YVL 7.7, Radiation monitoring in the environment of a nuclear power plant, 22 Mar 
2006
• • •
YVL 7.8, Environmental radiation safety reports of a nuclear power plant, 22 Mar 
2006
• • •
YVL 7.11, Radiation monitoring systems and equipment of a nuclear power plant, 
13.7.2004*
•
*The implementation of Guide YVL 7.11 for operating nuclear facilities has been decided in 2005.
date notes to be recorded in plant documentation. 
STUK approved the interpretations presented by 
Teollisuuden voima Oy concerning the application 
of the guide at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
Approval required specifications to the utility’s 
guidelines, such as those ensuring the precondi-
tions for regulation by STUK.
In the implementation decision for Guide yvL 
7.1, STUK required that the utilities deliver an as-
sessment of the containment of radioactive releases 
using the best available technology and update the 
descriptions in the Safety Analysis Report. 
In the decision issued to Fortum Power and 
heat Oy on the application of Guide yvL 7.6, 
STUK pointed out that, according to the guide, the 
laboratory analyses of releases must be carried 
out at laboratories that comply with the require-
ments of appropriate standards. STUK required 
that an independent evaluation of the laboratory 
at the Loviisa nuclear power plant be conducted in 
view of applicable standards. Furthermore, STUK 
required that the utility updates the description of 
the release routes of gaseous substances, included 
in the Safety Analysis Report. In the decision is-
sued to Teollisuuden voima Oy, STUK required 
that that the radioactive iodine and aerosol releas-
es through the exhaust gas pipe must be measured 
using a fixed, continuously operating radiation 
measurement system. This requirement must be 
met in connection with the upgrade of radiation 
measurement systems in progress at the Olkiluoto 
plant.
The revision of YVL guides is progressing
The structural revision of the yvL guides was ini-
tiated in 2005 by assessing the existing guides and 
defining the development objectives. The overall ob-
jective is to improve the internal consistency of the 
guides and, in particular, clarify the requirements 
laid down in the guides. The requirements will be 
numbered to make it easier to find the individual 
requirements in the guides and to control compli-
ance with them. This will also enable amending 
the guides with regard to individual requirements.
The overall revision will be implemented in four 
stages. higher-level and system-level guides will be 
prepared at the initial stage, and the next stages 
will cover the revision of component-level guides. 
The objective is to have the new set of STUK-yvL 
guides completed by the end of 2011. 
working groups composed of representatives of 
Finnish nuclear utilities and vTT, the Technical 
Research centre of Finland, have been set up to 
support STUK’s experts in the preparation of each 
new guide. The working groups will discuss the 
main content of the guides during their prepara-
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tion, thus reducing the overall period of time spent 
in their preparation. The follow-up group set up for 
the entire project, composed of representatives of 
STUK, the utilities and vTT, convened two times 
in 2007. 
The preparation of five guides of the new type, 
started the previous year, was continued in 2007. 
Experiences of the preparation of the first guides 
will be compiled during the spring of 2008. In ad-
dition, the preparation of a number of new guides 
was planned to begin in 2007. Preliminary drafts 
of these guides were prepared. The plan according 
to the preparatory procedure for STUK guides was 
drawn up for four guides.
Figure 5. The hierarchy of the nuclear safety 
regulations.
 Constitution Parliament
 Acts Parliament
 Decrees President, Government  or Ministries
 YVL Guides STUK (nuclear and radiation safety)
Technical standards Standardisation Organisations 
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4 Nuclear facilities’ regulation 
and regulation results in 2007
preventive maintenance. The number of events was 
low and their risk significance slight. The safety 
systems have functioned as planned during events. 
The safety significance of operational transients 
and detected component failures was low.
The accident risk at the Loviisa power plant 
has reduced and risk factors have been elimi-
nated effectively. In 2007, a new seawater line was 
completed that enables alternatively taking the 
sea water necessary for cooling the plant during 
shutdown from the discharge channel. This modi-
fication significantly reduces the risk in situations 
where algae, frazil ice or an oil spill could endanger 
the normal intake of sea water.
The Loviisa plant employs an ageing manage-
ment programme aimed at guiding the mainte-
nance and modifications at the entire plant so that 
the plant can be used safely throughout is lifetime. 
Investments have been continued according to 
long-term plans. During the year, the management 
of spare parts was found to require development. 
Most of the Loviisa I&c system upgrade work was 
postponed to 2008, but preparatory construction 
and installations were carried out at the plant.
Plant operation did not cause a radiation haz-
ard to workers, the population or environment. 
Occupational radiation doses and radioactive re-
leases into the environment were low and clearly 
below authorised limits. Emergency preparedness 
at the Loviisa power plant is in compliance with 
regulatory requirements. The functionality of the 
emergency response was tested during an emer-
gency exercise organised at the end of November.
The Loviisa power plant has developed its qual-
ity assurance system on a long-term basis. The 
system is mostly functional and comprehensively 
regulated. Observations made during the year in-
dicate that the Loviisa power plant must continue 
to develop its procedures related to operational 
planning, monitoring of the attainment of objec-
4.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment 
of the Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa plant units were 
operated safely in 2007
In 2007, the safety of the Loviisa plant was subject 
to more intensive and extensive assessment than 
usual due to the renewal of the plant’s operating li-
cence. STUK reviewed the safety review drawn up 
by the licensee, which included an evaluation of the 
plant’s condition and operation during the previous 
licence term and an estimate on the development of 
the plant’s condition and its operating organisation 
during the next licence term. According to STUK’s 
assessment, the facility is safe and operated well, 
based on which it supported the extension of the 
operating licence.
The condition of the multiple barriers contain-
ing releases of radioactive substances has re-
mained good. There were no leaking fuel rods at 
the plant in 2007. A significant follow-up item that 
has an impact on the integrity of the reactor pres-
sure vessels at both plant units is the tightness of 
the corrosion protection pipes in the penetrations 
of vessel heads. No indications of deterioration 
were observed in the inspections of the reactor 
pressure vessel and piping performed during the 
annual maintenance outages at the plant units. 
The results of annual tests prove that the leak-
tightness of the containment and isolation valves 
has remained good.
Plant operation has been systematic and in 
compliance with the Technical Specifications and 
guidelines, with two exceptions. The condition of 
components and systems designed to prevent ac-
cidents and mitigate their impact has remained 
good. The number of component failures has been 
low. No indications of deterioration in the condition 
of components were detected in periodic tests and 
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tives, the working environment, and monitoring 
of the implementation of modification projects and 
their schedules.
human resource planning at the Loviisa power 
plant is based on a ten-year plan, which is sub-
ject to annual management review and updating. 
About 50 new staff were recruited at the plant in 
2007. Attention must still be paid to the sufficiency 
of personnel resources in duties important to nu-
clear safety, such as quality control, quality assur-
ance, risk assessment and radiation protection. 
Personnel training activities at the Loviisa power 
plant have been organised appropriately. however, 
the implementation of the familiarisation pro-
grammes for new personnel and persons changing 
duties must be developed.
4.1.2 Oversight and observations
Operating licence
In its statement, STUK supported 
the extension of the Loviisa 
plants’ operating licence. 
To prepare for the statement submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, STUK conducted 
a safety assessment on the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant, based on STUK’s inspections and reviews 
of the issues and documents related to the operat-
ing licence application, a review of the applicant’s 
own safety review and the results of oversight. 
STUK requested a statement from the Ministry of 
the Interior on emergency preparedness and physi-
cal protection, and a statement from the Advisory 
committee on Nuclear Safety on STUK’s draft 
statement.
STUK started the review of documents in 2006, 
and the work was continued in 2007 according 
to a predefined schedule. The key areas for re-
view comprised lifetime management, plant safety, 
safety analyses, issues related to plant operation 
and the safety culture, as well as environmental 
and nuclear waste-related issues. On the basis of 
STUK’s observations, the applicant supplemented 
the documentation during the spring of 2007.
Based on the existing licences granted by STUK, 
the reactor pressure vessels may continue to be 
used at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 until 2012 and 
2010, respectively. Further use requires renewed 
licences, but there are no foreseeable obstacles for 
the continued use of the reactor pressure vessels 
after the expiry of the current licences. If neces-
sary, the reactor pressure vessel can be annealed 
at spots subject to embrittlement due to neutron 
radiation. The time for the potential annealing will 
be determined on the basis of analyses.
Safety enhancements must be continued dur-
ing the new operating licence term. For example, 
the risk arising from primary circuit coolant leaks 
directly outside the containment must be reduced. 
Improvements aimed at preventing reactor coolant 
Extending the lifetime of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant by 20 years from the original design 
base is based on the assessments made within 
the lifetime management programme. The lifetime 
management programme and the related know-
how have been developed actively and systemati-
cally at the Loviisa power plant. From the perspec-
tive of lifetime extension, it is essential that the 
plant has in place adequate procedures to ensure 
that the condition of the plant has been investi-
gated in depth and that the phenomena related to 
ageing can be identified early enough. The fatigue 
analyses of components imposing limits on the 
plant’s lifetime have been updated to correspond 
with the 50-year lifetime. Since the first years of 
operation, a number of improvements have been 
implemented at both units to reduce the risk of 
embrittlement in the reactor pressure vessel due 
to neutron radiation. The strength of the reactor 
pressure vessel is controllable over the 50-year 
lifetime.
The design bases concerning the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant were mostly laid down during 
the 1970s. The objective during the operation of the 
plant has been to continuously improve plant safe-
ty. Substantial modernisations have been carried 
out at the Loviisa nuclear power plant since its 
commissioning, and extensive modifications have 
been implemented in several systems. Examples 
of improvements implemented in areas identified 
through probabilistic risk analysis during the 
past operating licence term include securing the 
cooling of main coolant pump seals was well as 
improvements to the plant’s residual heat removal 
and emergency cooling systems. In addition, modi-
fications were implemented in the containment 
systems to improve control of severe reactor ac-
cidents.
STUK-B 92
25
pump seal leaks shall be continued in view of fire 
and flood situations. Precautions against potential 
oil accidents in the Gulf of Finland must be further 
improved by, e.g. developing the emergency prepar-
edness for oil-combating in the neighbouring area 
and the instructions relating to outage situations. 
In order to decrease the possibility of a reactivity 
accident, the accidental flow of unborated coolant 
into the primary circuit must be more reliably pre-
vented. The risks arising from heavy load lifting 
must be further reduced by improving the struc-
tural reliability of the crane and developing the 
procedures relating to lifting. The licensee has pre-
sented a long-term plan for reducing the accident 
and release risk, and for supplementing the exist-
ing Probabilistic Risk Assessment. STUK oversees 
the implementation of the programme.
According to STUK’s assessment, Fortum Power 
and heat Oy aims to maintain an advanced safety 
culture. however, the safety culture could be ad-
vanced in a more systematic manner with the sup-
port of experts in organisational research. STUK 
will follow the development of the safety culture. 
Attention will be paid to the sufficiency of person-
nel at the Loviisa power plant during the new op-
erating licence term. The utilisation of operational 
experience feedback to improve safety should also 
be improved.
The assessment pertaining to the extension of 
the operating licences for the Loviisa plant units 
was carried out on the basis of currently valid leg-
islation. The nature of the planned amendments to 
nuclear energy legislation is such that they would 
not have affected the conclusions of the assess-
ment.
STUK’s statement was completed on 5 july 2007, 
and STUK supported the extension of the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant’s operating licence. According 
to STUK’s judgment, continued operation at Loviisa 
is safe and in compliance with statutory require-
ments. In its statement, STUK remarked that two 
periodic safety reviews of the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant are due during the next licence term. The first 
one must be submitted to STUK for approval by 
the end of 2015, and the second by the end of 2023. 
Extensive plant modifications and safety improve-
ments will be implemented at the beginning of the 
new licence term. STUK considered it important 
that the first overall safety assessment should be 
conducted soon afterwards.
The operating licence granted to the 
Loviisa plant units extends their 
lifetime until the age of 50 years.
The previous operating licence of the Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant was valid until 31 December 2007. 
On 1 November 2006, Fortum Power and heat Oy 
submitted an application to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to extend the operating licence for 
Loviisa 1 until the end of 2027 and for Loviisa 2 
until the end of 2030. The terms applied for meant 
adding 20 years to the plants’ lifetime, resulting in 
an aggregate energy-generating life of more than 
50 years for each plant unit. The Ministry of Trade 
and Industry requested a statement on the ap-
plication from STUK, among others. At the same 
time, the utility submitted to STUK the reports ac-
cording to section 36 of the Nuclear Energy Decree 
and the periodic safety review according to Guide 
yvL 1.1. 
On 26 july 2007, the Government granted 
operating licences for the Loviisa plant units, 
covering the terms Fortum Power and heat had 
applied for. The licence conditions include the re-
quirement that the licensee must submit periodic 
safety reviews to STUK by the end of 2015 and 
2023. STUK’s statement, the safety assessment, 
the review of the documents according to section 36 
of the Nuclear Energy Decree and the statement 
of the Advisory committee on Nuclear Safety are 
available on STUK’s website at www.stuk.fi.
Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
In connection with the renewal of the operating li-
cence, the licensee has reviewed all of the analyses 
of transient and accident situations at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant and revised them to the extent 
required on the basis of modifications carried out 
at the plant or amendments to regulatory require-
ments. Since the previous operating licence was 
granted, STUK has revised the guidelines defining 
the classification of initiating events on the basis 
of frequency, providing instructions for conducting 
the analyses and laying down acceptance criteria 
for the analyses. The adoption of new procedures 
for transient and accident situations at the Loviisa 
plant in 2006 is one of the changes resulting in the 
need to revise the accident analyses.
The analyses discuss anticipated operational 
transients and postulated accidents used as the 
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design basis of the safety systems, as well as so-
called severe accidents. All initiating events have 
been classified into these classes on the basis of 
their frequency. Each class contains a variety of 
transient and accident sequences, and separate 
analyses have been presented for each. All safety-
critical analyses include sensitivity analyses, often 
of considerable scope.
STUK verified the analyses submitted by the 
licensee, and the methods used in them. In order 
to ascertain the reliability of the results, STUK 
commissioned independent comparative analyses 
of the most significant safety-related events at the 
Loviisa plant units. These analyses also included 
safety analyses, required for assessing the uncer-
tainties relating to calculating methods and as-
sumptions.
On the basis of the verifications carried out by 
STUK and the analyses commissioned, the results 
of the deterministic analyses revised by the licen-
see fulfil the acceptance criteria presented in the 
revised guidelines.
In connection with the licence renewal, the li-
censee has also prepared a plan on actions aimed 
at further enhancing the safety of the plant units in 
the future, necessitating a revision of the analyses. 
The most significant upgrade at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant during the next few years is the I&c 
upgrade, which entails an update of almost all of the 
analyses of transient and accident situations. STUK 
followed the implementation of these plans during 
2007.
Probabilistic risk analyses
Fortum Power and heat Oy submitted the revised 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant for the processing of the op-
erating licence application to STUK. The analysis 
has been developed and supplemented with regard 
to flood and weather events during power opera-
tion and the modelling of fires and seismic events. 
The calculation of releases into the environment 
has been made more specific by revising the model 
for the migration of radioactive substances. The 
supplemented analysis also includes a preliminary 
estimate on the risk of a radioactive release during 
outage situations. According to STUK’s observa-
tions, however, the outage risk analysis must be 
specified further.
The risks of power operation and annual main-
tenance outages are of the same order of magni-
tude. During power operation, the most significant 
risk factors comprise breaks in the control rod 
drive mechanism cooling system and reactor cool-
ant pump seal leaks. During an annual mainte-
nance outage, the most significant risks include 1) 
dropping of a heavy load in the reactor building, 
2) a sudden increase in reactor power if unborated 
cooling water is accidentally fed into the reactor, 
and 3) introduction of oil into the plant’s sea water 
channel due to a shipping accident.
On the basis of the review, STUK required the 
utility to present a plan to reduce the plant’s risks. 
Safety improvements presented in the utility’s plan 
include: 1) improved reliability of break isola-
tion in the control rod drive mechanism cooling 
piping, 2) securing the control of reactor coolant 
pump seal leaks in fire situations, 3) installation 
of on-line boron analysers to prevent the feeding of 
unborated water, 4) improving the procedures and 
equipment used for heavy load lifting, and 5) the 
further development of guidelines for oil risk situ-
ations. Significant upgrade projects are under way 
at the plant (e.g., the I&c upgrade project LARA), 
whose implementation will improve safety. The ma-
jority of the modifications will be implemented in 
2008–2010.
The utility also presented a plan for supple-
menting the analyses. The outage risk analysis will 
be specified further in 2008–2009, and the develop-
ment of outage instructions based on the analysis 
will be completed in 2012–2015.
Oversight of plant modifications
The I&C systems of the Loviisa 
power plant will be upgraded
The most important plant modification project at 
the Loviisa plant is the upgrade of the I&c sys-
tems of the plant units. The project started in 2004 
with the construction of a new I&c building, and 
the project is to be completed in 2014.
According to the plan, the upgrade will be im-
plemented phase by phase so that each upgraded 
system section will be available for commission-
ing during annual maintenance outages. The first 
phase was intended to be implemented at Loviisa 
1 during the 2007 annual maintenance, comprising 
the upgrade of the I&c of reactor power limitation 
and control rod control. however, the construc-
tion of the buildings for the new I&c system was 
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delayed, which resulted in delays concerning the 
buildings’ air conditioning and electrical installa-
tions, for example. STUK’s review in 2007 further 
showed that the plans for the first-phase I&c 
upgrade were not fully acceptable, and part of the 
necessary documentation could not be submitted to 
STUK on schedule. Therefore, the first phase could 
not be installed and commissioned at Loviisa 1, 
and was postponed to 2008. Preparatory construc-
tion and installations for 2008 were carried out in 
2007. STUK witnessed the installations in connec-
tion with the oversight of annual maintenance.
The postponement of the first-phase I&c up-
grade modifications at Loviisa 1 will delay the 
schedule for the next phases of the upgrade. 
Refuelling machines will be modernised
Fortum Power and heat has begun planning the 
modernisation of refuelling machines at Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2. The aim of the modernisation is to 
improve occupational safety and upgrade the I&c 
and electrical systems. The bridge of the refuelling 
machine will be made higher, which will enable the 
refuelling machine to move over the permanent 
safety railings to be constructed around the fuel 
pool. In 2007, the utility presented the concep-
tual design of the refuelling machine to STUK and 
submitted documentation concerning the safety 
functions and safety classification to STUK for ap-
proval.
Pre-operational testing of the waste 
solidification facility continued
A solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste 
has been constructed on the Loviisa plant site. 
The solidification facility processes the evapora-
tion residues generated at the power plant and the 
radioactive ion exchange resins from the purifica-
tion filters. The aim is for, in the first phase, normal 
operation to begin with the solidification of evapo-
ration residues. The utility continued facility-level 
pre-operational tests within the solidification facil-
ity implementation project (LOKIT), which started 
in 2006. STUK reviewed the solidification facility 
test programmes and their results according to the 
follow-up plan. After an inspection of the radiation 
protection arrangements, STUK gave permission 
to continue the tests with radioactive liquid evapo-
ration residues and witnessed the tests. Needs for 
improvement, such as those concerning level meas-
urements, were observed during the tests, due to 
which the tests will be carried out again in 2008 
once the measurements function reliably.
Intake of cooling water is being 
ensured through modifications
A project to ensure shutdown reactor cooling (the 
EScO1 project) is under way at the Loviisa plant. 
The project includes the construction of an alterna-
tive seawater intake route from the east side of the 
plant site. The new water intake alternative can be 
used, for example, if a large oil spill or a bed of al-
gae prevents the operation of normal water intake 
on the west side. At the end of 2007, the new sea-
water intake route was completed at Loviisa 1 and 
the construction of a new route at Loviisa 2 was in 
the final stages. In addition, an oil combating plan 
for the new water intake site is necessary in case of 
threatening oil damage situations.
The importance of preparing for oil hazards has 
become emphasised during the past few years as 
oil transports in the Gulf of Finland have increased 
significantly. In its safety assessment related to 
the operating licence renewal for the Loviisa power 
plant, STUK paid attention to the fact that the 
implementation of an alternative water intake 
and the preparation of an oil combating plan 
have been delayed compared with the approved 
schedules. STUK has requested the Loviisa power 
plant to submit a description of the oil combating 
arrangements at the power plant. The description 
must cover the alerting arrangements, the avail-
able equipment, the locations for oil booms, the 
arrangements for co-operation with the Finnish 
Environment Institute and the regional fire and 
rescue services, as well as training and instruc-
tions.
Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical Specifications
STUK controlled compliance with the Technical 
Specifications at the Loviisa power plant by wit-
nessing operations on-site. Specific areas of control 
included the testing and repair of components sub-
ject to the Technical Specifications. After the com-
pletion of the annual maintenances at Loviisa 1 and 
2, STUK verified the state of the plant units in com-
pliance with the Technical Specifications and that 
the Technical Specifications had been appropriately 
updated before giving permission for start-up.
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Figure 6. INES classified events at the Loviisa plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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Two events occurred at the Loviisa plant re-
sulting in non-compliance with the Technical 
Specifications. The safety significance of both 
events was low but, as a result, actions to improve 
safety were initiated. In addition, the utility ap-
plied for the approval of seven deviations from the 
Technical Specifications. Five of the applications 
concerned prolonged repairs of component mal-
functions. In the future, attention must be paid to 
this issue, as all faults should be repaired within 
the time limits set in the Technical Specifications. 
STUK approved the applications after analysis 
(Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2).
The Technical Specifications of the Loviisa pow-
er plant are currently up-to-date, and the document 
is sufficiently easy and clear to use. The number of 
deviations from and non-conformances with the 
Technical Specifications is low, indicating that the 
plant has been operated in a manner that ensures 
good nuclear safety.
Operation and operational events
One resident inspector is employed at the Loviisa 
power plant to oversee the operation of both plant 
units on a daily basis. In addition, operation is 
controlled according to a systematic programme 
drafted for this purpose. As a new feature, STUK’s 
periodic inspection programme includes inspec-
tions of operating activities performed on a quar-
terly basis since the beginning of 2007. In these 
inspections, utility representatives present signifi-
cant issues related to nuclear and radiation safety 
and operation and maintenance activities, as well 
as the situation of corrective action initiated due to 
events reported to STUK. The inspections include 
rounds in various areas of the plant. Significant 
issues related to operation were not raised in the 
inspections. In connection with the inspections, 
STUK required improvements to housekeeping at 
the plant and the storage of goods and the marking 
of storage areas at the plant.
The impact of inoperabilities resulting from 
component malfunctions, preventive maintenance 
and other events on the annual accident risk was 
very low, rating about 0.9% at Loviisa 1 and about 
2% at Loviisa 2. A few individual component mal-
functions and the preventive maintenance of the 
subsystems of the auxiliary feed water system 
were most significant in terms of risk.
Operation and operational events
The Loviisa plant units operated reliably in 2007. 
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 94.6% and that of 
Loviisa 2 was 96.1%.
The duration of the annual maintenance out-
age was 20 days at Loviisa 1 and 15 days at 
Loviisa 2. In addition, brief reductions in output 
capacity occurred in both plant units due to 
technical failures. The most significant of these 
were a turbine shutdown at Loviisa 1 for repair 
of a hydrogen leak in a generator, and damage to 
and repair of a support bearing in a main service 
water pump. Production losses in nominal output 
caused by component malfunctions were low as a 
whole, 0.34% at Loviisa 1 and 0.23% at Loviisa 2. 
Production losses from component malfunctions 
over a longer time period are depicted by the indi-
cators in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.1g).
Table 2. Events at the Loviisa plant units subject to special reports by the utility. The table shows events due to 
which the plant unit was in non-compliance with the Technical Specifications. All events subject to reporting are 
discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1). Appendix 3 describes events subject to special reports in more detail.
Event Non-compliances with the 
Technical Specifications
Special report INES rating
Power-failure of diesel-backed switchgears at Loviisa 1 • • 0
Faulty status of the connection between diesel generator DC systems at 
Loviisa 2 
• • 0
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Figure 7. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa 
plant in 2007.
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Annual maintenance at Loviisa 1
The short refuelling outage at Loviisa 1 was car-
ried out between 18 August and 7 September 2007, 
taking two days longer than planned. Reasons for 
the longer duration included servicing four main 
coolant pumps instead of two, and the repair of an 
isolation valve of the special sewerage of the con-
tainment at the end of the outage.
Two malfunctions in power supply occurred 
during the Loviisa 1 outage: malfunction of an 
over-current relay on 22 August 2007 (resulting in 
non-compliance with the Technical Specifications, 
indicator A.I.1g) and a malfunction in the na-
tional grid on 24 August 2007. The events did not 
compromise plant safety.
In addition to refuelling, the annual mainte-
nance included normal servicing operations and 
inspections, and servicing of four reactor coolant 
pumps. Maintenance of the secondary circuit in-
cluded servicing of service water pumps. Turbine 
and generator inspections were carried out, and 
preparations were made for the replacement of a 
generator stator in 2008. As a modification opera-
tion, a rewound reactor coolant pump motor was 
installed during the annual maintenance. As a 
safety-improving modification, the blow-down sys-
tem pipe for two steam generators was duplicated. 
On a steam generator, one end of a defective heat 
transfer tube was plugged, which could not be per-
formed in 2006.
Annual maintenance at Loviisa 2
The refuelling outage at Loviisa 2 began on 8 
September 2007 and ended on 23 September 2007, 
about four hours ahead of schedule. The outage 
was the shortest in the Loviisa plant’s history, tak-
ing 14 days and 21 hours. 
Three new cracked buses were detected in the 
6kV switchgear, which were repaired. This rep-
resents an ageing phenomenon only evident at 
Loviisa 2, due to the structure of the buses, which 
will be monitored in the future as well.
In addition to refuelling, the annual mainte-
nance included servicing operations and inspec-
tions, inspections of reactor pressure vessel head 
sealing grooves and servicing of two reactor cool-
ant pumps. During the outage, one service water 
pump was serviced and one pump was replaced. 
6kV switchgear buses were inspected to detect 
potential new cracks. The annual outage also 
included turbine and generator inspections. As a 
safety-improving modification, the blow-down sys-
tem pipe for one steam generator was duplicated.
Figure 8. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
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Annual maintenance outages
Based on STUK’s oversight, it could be determined 
that the annual maintenance at the Loviisa power 
plant was planned well and implemented safely.
96 days during normal working hours were 
spent on overseeing annual maintenance outages. 
In addition, one resident inspector worked regu-
larly on-site. The oversight of annual maintenance 
outages also included a total of 89 inspection days 
outside working hours.
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Plant maintenance and ageing management
In 2007, STUK evaluated the report on ageing man-
agement at the Loviisa plant submitted by Fortum 
Power and heat Oy. The documents describe the 
principles and implementation of lifetime manage-
ment, and the condition and lifetime extension bas-
es of components, structures and systems. STUK 
found that the ageing management programme in 
the proposed form is deficient compared with the 
requirements contained in Guides yvL 5.2 and 
yvL 5.5. The utility has been requested to present 
a plan for remedying the deficiencies. 
STUK also inspected the maintenance of quali-
fication for systems, components and structures 
at the Loviisa power plant. STUK required that 
the maintenance of qualification is developed to 
make it more systematic, taking into account the 
traceability of qualification, any changes taking 
place during plant operation, updates to safety 
analyses and amendments to the qualification re-
quirements. The utility submitted the programme 
concerning the maintenance and follow-up of the 
Loviisa power plant towards the end of 2007.
STUK assessed the ageing management proc-
ess of the power plant and verified the information 
contained in the submitted documents through 
annual periodic inspections on-site. STUK has 
found that the availability of qualified spare parts 
for some I&c components is poor. Fortum Power 
and heat Oy has started the procurement of spare 
parts meeting the requirements for neutron flux 
detectors, for example, which are used during reac-
tor start-up and shutdown.
STUK reviewed the plans for modifications in 
the electrical and I&c systems and supervised 
some of the commissioning inspections of modifi-
cations. Significant repair and maintenance op-
erations concerning electrical components included 
the replacement of reactor coolant pump and sea 
water pump motors. During the annual mainte-
nances, STUK oversaw the periodic inspections 
and testing of electrical and I&c systems and 
components. The electrical engineering and I&c 
technology section of the Loviisa power plant’s 
inspection organisation carried out more than 40 
commissioning inspections after the modifications 
of safety-classified systems.
No significant observations concerning the age-
ing management of mechanical components were 
made during annual maintenance at the Loviisa 
plant units. In-service inspections of the reactor 
pressure vessel and the main coolant piping ac-
cording to Guide yvL 3.8 were carried out as a 
duty of the licensee at both plant units. STUK’s 
oversight included the approval of the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections, oversight of 
the inspections and review of the results on-site. 
The final result reports will be submitted to STUK 
for approval after the annual maintenance. STUK 
reviewed on-site the results of the condition moni-
toring inspections of the secondary circuit piping 
made by the licensee.
In inspections performed during annual mainte-
nances in 2004, the utility detected water between 
the penetration nozzle pipe and its inner corrosion 
protection pipe in two penetrations for control rod 
drive mechanisms in the reactor pressure vessel 
heads at both of the Loviisa plant units. At the up-
per end of the seal weld of the protection sleeve wa-
ter seeps in through a crack, which expands when 
the structure cools down during reactor shutdown. 
when the structure warms up to operating tem-
perature, the water remains inside and may cause 
bulging of the sleeve. The inspections were carried 
out on the basis of operational experience feedback 
from vvER plants of the same type. After detec-
tion, the penetration nozzles have been inspected 
annually using Tv cameras, and no bulging caused 
by water or other visible changes have been ob-
served. At Loviisa 2, the assemblies were repaired 
by replacing the corrosion protection pipes during 
the 2006 outage. A corresponding repair will be 
carried out at Loviisa 1 during the 2008 annual 
maintenance outage.
At Loviisa 1, the fastening bolts of the reactor 
core support basket were inspected at the loca-
tions of replaced fuel elements and control rods. 
The bolts were verified to be securely in place. A 
dye penetrant test was carried out on the sealing 
grooves of the flange surface of the reactor pres-
sure vessel. No defects were found in the inner 
sealing grooves repaired in 2006. The cracks in the 
outer sealing grooves detected the same year and 
not repaired had not increased. Furthermore, a 
few new cracks were detected in the outer sealing 
grooves, which were not repaired and will be moni-
tored. On one steam generator, one end of one heat 
transfer tube was plugged. This had not been per-
formed in 2006, as the mouth of the tube had to be 
ground before plugging and the workers were not 
STUK-B 92
31
prepared for it. In addition, condensate chambers 
were installed on two steam generators to enable 
stabilising water level measurement. STUK ap-
proved the related structural designs and trial run 
programmes before the annual maintenance out-
ages. In addition, during the annual maintenance, 
pressuriser main safety valves and three reactor 
coolant pumps were serviced and inspected, and 
the control rod drive mechanisms were serviced. 
Steam generator main safety valves underwent 
annual testing before the outage.
The sealing grooves at flange level in the reac-
tor pressure vessel were also inspected at Loviisa 
2. The old cracks had not increased, but a new 
spot-type defect indication was detected in the 
surface area between the second and third grooves. 
The new defect was not repaired as, according to 
the utility’s action plan, the sealing surface will 
be repaired at one plant unit in 2008. In addition, 
the pressuriser safety valve control valves, steam 
generator main safety valves, two reactor coolant 
pumps and control rod drive mechanisms were 
serviced and inspected as at Loviisa 1.
There were two periodic inspections of pressure 
equipment in STUK’s inspection area at each plant 
unit. STUK supervised at both plant units inspec-
tions of safety class 3 and 4, as well as class EyT 
(non-nuclear) pressure equipment performed by 
inspection organisations.
During the year, STUK made a total of 132 
construction inspections and inspections of on-site 
modifications and repairs, as well as 10 commis-
sioning inspections.
Radiation safety 
Occupational radiation safety
On the basis of documents submitted by Fortum 
Power and heat Oy, STUK approved the use of the 
dosimetry system of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
until 2011. Revisions of the dosimetry instructions 
and procedures will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval in 2008. The dosimeters used for measuring 
the occupational radiation doses underwent an an-
nual test with acceptable results. The test comprises 
irradiating a sample of dosimeters at STUK’s meas-
urement standard laboratory and determination of 
the doses at the power plant. 
STUK carried out a radiation protection in-
spection according to the periodic inspection pro-
gramme at the Loviisa plant, covering the resourc-
es, expertise and operation of the radiation protec-
tion organisation. STUK required the Loviisa plant 
to develop its operations further and, among other 
things, intensify the radiation protection training 
of work planners and organise preliminary prac-
tice for demanding maintenance operations.
STUK carried out outage radiation protection 
inspections during the annual maintenances at the 
Loviisa plant units. The inspections showed that 
the plant has developed the radiation signs and 
labelling of work areas, for example. STUK will 
continue inspections to assess the use of radiation 
work permits at the plant, contamination monitor-
ing during annual maintenance and guidance con-
cerning work areas. The Loviisa plant’s radiation 
protection guidelines are being developed further 
with regard to surface contamination measure-
ments, for example. The plant is also assessing 
whether changing the order of annual mainte-
nances in the future would be useful in terms of 
implementing more efficient radiation protection.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 0.41 
manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.32 manSv at Loviisa 1. 
According to STUK guidelines, the threshold for 
one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over two 
successive years is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of 
net electrical power. This means a collective dose 
value of 1.22 manSv per each Loviisa plant unit. 
This value was not exceeded at either plant unit. 
The collective dose of the Loviisa plant units was 
a record low in operating history. The collective 
occupational dose at the Loviisa units in 2007 was 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations
During the operating year, one new pressure equip-
ment manufacturer was authorised for the Loviisa 
power plant. Three testing organisation authorisa-
tions according to Guide YVL 1.3 were granted. In 
addition, three testing organisations were author-
ised to conduct in-service inspections according to 
Guide YVL 3.8. The authorisation of the inspection 
organisation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
was renewed for five years. In addition, a separate 
unit of the inspection organisation was authorised 
to carry out inspections in the electrical and I&C 
area. The licence of one testing organisation was 
withdrawn due to lack of accreditation.
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also low compared with the average level of PwRs 
in the OEcD countries. 
The annual collective radiation dose mainly ac-
cumulates in operations performed during annual 
maintenance outages. The collective radiation dose 
due to operations during the outage at Loviisa 1 
was 0.37 manSv, while the highest individual ra-
diation dose incurred during the outage amounted 
to 6.27 mSv. The collective radiation dose due to 
operations during the annual maintenance outage 
at Loviisa 2 was 0.28 manSv, while the highest in-
dividual radiation dose incurred during the outage 
amounted to 5.34 mSv. The highest radiation dose 
incurred during the outages at both plant units 
was 9.82 mSv. 
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants in 2007 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
The majority of the radioactive substances gener-
ated during nuclear reactor operation originate in 
nuclear fuel and the reactor cooling system, as well 
as the related purification and waste systems. The 
liquid and atmospheric releases from the plant are 
purified and delayed so that their radiation impact 
on the environment is very low compared with the 
impact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The releases are carefully measured to 
ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits. The calculated radiation dose of the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
has been less than one per cent of the set limit of 
0.1 millisievert during the past few years.
STUK required the Loviisa plant to assess not 
only the development of the weather mast system 
on-site, but also that of off-site real-time additional 
measurements and the related predictive models 
in 2007–2009 with regard to the spreading of any 
atmospheric releases.
The current programme for environmental radi-
ation monitoring in the surroundings of the Loviisa 
power plant has been approved for 2003–2007. 
Experts at the utility and the independent labora-
tory carrying out measurements presented their 
experiences and development needs for the new 
period extending until 2012. The programme will 
be submitted in its final form to STUK for approval 
at the beginning of 2008.
STUK reviewed the Loviisa plant’s quarterly 
and annual reports on radioactive releases and 
environmental monitoring.
Releases from the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
into the environment in 2007 were significantly 
below the prescribed limits. Releases of radioac-
tive noble gases into the air were approximately 
5.5 TBq, which is approximately 0.03% of the au-
thorised limit. The releases of radioactive noble 
gases were dominated by argon-41, i.e. the acti-
vation product of argon-40, originating in the air 
space between the reactor pressure vessel and the 
main concrete shield. The releases of radioactive 
iodine isotopes into the air were about 0.7 MBq, 
i.e. approximately 0.0004% of the authorised limit. 
Aerosol releases were approximately 0.1 GBq, tri-
tium releases approximately 0.2 TBq and car-
bon-14 releases approximately 0.2 TBq. 
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, i.e. 16 TBq, is approximately 11% of 
the release limit. The total activity of other nu-
clides released into the sea was about 0.4 GBq, i.e. 
about 0.04% of the release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.05 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% of the set 
limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5). The radiation 
emitted by natural radioactive elements in the soil 
of the environment of the plant causes a person 
outdoors to incur an equivalent dose in about 15 
minutes.
A total of 317 samples were collected and ana-
lysed from the environment of the Loviisa power 
plant in 2007. A wide-ranging and comprehensive 
monitoring programme approved by STUK is being 
implemented in the surroundings of the nuclear 
power plant. The programme is extensive, and 
more than 300 samples are taken from air and 
terrestrial and marine environment surrounding 
the plant site each year. External background ra-
diation and the radioactivity of people in the vicin-
Table 3. Radioactive nuclides originating from the Lo-
viisa plant detected in environmental samples in 2007.
Sample Observed nuclides (number of samples)
Air Co-60 (2)
Aquatic plants Co-60 (6), Ag-110m (5), Mn-54 (1), Co-58 (3), 
Sb-124 (3)
Sediment Co-60 (7), Ag-110m (1)
Seawater H-3 (7)
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ity are also measured regularly. Extremely small 
amounts of radioactive substances originating in 
the nuclear power plant have been observed in 
some of the analysed samples. The amounts are so 
small that they are insignificant in terms of radia-
tion exposure.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the preparedness of the or-
ganisations operating nuclear power plants to act 
in abnormal situations. No such situations occurred 
at the Loviisa power plant in 2007. 
Emergency preparedness at the Loviisa pow-
er plant meets the key regulatory requirements, 
which was determined in a periodic inspection 
held in September 2007. The inspection focused 
on the reorganisation of the emergency response 
organisation’s premises, testing of the connections 
used for plant data transfer during an emergency 
situation and the securing of connections, and the 
development of the power plant’s internal alerting 
procedures. 
The Loviisa power plant and the Eastern 
Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services maintain in 
co-operation their preparedness for an accident at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant, e.g. by harmonis-
ing the support material used in emergency situ-
ations, such as map templates and measurement 
patrol routes, and by improving the transmission 
of measurement data so that it is collected directly 
in a common database.
The emergency exercise at the Loviisa power 
plant was held on 23 November 2007.
Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
The emphasis in terms of safety management was 
on the comprehensive assessment of the safety 
and operation of the plant (see section “Operating 
licence”). In addition, the IAEA carried out an 
OSART inspection of the Loviisa power plant in 
March 2007.
The safety management inspection at the 
Loviisa power plant focused on the substitute ar-
rangements for the responsible manager, the man-
agement of personnel resources and facilities, the 
management of safety and quality issues and the 
assessment and improvement of operations. STUK 
required the Loviisa power plant to clarify the sub-
stitute arrangements for the responsible manager 
and improve the monitoring of deadlines set by 
the authorities. STUK also emphasised that the 
systematic character, efficiency and effectiveness 
of operational planning must be improved further, 
and that particular attention must be paid to the 
implementation of self-assessment and manage-
ment reviews.
The responsible manager at the Loviisa power 
plant changed at the beginning of 2008. STUK 
approved the new responsible manager and his 
substitute on the basis of the application and as-
sessment discussions.
The management of the Loviisa power plant 
must pay attention to the operational planning and 
monitoring of the attainment of objectives, work-
ing rooms and personnel’s working conditions, as 
well as the monitoring of the implementation and 
schedules of modification projects. In 2008, STUK 
will carry out targeted inspections of operational 
planning, setting of objectives and the allocation of 
resources at the Loviisa power plant.
OSART review
OSART is a service provided by the Internal 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to its member coun-
tries, where an international Operational Safety 
Review Team conducts an extensive assessment 
of the operational safety of a nuclear power plant. 
The review team assesses the safety level of the 
power plant and identifies areas for improvement, 
to assist the plant in continuously improving its 
operational safety. The review team also identifies 
good practices and operating models employed at 
the plant that may benefit other power plants. The 
review visits are made at the request of the host 
country.
An OSART review covers eight areas: 
•	 management,	organisation	and	administration
•	 training	and	qualification	
•	 operations	
•	 maintenance	
•	 technical	support	
•	 radiation	protection	
•	 operational	experience	feedback	
•	 chemistry	
•	 emergency	planning	and	preparedness.
34
STUK-B 92
Quality management system 
STUK carried out an inspection where it assessed 
the functionality and scope of the Loviisa power 
plant’s quality assurance system and the quality 
management of procurement activities. 
The Loviisa power plant has a functional and 
comprehensively regulated quality assurance sys-
tem. Special attention has been paid to the system-
atic implementation of internal follow-up inspec-
tions, and a number of comprehensive inspections 
have been targeted at areas important to nuclear 
safety. The Loviisa power plant I&c system up-
grade project has had problems in terms of not 
only its schedule but also with supplier inspections 
related to procurement and the procedures applied 
at the power plant to monitor quality assurance in 
delivery projects. 
In 2008, STUK will follow improvements in the 
monitoring of the procurement procedure and sup-
pliers at the Loviisa power plant.
Personnel qualifications and training 
STUK carried out an inspection at the Loviisa 
power plant focusing on the development of ex-
pertise management, training activities and the 
organising of training activities. The inspection 
also covered the progress of the instructions and 
training subproject of the Loviisa I&c system up-
grade project and the qualification requirements 
for external subcontractors and work supervision 
and their training for annual maintenances in 
2007. The training activities and their organisa-
tion have been implemented appropriately at the 
Loviisa power plant. STUK required for particular 
attention to be paid to the orientation of new per-
sonnel and the implementation of familiarisation 
programmes and that the sufficiency of training 
facilities should be assessed. In addition, a suf-
ficient number of personnel must be allocated for 
the instruction and training subproject of the I&c 
system upgrade project and the plans must be up-
dated to reflect the changes in the project.
human resource planning at the Loviisa power 
plant is based on a ten-year plan, which is sub-
ject to annual management review and updating. 
Dozens of new personnel have been recruited at the 
plant during the year. The sufficiency of personnel 
resources has been found to be critical in a number 
of tasks, such as quality control, quality assurance, 
risk assessment and radiation protection.
The utility recruited six new personnel for op-
erator training during the year. STUK authorised 
seven new operator trainees with two-year licences 
on the basis of written examinations. Six people 
took the oral exam and were authorised as new 
operators. The operator licences of 17 people were 
renewed, one examination result was considered 
failed, and one operator licence expired during the 
year.
The occupational safety and health system 
(OhSAS 18001) is being developed at the plant. 
This was visible in 2007 in that attention was paid 
to the radiation protection and occupational safety 
of personnel and contractors, and the orderliness of 
the working environment, for example.
Operational experience feedback
Fortum has established a special Operational 
Experience Feedback Group (KKR) for the collec-
tion, screening, analysis and entry into process-
ing of operational experience data from other 
nuclear power plants. Group members have ex-
pertise in various areas of technology. Besides the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant, the group also serves 
Fortum’s other functions. The group’s key sourc-
es of information include the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO) as well as the 
IAEA and the OECD/NEA through the Incident 
Reporting System (IRS) maintained by them. The 
operational experience data processing group re-
views the reports received and investigates wheth-
er any of the events requires measures to be taken 
at the plant or in its procedures and instructions. 
The group provides recommendations for further 
processing and decisions to be made on possible 
further action. The Loviisa power plant receives 
operational experience data from VVER plants in 
the framework of co-operation in various fields of 
technology.
Reports were completed on all of the significant 
own events entered into processing at the Loviisa 
power plant in 2007. At its meetings in 2007, KKR 
handled a total of 48 event and investigation re-
ports concerning other power plants, of 800 reports 
pre-screened from various sources. KKR issued a 
recommendation on the radiation protection as-
sessment of the industrial radiography imaging 
performed at the plant.
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Operational experience feedback
Few events at the Loviisa power plant have called 
for a special report. In 2007, two non-conformances 
with the Technical Specifications concerning elec-
trical systems were reported. The safety signifi-
cance of both events was low. In the case of the first 
event, the utility also conducted a separate root 
cause analysis, based on which the procedures con-
cerning the co-ordination and implementation of 
modifications were made more specific, the phas-
ing of work in the work order system was specified 
further and the inspection instructions for electri-
cal installations were supplemented. In the second 
case, the causes were obvious, and corrective action 
comprised clarifying the technical causes of the 
event and eliminating their impacts.
A disturbance report must be drawn up on any 
significant operational disturbances. The number 
of such transients at the Loviisa power plant has 
remained moderate and, in 2007, disturbance re-
ports were drawn up on a total of eight events. No 
reactor scrams took place at the Loviisa plant units 
in 2007.
Internal processing at the plant and reporting 
is also required for low-level events or near-misses 
not subject to a special or disturbance report. 
Reports on such events are submitted to STUK for 
information if the event is or may be relevant to 
nuclear or radiation safety or STUK’s communica-
tion activities. In 2007, the Loviisa power plant 
submitted eight such event reports to STUK.
STUK reviewed the event reports submitted 
by the licensee and the annual summary of opera-
tional experience feedback activities. In addition, 
operational experience feedback activities were 
the subject of two inspections within the periodic 
inspection programme. In the inspection of opera-
tional experience feedback activities in 2007, it was 
remarked that only a few root cause analyses have 
been carried out at the Loviisa power plant in con-
nection with the most significant events over the 
past few years, which is due to the extremely heavy 
method. The power plant has already started to de-
velop the method in a lighter direction. In addition, 
attention was paid to the resources of international 
operational experience feedback activities, which 
were improved towards the end of 2007.
It was found in the inspection concerning the 
utilisation of international operational experience 
feedback that the utility has established proce-
dures for these activities and that the Loviisa pow-
er plant actively aims to improve its efficiency. A 
more comprehensive screening of IRS reports was 
identified as a target for development. The plant 
assumed that noteworthy events are included in 
the reports of the world Association of Nuclear 
Operators (wANO).
The Loviisa power plant has systematic proce-
dures and guidance for investigating and assessing 
events of their own, as well as initiating corrective 
action and monitoring its implementation. No sig-
nificant recurring events are evident in the plant’s 
operational events, and their number and sever-
ity are decreasing. The power plant has identified 
and taken action on its own initiative to improve 
resources, know-how and procedures. According to 
STUK’s assessment, root cause analysis and the 
recording of human factors, among other things, 
need to be developed.
Spent nuclear fuel and low- and 
intermediate level waste 
STUK oversees the nuclear waste management of 
nuclear power plants through document reviews 
and the periodic inspection programme.
STUK carried out the inspections according to 
the periodic inspection programme at the Loviisa 
power plant. The inspection of low- and intermedi-
ate-level waste management focused on the situa-
tion of the construction and reorganisation project 
for the storage, waste and repair shop facilities, 
the arrangements at the liquid waste solidification 
facility, waste accounting, organisation and in-
structions. The inspection concerning the final dis-
posal facility for low- and intermediate-level waste 
focused on the maintenance procedures for the 
concrete and rock structures of the final disposal 
facility. No significant deficiencies were detected in 
the inspections.
In 2007, maintenance waste below the activity 
limits taken to Kymenlaakson jäte Oy’s landfill, as 
well as scrap metal, were cleared from control at 
the power plant with STUK’s approval.
No events significant to plant or environmental 
safety were evident in the treatment, storage or 
the final disposal of low- and intermediate-level 
waste (“operating waste”) at the Loviisa power 
plant. The volume and activity of operating waste 
in relation to generated electrical power remained 
relatively low compared with most other countries. 
The contributing factors include the high quality 
standards for nuclear waste management and nu-
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clear fuel, the planning of maintenance and repair 
operations, decontamination, component and proc-
ess modifications, as well as waste monitoring and 
sorting, which enable clearing some of the waste 
from control. The power plant employs efficient 
procedures for reducing the volume of waste sub-
ject to final disposal.
The waste processing facilities at the Loviisa 
power plant are cramped and impractical. The 
construction and reorganisation project for storage, 
waste and repair shop facilities mentioned above 
will improve the facilities and equipment for waste 
processing. The maintenance of low- and interme-
diate-level waste will be improved by introducing 
centralised facilities for waste processing, activity 
determination and interim storage. The construc-
tion work under the project started in 2007 and is 
scheduled to be completed at the end of 2009.
STUK reviewed plans relating to the extension 
of the final disposal facility for low- and interme-
diate-level waste. A reception facility for solidified 
waste will be completed in the extension.
Waste volumes
The volume of low- and intermediate-level waste 
was 3,060 m³ at the end of 2007. The volume in-
crease from 2006 is 70 m³. Approximately 48% of 
the waste has been disposed of. 
The volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site 
at the Loviisa power plant at the end of 2007 was 
3,565 assemblies (429 tU) and the increase 204 
assemblies (26 tU). The storage capacity at the 
Loviisa power plant will be increased by employing 
more dense racks. The first two dense racks were 
installed in February 2007.
4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant has remained good
The condition of the multiple barriers containing 
releases of radioactive substances has remained 
good. Teollisuuden voima Oy aims to prevent fuel 
leaks by more effectively preventing loose parts 
from entering the reactor, but a small fuel leak 
caused by a loose part was detected at Olkiluoto 2 
during the 2006–2007 operating cycle. Inspections 
of the reactor pressure vessel and piping revealed 
no deterioration of the materials. The results of an-
nual tests show that the leak-tightness of the con-
tainment and isolation valves has remained good.
Three reactor scrams occured due to distur-
bances at Olkiluoto 2 in 2007. The number is con-
siderably higher than average over the past few 
years. however, situations compromising nuclear 
and radiation safety did not occur. Plant operation 
has been systematic and in compliance with the 
Technical Specifications and guidelines, except for 
in two situations. The condition of components and 
systems designed to prevent accidents and mitigate 
their impact has remained good. No indications of 
condition deterioration were detected in periodic 
tests and preventive maintenance. The number of 
safety system component failures has been low. A 
failure was detected in the reactor scram system 
at Olkiluoto 2 in connection with an operational 
transient.
The Olkiluoto plant employs an ageing manage-
ment programme aimed at guiding the maintenance 
and modification operations at the entire plant so 
that the plant can be operated safely throughout its 
lifetime. No effects pertaining to ageing that endan-
ger plant safety were evident in inspections during 
2007. No safety-endangering factors are evident in 
maintenance-related safety performance indicators, 
either. No modifications important to safety were 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
According to the risk analysis, the safety of the 
Olkiluoto power plant has improved slightly thanks 
to the small improvements made. Modifications 
were implemented at the turbine plant to improve 
plant operability.
Plant operation did not cause a radiation 
hazard to the workers, the population or environ-
ment. Occupational radiation doses and radioac-
tive releases into the environment were low and 
clearly below the prescribed limits. The installa-
tion of new steam dryers in 2006 and 2007 has 
reduced radiation at the turbine plant to the level 
of 1998. This also reduces the occupational radia-
tion doses of turbine plant workers. Emergency 
preparedeness at the Olkiluoto power plant is in 
compliance with regulatory requirements. The 
functionality of the emergency response was test-
ed during an emergency exercise organised at the 
end of November. 
Teollisuuden voima Oy has set its safety objec-
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tives high. Several actions to enhance the safety 
culture are in progress at the plant. The self-
assessment of the safety culture was repeated at 
the utility in 2007, and the results showed im-
provement compared with the assessment in 2004. 
Several events occurred at the power plant in 2007 
where deficiencies in quality and information man-
agement could be identified behind the events. The 
utility identified deficiencies related to guidelines, 
among other things, through its event analysis 
process. For example, errors have been detected in 
the reactor monitoring system software, the wrong 
type of fuses have been installed and deficiencies 
have been detected in guidelines and operation 
orders. More attention must be paid to the correct-
ness of the plant’s data systems and documents. 
Teollisuuden voima Oy is investing in person-
nel training. In addition to offering training, the 
utility must ensure that personnel have sufficient 
time for training and development. The utility has 
recruited more personnel and started human re-
source planning in view of the needs of Olkiluoto 
3. Attention must still be paid to the sufficiency 
of personnel resources, particularly in the fields 
of reactor physics and electrical and I&c systems 
maintenance.
4.2.2 Oversight and observations
Licence statements
The operating licence of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant 
units is valid until the end of 2018. No licence 
statements were prepared concerning the plant 
units in 2007. Teollisuuden voima Oy must draw 
up a periodical safety review of the condition of 
the plant units and its development by the end of 
2008. In 2007, STUK initiated discussions with 
Teollisuuden voima Oy on the content of the peri-
odical safety review and prepared a project plan for 
the review of the document.
Review of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
No plant modifications were implemented at the 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2007 that would have 
called for revising the transient and accident anal-
yses. In connection with annual refuelling, the li-
censee submits certain key analyses related to the 
safety of the plant units to STUK for approval. The 
purpose of these analyses is to prove that reactor 
properties do not change on refuelling so that the 
safety margins would be significantly reduced. The 
analyses submitted in connection with refuelling in 
2007 ascertained this.
No other deterministic safety analyses concern-
ing the Olkiluoto plant units were submitted to 
STUK for approval in 2007.
Probabilistic risk analyses
Teollisuuden voima Oy implemented an improve-
ment programme concerning the reactor build-
ing cooling risk between 2005 and 2007. The pro-
gramme assessed and reduced the risks related 
to the loss of heating in instrumentation rooms 
at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 during severely cold weather. 
According to preliminary assessments, the freez-
ing of impulse lines for reactor level measurement 
located in the reactor building had substantial risk 
significance. Plant modifications were implemented 
to reduce these risks. The utility surveyed the in-
strumentation rooms where safety-significant com-
ponents sensitive to the loss of heating are located. 
Other particularly risk-significant areas were not 
identified. During the 2007 annual maintenance, 
new temperature alarms were installed in about 
20 rooms at each plant unit. An alarm signal will 
be given to the control room if the temperature of 
these rooms drops too low. More specific risk analy-
ses show that the risk-significance of the cooling of 
instrumentation rooms has been reduced to a very 
low level.
In 2007, STUK reviewed the updated risk anal-
ysis for annual maintenance outages at Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 drawn up by Teollisuuden voima Oy. 
Outages are characterised by reactor servicing op-
erations, where errors may cause hazardous situa-
tions. For example, errors made in connection with 
the servicing of reactor coolant pumps fastened 
to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel could 
result in a reactor bottom leak that is difficult to 
control. The utility has previously implemented a 
number of improvements in the procedures applied 
during outages. According to the latest update to 
the outage risk analysis, the outage-related risk 
has decreased further due to the new modifications 
to the reactor coolant pump servicing procedures. 
The current outage risk is only about 1.3% of the 
plant’s total risk.
Oversight of plant modifications
A rather small number of large-scale modifications 
were implemented at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant in 2007. The number of modifications dur-
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ing the maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 was 
about 130, of which during the refuelling outage at 
Olkiluoto 1 there were about 40. The largest modi-
fications, such as the replacement of the extraction 
lines of the low-pressure turbine and the piping 
and valve replacements for the turbine drain lines 
were implemented during the maintenance outage 
at Olkiluoto 2. 
A project to upgrade the fixed radiation meas-
urement systems has been started at both of the 
Olkiluoto plant units. The first upgraded exhaust 
gas system radiation measurement devices were 
commissioned at Olkiluoto 2 after the 2007 annual 
maintenance. The installed devices have functioned 
perfectly. Most of the project will be implemented 
in 2008 and 2009.
Operation and operational events
The operation of Olkiluoto 1 was nearly free of distur-
bances. On the other hand, a number of disturbances 
occurred at Olkiluoto 2, resulting in higher produc-
tion losses than in previous years. 
The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 97.5% and that 
of Olkiluoto 2 was 93.7%. The annual maintenance 
outages caused the most significant reductions in the 
load factor: the outage at Olkiluoto 1 lasted 8.5 days 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 lasted 17 days. Losses in the 
gross energy output due to component malfunctions 
were 0.04% at Olkiluoto 1 and 1.3% at Olkiluoto 2. 
Production losses from component malfunctions over 
a longer time period are depicted by the indicators in 
Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.1g).
No significant breaks in power generation or power 
losses due to component failures occurred at Olkiluoto 
1. A mechanical seal of a feed water pump sustained 
damage during power operation of the plant unit, and 
power was reduced for the duration of its replacement 
on 3 April 2007. During a periodic test at Olkiluoto 
1 on 5 July 2007, a pressure gauge exploded and the 
discharging hydrogen caught fire. The fire was extin-
guished immediately by the fire brigade, and no seri-
ous injuries were sustained.
Seven events related to component malfunctions 
and disturbances occurred at Olkiluoto 2, causing 
production breaks or power losses. Three reactor 
scrams occurred at the plant unit due to disturbances: 
on 15 May 2007, 4 September 2007 and 29 December 
2007. Power was reduced once to investigate a valve 
malfunction in the blow-down system and twice to in-
vestigate and even out vibrations in the low-pressure 
turbines. Start-up of the plant unit after annual 
maintenance had to be interrupted when oil remain-
ing in the insulation of a high-pressure turbine, due to 
an oil leak, caught fire. The fire was extinguished, the 
oil was removed, and the damage caused by the fire 
was repaired.
Table 4. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units subject to special reports by the utility. The table shows events due to 
which the plant unit was in non-compliance with the Technical Specifications. All events subject to reporting are 
discussed in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1). Appendix 3 describes events subject to special reports in more detail.
Event Non-compliances 
with the Technical 
Specifications
Special report INES rating
Violation of dryout limits at Olkiluoto 1 as a result of programming error • • 0
Testing of main steam relief valves in the wrong operational state • • 0
Reactor trip at Olkiluoto 2 • 1
Unqualified fuses in the electrical systems of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
•
1
Wrong fuses in the shut-down secondary cooling system of Olkiluoto 2 0
Unlocked containment isolation valves at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 non-
compliant with the Technical Specifications
• • 0
Figure 9. INES classified events at the Olkiluoto plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical Specifications
compliance with the Technical Specifications at the 
Olkiluoto power plant was controlled by witnessing 
operations on-site. Oversight focused on the testing 
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Figure 10. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 11. Daily average gross power oh the Olkiluoto 
plant units in 2007.
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and repair of components subject to the Technical 
Specifications. After the completion of the annual 
maintenance outages, the plant units’ state in com-
pliance with the Technical Specifications was as-
certained prior to start-up.
Two unintentional situations of non-compliance 
with the Technical Specifications occurred at the 
Olkiluoto plant in 2007. In addition, the utility 
applied for the approval of five deviations from 
the Technical Specifications. STUK approved all 
of the applications. Four of the temporary ex-
emptions concerned deviations from the Technical 
Specifications necessary for plant modifications or 
modernisations, and one was related to the test in 
progress at the repository of low- and intermediate-
level waste (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2).
Teollisuuden voima Oy is carrying out an overall 
review of its Technical Specifications. The part con-
cerning conditions and restrictions and their jus-
tifications were assessed in 2007. The assessment 
and development of the Technical Specifications is 
part of the periodical safety review.
The utility submitted 12 amendment propos-
als to STUK for approval, concerning issues such 
as component inspections, testing and calibration. 
Amendments were also implemented due to compo-
nent upgrades.  STUK approved the amendments 
as such, or required that additional information, 
such as updated operating instructions should be 
submitted in arrears. Three amendment proposals 
were returned for new preparations, either in their 
entirety or partially. One amendment was not ap-
proved as the implementation of the modification 
was postponed.
Operation and operational events
Two resident inspectors are employed at the 
Olkiluoto power plant to oversee the operation of 
the operating plant units on a daily basis. In addi-
tion, operation is controlled according to a system-
atic inspection programme drafted for this purpose. 
As a new feature, STUK’s periodic inspection pro-
gramme includes the inspections of operations per-
formed on a quarterly basis since the beginning of 
2007. In these inspections, utility representatives 
present significant issues related to nuclear and 
radiation safety and operation and maintenance 
activities. The requirements related to the scram 
system valves, in particular, were prominent in 
the inspection records. The utility detected sealing 
problems in the valves and one malfunction. STUK 
required a further report on the nitrogen leaks 
from the valves and requested the utility to assess 
the schedule and criteria for corrective action to be 
taken during the 2008 annual maintenance.
The impact of inoperabilities due to component 
malfunctions, preventive maintenance and other 
events on the annual accident risk was about 6% at 
each plant unit. This was due to the long duration 
of the preventive maintenance packages for the 
diesel generators and latent component failures in 
the safety systems. No special action by STUK was 
required due to the target level being exceeded. 
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Annual maintenance outages 
Based on its oversight, STUK determined that the 
annual maintenance planned and implemented 
by Teollisuuden voima Oy was carried out safely. 
Needs for improvement were observed in modifica-
tion planning schedules and compliance with the 
procedures. Attention must be paid to the manage-
ment of changes to planned modification work con-
cerning systems important to nuclear safety (e.g. 
decay heat removal). The impact of the changes 
must be assessed comprehensively. 
Ninety-six working days during normal working 
hours were spent on-site on overseeing the annual 
maintenance outages of the Olkiluoto plant units. 
Two resident inspectors were also working on-site. 
In addition, a total of 66 inspection days outside 
working hours were spent on overseeing annual 
maintenance outages.
Plant maintenance and ageing management 
The utility reports annually on the ageing of elec-
trical and I&c components. The report describes 
the essential ageing phenomena subject to follow-
up, the observations related to ageing and the ac-
tions necessary for lifetime extension. The obser-
vations are mostly related to the ageing of the 
structural parts of components, usually previously 
detected ageing phenomena under monitoring, 
such as whisker growth on zinc coated surfaces, 
wear of the sliding surfaces of position indicators 
in certain actuators, ageing of the comb material of 
certain types of relays and the ageing of the mini-
ature relays of component control logics.
During the year, a new I&c ageing phenomenon 
was detected in potentiometers, which are used in 
the voltage sources of detectors for power range 
neutron flux measurement. Due to this, corrective 
action was initiated with the original supplier of 
the parts.  
Repair and maintenance operations on electri-
cal and I&c systems and components included the 
replacement of safety-classified batteries and valve 
actuators. The feature of the radiation monitoring 
system of the main steam pipes causing distur-
bances was repaired, and the exhaust gas radiation 
measurement system was replaced at each plant 
unit. A total of 11 rectifiers were replaced within 
the ongoing rectifier modernisation project at the 
plant units in 2007.
STUK reviewed the pre-inspection documenta-
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 1
The annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 1 comprised 
a refuelling outage that took place between 6 and 
15 May 2007. The outage lasted 8.5 days.
Eight control rod drive mechanisms were in-
spected to investigate the problems that had oc-
curred since the 2006 annual maintenance, con-
cerning control rod drive mechanism trips from 
torque protection. The observations supported the 
assumption that impurities carried by scram sys-
tem water on top of the drive nut triggered the 
torque protection (see Annual report 2006).
Annual maintenance at Olkiluoto 2
The maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 took place 
between 20 May and 6 June 2007. The outage 
also included modification operations. The outage 
that took almost 17 days was more than 1.5 days 
longer than planned. The delay was caused by an 
oil leak in the turbine building on 2 June 2007 
and the cleanup of the leaked oil. On 7 June 2007, 
during start-up of the plant unit, a beginning fire 
was detected in the turbine building and the plant 
unit had to be taken back to hot standby state. 
In connection with shutdown of the plant unit, a 
reactor scram occured due to a malfunction in the 
reactor water level measuring. A small fuel leak 
was detected during the operating cycle preceding 
the outage. The leaking assembly was located and 
removed from the reactor. 
The modifications implemented during the out-
age comprised piping replacements and moderni-
sations due to system ageing. Two low-pressure 
turbines were opened, and cracks detected in 
inspections were repaired. Turbine drain lines 
and low-pressure extraction lines were replaced. 
A shutdown reactor cooling system valve was re-
placed with a valve of a new type, a generator rotor 
was replaced, and radiation monitoring system 
equipment of the exhaust gas system was replaced. 
The steam dryer that had been removed during 
the 2006 outage after being used for a year was 
reinstalled in the reactor, after repair during the 
operating cycle.
Hydroids were detected in the sea water sys-
tems of both plant units. The utility is looking for 
means to combat hydroid growth, as ample growth 
hampers water flow.
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tion concerning safety-classified modifications and 
the feasibility studies of new components important 
to safety. During the year, Teollisuuden voima Oy’s 
inspection organisation made more than 60 com-
missioning inspections for safety-classified items 
in electrical and I&c systems. STUK reviewed the 
pre-inspection documents and supervised some of 
the commissioning inspections. During the annual 
maintenances, STUK supervised periodic inspec-
tions and the testing of electrical and I&c systems 
and components and certain improvement-related 
actions, such as actions to investigate the possi-
bilities for removing disturbances in reactor water 
level measurement.
No significant observations related to ageing 
management were made during the annual main-
tenance outages at the Olkiluoto plant units. The 
in-service inspections of the reactor pressure ves-
sel and the main steam pipes and feed water pipes 
were carried out as a duty of the licensee at both 
plant units according to Guide yvL 3.8. STUK’s 
oversight included the approval of the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections, oversight of 
the inspections and review of the results on-site. 
The final result reports are to be submitted to 
STUK for approval after the annual maintenance. 
STUK reviewed on-site the results of the condition 
monitoring inspections of the secondary circuit pip-
ing made by the licensee. 
Fault indications were detected at Olkiluoto 1 
in the sealing surfaces of one inner isolation valve 
of the main steam system, one relief valve of the 
blow-down system and one stop valve of the scram 
system. STUK approved for the faults to be moni-
tored without repair. STUK required that the util-
ity presents a plan for shortening the inspection 
cycle for the sealing surface of the main steam sys-
tem valve and justifications for the selected inspec-
tion cycle. After the outage, the utility has initiated 
an investigation for replacing the valve and other 
similar valves (four valves per plant unit) at each 
plant unit in 2010–2011. Other significant opera-
tions included the inspections of the main steam 
valves and the replacement of their internals, 
servicing and inspection of relief valves and control 
valves of the blow-down system and the servicing 
of control rod actuators.
At Olkiluoto 2, the new reactor steam dryer 
manufactured by Skoda was reinstalled after the 
repair of the damage that had arisen during the 
first operating cycle (2005–2006). STUK approved 
the repair and installation. One of the isolation 
valves of the shutdown reactor coolant system was 
replaced. A similar operation was implemented 
at Olkiluoto 1 the previous year. A second item of 
similar valves will be replaced at each plant unit 
during 2008 and 2009. Fault indications were also 
detected at Olkiluoto 2 in the sealing surfaces of 
one inner isolation valve of the main steam system 
and one relief valve of the blow-down system, and 
STUK approved for them to only be monitored. The 
main steam valves, the relief and control valves of 
the blow-down system and the control rod actua-
tors were serviced and inspected as at Olkiluoto 1.
No actual periodic inspections of pressure 
equipment were included in STUK’s inspection 
area at Olkiluoto 1. however, two nitrogen tanks 
of the scram system were inspected. A total of 19 
inspections in STUK’s inspection area were carried 
out at Olkiluoto 2.
STUK carried out a total of 249 construction 
inspections and inspections of on-site repairs and 
modifications during the year, as well as four com-
missioning inspections. 
Radiation safety 
Occupational radiation safety
On the basis of documents submitted by 
Teollisuuden voima Oy, STUK approved the use of 
the dosimetry system of the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant until 2011. As appropriate, the approval 
also covers the operational agreement between the 
utility and the Doseco company measuring indi-
vidual doses at the power plant. 
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses underwent an annual test, 
with acceptable results. The test comprises irradi-
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations 
During the operating year, authorisations were 
granted to 25 pressure equipment manufacturers 
for the Olkiluoto plant (plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 
and 3). Fifty-three testing organisation authorisa-
tions according to Guide YVL 1.3 were granted. In 
addition, four testing organisations were author-
ised to conduct in-service inspections according to 
Guide YVL 3.8. One manufacturer authorisation 
and four testing organisation authorisations were 
withdrawn.
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ating a sample of dosimeters at STUK’s measure-
ment standard laboratory and determining the 
doses at the power plant. 
STUK carried out a radiation protection in-
spection according to the periodic inspection pro-
gramme at the Olkiluoto power plant, covering the 
resources, expertise and operation of the radia-
tion protection organisation. STUK required the 
Olkiluoto plant to develop further the radiation 
protection training and preliminary practising for 
maintenance operations. 
STUK carried out radiation protection inspec-
tions during the annual maintenances at each 
plant unit. The plant has developed, e.g. the radia-
tion measurements at the border of the monitoring 
area. Attention was also paid to the scope of and 
deviations in the use of protective equipment.
The manager of the radiation protection or-
ganisation at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
changed in 2007. To a certain extent, the organisa-
tion also takes part in preparing for the implemen-
tation of radiation protection at Olkiluoto 3. 
As part of the interim safety review, the utility 
will review the descriptions related to radiation 
protection at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 contained in the 
Safety Analysis Report in 2008 and 2009, and as-
sess the occupational radiation protection actions 
in view of the comparative data received from simi-
lar nuclear power plants in Sweden.
Radiation doses
The collective occupational radiation dose was 0.26 
manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.92 manSv at Olkiluoto 
2. The annual maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 
2 was extensive in terms of both human resourc-
es and the amount of work. According to STUK 
guidelines, the threshold for one plant unit’s col-
lective dose averaged over two successive years 
is 2.10 manSv. This value was not exceeded at 
either plant unit. The collective radiation dose at 
Olkiluoto was clearly below average for BwRs in 
the OEcD countries.
Occupational radiation doses mostly accumu-
late during annual maintenance at the power 
plant. The collective radiation dose of workers at 
Olkiluoto 1 during the outage was 0.17 manSv 
and that of workers at Olkiluoto 2 during the out-
age was 0.86 manSv. The radiation levels at the 
Olkiluoto 1 turbine plant decreased as the steam 
dryer of the plant unit was replaced during the 
2006 outage. The moisture content of the steam 
flowing in the steam tubes and the concentration 
of radioactive substances carried by the moisture 
has decreased. 
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
workers at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants in 2007 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
The majority of the radioactive substances gener-
ated during nuclear reactor operation originate in 
nuclear fuel and the reactor cooling system, as well 
as the related purification and waste systems. The 
liquid and atmospheric effluents from the plant are 
purified and delayed so that their radiation impact 
on the environment is very low compared with the 
impact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The releases are carefully measured to 
ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits. The calculated radiation dose of the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
has been less than one per cent of the set limit of 
0.1 millisievert over the past few years. 
Some of the measuring sensors of the weather 
mast at the Olkiluoto plant site are being replaced, 
and the acceptance testing of the sensors was 
witnessed at vaisala Oy in 2007. STUK required 
that the plant in 2007–2009 assesses not only the 
development of the weather mast system but also 
that of the off-site additional measurements and 
the related predictive models with regard to the 
dispersion of any releases into the atmosphere.
The current programme for environmental radia-
tion monitoring in the environment of the Olkiluoto 
power plant has been approved for 2003–2007. 
Experts at Teollisuuden voima Oy and the in-
dependent laboratory carrying out measurements 
presented their experiences and development needs 
for the new period extending up to 2012. The pro-
gramme will be submitted in its final form to STUK 
for approval at the beginning of 2008.
STUK reviewed the quarterly and annual re-
ports concerning radioactive releases and envi-
ronmental monitoring submitted by the utility. 
After discovering that a minor by-pass flow has 
been possible in the particle filter for the radiation 
measurement of releases into the atmosphere, the 
utility repaired the detected fault and reported the 
rectified data to STUK.
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Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below 
authorised limits in 2007. Releases of radioac-
tive noble gases into the air were approximately 
0.1 TBq, which is approximately 0.0006% of the 
authorised limit. Releases of radioactive iodine 
isotopes into the air were approximately 15 GBq, 
which is approximately 0.01% of the authorised 
limit. Aerosol releases were approximately 30 MBq, 
tritium releases approximately 0.4 TBq and car-
bon-14 releases approximately 1.1 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, i.e. 2.4 TBq, is approximately 13% of 
the annual release limit. The total activity of other 
nuclides discharged into the sea was 0.6 GBq, or 
approximately 0.2% of the plant-site specific dis-
charge limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
about 0.05 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% of the set 
limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5). The radiation 
emitted by natural radioactive elements in the soil 
of the environment of the plant causes a person 
outdoors to incur an equivalent dose in about 15 
minutes.
A total of 307 samples from the environment 
of the Olkiluoto power plant were collected and 
analysed in 2007. A wide-ranging and comprehen-
sive monitoring programme approved by STUK 
is being implemented in the environment of the 
nuclear power plant. The programme is extensive, 
and more than 300 samples are taken from air and 
terrestrial and marine environment surrounding 
the plant site each year. External background ra-
diation and the radioactivity of people in the sur-
roundings are also measured regularly. Extremely 
small amounts of radioactive substances originat-
ing in the nuclear power plant have been observed 
in some of the analysed samples. The detected con-
centrations were insignificant in terms of radiation 
exposure.
Emergency preparedness 
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the preparedness of the or-
ganisations operating nuclear power plants to act 
in abnormal situations. No such situations occurred 
at the Olkiluoto power plant in 2007. 
Emergency preparedness at the Olkiluoto pow-
er plant meets the main regulatory requirements, 
which was determined in a periodic inspection 
held in September 2007. The inspection covered, 
among other things, the tasks of the action groups 
of the Olkiluoto power plant’s emergency response 
organisation and the procedures and training for 
the construction sites of Olkiluoto 3 and Onkalo 
concerning the evacuation of personnel from the 
site in case of an accident at Olkiluoto 1 or 2.The 
licensee and the authorities have engaged in close 
co-operation. In 2007, training events on prepa-
ration for an accident at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant were organised for the fire and rescue 
authorities throughout the area of the Satakunta 
regional rescue services and the personnel of the 
Provincial State Office of western Finland.
Emergency exercises test the operation of the 
emergency response organisation, the functional-
ity of the emergency response guidelines and the 
availability of the emergency response premises 
in practice, which are developed on the basis of 
the feedback received for the exercises. STUK also 
assesses the licensee’s emergency preparedness 
during exercises. The emergency exercise at the 
Olkiluoto power plant was held on 28 November 
2007.
Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
In 2007, the operations of the Olkiluoto power plant 
were developed on the basis of feedback received 
from the world Association of Nuclear Operators 
(wANO) in 2006. The utility has become aware of 
the significance of management and leadership on 
the basis of both the feedback and its own opera-
tional analysis, and will make a significant invest-
ment in developing management over the next few 
years. In the autumn of 2007, the utility carried out 
a second self-assessment of its safety culture, ap-
plying IAEA’s model. During 2007, STUK approved 
Teollisuuden voima Oy’s applications for changing 
the responsible manager and its organisation.
Based on inspections and the organisational 
Table 5. Radioactive nuclides originating from the Olki-
luoto plant detected in environmental samples in 2007.
Sample Observed nuclides (number of samples)
Aquatic plants Co-60 (11), Mn-54 (1)
Sediment Co-60 (5)
Fish Co-60 (1)
Mussels Co-60 (2)
Seawater H-3 (1)
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oversight process, STUK is able to state that 
Teollisuuden voima Oy is investing in the develop-
ment of managerial work and pays attention to 
learning within the organisation. however, clearer 
objectives must be set for safety management and 
their attainment must be monitored to ensure con-
tinuous development. 
Quality management system
Teollisuuden voima Oy has maintained and im-
proved the Olkiluoto power plant’s quality man-
agement system according to its own plans. Several 
events occurred at the power plant in 2007 where 
deficiencies in quality management and quality 
assurance could be identified as underlying fac-
tors. The utility identified deficiencies related to 
guidelines, for example, through its event analy-
sis process. The utility replaced its own assess-
ment of the functionality and scope of its inter-
nal quality assurance activities by making an as-
sessment against the reference levels concerning 
quality management defined by western European 
Nuclear Regulators’ Association (wENRA) and the 
wANO assessment carried out in 2006. 
STUK controlled Teollisuuden voima Oy’s qual-
ity assurance system and its functionality through 
document reviews and inspections of the periodic 
inspection programme. Keeping the quality man-
agement system up-to-date will become even more 
challenging in the near future due to the inclusion 
of the construction project in the quality manage-
ment system concerning the operating plant units 
and the continuously increasing organisational 
changes related to Olkiluoto 3. 
Personnel qualifications and training
Teollisuuden voima Oy is investing in personnel 
training. The utility has recruited more personnel 
and started human resource planning in view of 
the needs of Olkiluoto 3. The sufficiency of person-
nel has been challenging in the fields of reactor 
physics and electrical and I&c maintenance, in 
particular. The utility has paid attention to the 
transfer of silent knowledge and is allocating re-
sources for this over the next few years.
The utility recruited four new operator train-
ees in 2007. STUK authorised 11 new shift man-
ager trainees with two-year licences on the basis of 
written examinations. One person passed the oral 
exam and was authorised as a new operator. The 
operator licences of 19 people were renewed and 
one operator licence expired during the year. 
The organisation is very different during annual 
maintenance. Teollisuuden voima Oy has invested 
in the safety training of subcontractors and service 
providers and furthered awareness of the safety 
significance of their own work. Attention must 
continue to be paid to this as external workforce 
cannot assimilate all of the important information 
in a short period of time during training.
On the basis of inspections, licence hearings 
and organisational observations, STUK finds that 
Teollisuuden voima is investing extensively in 
personnel training and development. however, the 
utility must pay attention to ensuring that the 
personnel has sufficient time to develop their ex-
pertise alongside their normal duties.  
Over the next few years, Teollisuuden voima 
Oy must invest in long-term human resource plan-
ning and prepare for managing the organisational 
changes in a controlled and safe manner. The 
utility must prepare for the generational shift by 
creating functional procedures for the transfer of 
knowledge from senior personnel to new hands.
Operational experience feedback 
The Olkiluoto power plant has not seen any sig-
nificant changes in the number of exceptional situ-
ations and operational transients over the past 
few years. In 2007, the power plant reported four 
exceptional situations. In the case of one event, the 
utility also conducted a separate root cause analy-
sis, which revealed deficiencies in the management 
of amendments to the yvL guides, in ascertaining 
expertise and procedures concerning the entry of 
safety-classified components into the power plant. 
The events reported in special reports and their 
immediate causes were very different, but contrib-
utory factors were to some extent similar. The com-
mon factors are related to the management of the 
state of the plant and information, particularly in 
connection with changes. The utility has initiated a 
number of development actions aimed at ensuring 
that the components entered into the plant are in 
accordance with the designs and that their state 
and the guidelines are in compliance with the re-
quirements. 
Three reactor scrams took place at Olkiluoto 2, 
which were the most significant events in terms 
of nuclear safety at the Olkiluoto power plant in 
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2007. The number of scrams was also higher than 
normal. however, the causes of the scrams varied, 
and situations compromising nuclear and radia-
tion safety did not arise. In addition, there were 
three other operational transients. The events had 
no significant impact on nuclear safety.
Internal processing and reporting is also re-
quired for low-level events or near-misses not 
subject to a special or operational transient report. 
Reports on such events are submitted to STUK for 
information if the event is or may be relevant to 
nuclear or radiation safety or STUK’s communi-
cation activities. In 2007, Teollisuuden voima Oy 
submitted three such event reports to STUK.
STUK controlled the operational experience 
feedback activities by reviewing the event reports 
submitted by the licensee and the annual summa-
ry of operational feedback activities. In addition, 
the periodic inspection programme includes an 
inspection dealing with international operational 
experience feedback activities. 
This inspection showed that the utility has 
documented procedures in place for these activi-
ties and that the Olkiluoto power plant aims to 
improve the activities on its own initiative. A more 
comprehensive screening of IRS report was identi-
fied as a target for development. ERFATOM plays 
a significant role in the screening of operational 
events, but its screening criteria do not necessarily 
reflect the needs of Olkiluoto 3 in the future.
The Olkiluoto plant has systematic procedures 
and guidance for investigating and assessing the 
course and causes of events, and initiating correc-
tive action. Any significant recurring events have 
not been evident among operational events over 
the past few years, but common features, such as 
those related to the management of modification 
operations, can be observed as underlying factors. 
The utility has identified and taken action on its 
own initiative to improve the procedures of op-
erational experience feedback activities (the OPEX 
database). According to STUK’s assessment, there 
is room for development in terms of the monitoring 
of the implementation of corrective action. Neither 
interconnection between minor deviations detected 
in operation nor specific equipment failures and 
operational experience feedback activities is obvi-
ous. 
Spent nuclear fuel and low- and 
intermediate-level waste
STUK oversees the nuclear waste management of 
nuclear power plants through document reviews 
and inspections within the periodic inspection pro-
gramme.
STUK carried out the inspections according to 
the periodic inspection programme at the Olkiluoto 
power plant. The inspection of low- and intermedi-
ate-level waste management focused on the label-
ling and treatment of active components stored in 
pools in the reactor building, the situation of waste 
management development projects, waste account-
ing, organisation and guidelines. The inspection of 
the final disposal facility for low- and intermediate-
level waste dealt with the maintenance procedures 
for the concrete and rock structures of the final 
disposal facility. No significant deficiencies were 
detected in the inspections.
In 2007, maintenance waste below the activity 
Operational experience feedback
ERFATOM, composed of representatives of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Swedish nuclear 
power plants, collects and pre-screens operation-
al experience data based on reports from the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), 
the Incident Reporting System (IRS), and NRC, 
the United States nuclear safety authority. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s Group for Operational 
Experience (KÄKRY) processes the utility’s own 
and other plants’ events by screening the events, as 
well as assessing the observations and their signif-
icance for various fields of technology. The group 
forwards reports for information, requests state-
ments or gives recommendations to the responsible 
offices for further processing and decision-mak-
ing concerning potential further action. In 2007, 
the team processed 136 events at the Olkiluoto 
plants, and required action to prevent recurrence 
in the case of 21 of these. Typical corrective action 
comprises changing instructions or procedures, 
providing training or implementing component 
modifications. In addition, the group reviewed 200 
reports on significant events at other power plants. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy also receives information 
on events at other power plants directly from sis-
ter plants (such as Forsmark), plant vendors and 
the co-operation group of BWR reactor operators 
(BWR-NOG).
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limits taken to the local landfill for burial, waste 
oil delivered to Ekokem Oy, recyclable scrap metal 
and some reusable componenets were cleared from 
control with STUK’s approval.
No significant events in terms of plant or envi-
ronmental safety were evident in the treatment, 
storage or final disposal of low- and intermediate-
level waste (“operating waste”) at the Olkiluoto 
power plant. The volume and activity of operating 
waste in relation to generated electrical power 
remained relatively low compared with most other 
countries. The contributing factors include the 
high quality requirements for nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear fuel, the planning of main-
tenance and repair operations, decontamination, 
component and process modifications, as well as 
waste monitoring and sorting, which enable clear-
ing some of the waste from control. The power 
plant employs efficient procedures for reducing the 
volume of waste subject to final disposal. 
waste treatment and the waste systems have 
been subject to upgrading over the past few years. 
The bitumen-grouting system at Olkiluoto 1 was 
upgraded in 2007.
Safety case update for the final disposal 
facility for low- and intermediate-level waste
In accordance with the conditions of the operating 
licence, the safety case for the Olkiluoto final facil-
ity for low- and intermediate-level waste (the vLj 
repository) was updated towards the end of 2006, 
considering the experience gained and the research 
completed over the repository’s operating lifetime 
so far. The updated safety case includes the dispos-
al of waste from Olkiluoto 3 in the vLj repository. 
STUK reviewed the updated safety case in 2007 
and submitted its statement to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry towards the end of the year. In 
the review, STUK was assisted by external experts. 
STUK observed no deficiencies that would require 
immediate intervention in the implementation of 
final disposal.
Waste volumes
The volume of spent nuclear fuel on-site at the 
Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2007 was 6,750 as-
semblies (119tU, tonnes of original uranium) with 
an increase of 240 assemblies (42 tU) in 2007. 
The volume of low- and intermediate-level 
waste on-site at the Olkiluoto plant at the end 
of 2007 was 6,124 m3 with an increase of 112 m3. 
Approximately 78 % of the waste has been dis-
posed of.
4.3 Regulation of the construction 
of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of the new plant 
project is based on the observations made in the re-
view of detailed designs, the oversight of manufac-
turing and construction, the results of the inspec-
tion programme during construction, the oversight 
of the plant vendor and its subcontractors, as well 
as the information and experience acquired as a 
result of interactions between STUK, Teollisuuden 
voima Oy and the plant vendor.
On the basis of the review of detailed plans, 
STUK can state that the design has continuously 
become more detailed, but the plant vendor and the 
utility still have room for improvement in terms of 
submitting sufficiently detailed and unambiguous 
design documentation. STUK has required that 
the detected deficiencies in design documentation 
are corrected as the project progresses. In practice, 
this leads to changes and delays in design, par-
ticularly in cases where the safety requirements 
have not been taken into account correctly. The 
simultaneous progress of design and construction 
poses a special challenge to project management 
and supervision. when the design of certain proc-
ess and I&c systems has progressed more slowly 
than the construction design and construction, in 
some cases it has been necessary to modify com-
pleted structures. So far, it has been possible to 
implement the required modifications in compli-
ance with the original quality requirements. The 
management of modifications will be one of the key 
areas of STUK’s oversight in 2008.
The manufacturers, the plant vendor and 
the utility have supervised the manufacturing 
of the primary circuit components appropriately. 
Manufacturing defects are still observed from time 
to time, but the detected deviations have been 
repaired in accordance with the plans presented 
to STUK so that the original approval criteria are 
met. As a result of the supervision of the manu-
facturing and construction of other components, 
the utility and the plant vendor have found defi-
ciencies in their own operations and those of their 
subcontractors. Operational deficiencies have been 
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dealt with at meetings between the plant vendor, 
the utility and STUK’s project management and 
in connection with the inspections of the peri-
odic inspection programme during construction 
and construction inspections at the manufactur-
ers’ premises. however, the results of the audits 
on the manufacturers and suppliers still showed 
that some of the actors have not taken the quality 
requirements of the nuclear field into account in 
their operation and remedying the situation has 
required setting project- and product-specific qual-
ity requirements. The number of such observations 
was lower than in previous years. The plant vendor 
and the utility must take the lessons learned into 
account comprehensively throughout the supply 
chain in order to further improve the efficiency of 
operations. STUK participated in some of the au-
dits conducted by the utility and the plant vendor 
and, based on its observations, can state that the 
auditing activities have improved. 
Based on the periodic inspection programme 
during construction, STUK was able to form an 
opinion on Teollisuuden voima Oy’s project man-
agement, resources, processing of safety issues and 
quality management, as well as the supporting 
functions. In the inspections made in 2007, STUK 
paid attention to the future phases of the project, 
such as installations and plant commissioning, 
and estimated the utility’s preparedness in view of 
the needs. On the basis of the inspections, STUK 
demanded that the utility verifies the plant ven-
dor’s installation and commissioning procedures in 
good time. STUK required from the utility’s project 
management that safety issues be monitored more 
systematically, that the links between safety is-
sues and project phases be taken into account in 
decision-making and that decision-making and 
monitoring are traceable. STUK paid attention to 
the project management’s operation when process-
ing product and operational deviations, and ex-
pects more systematic processing of the deviations 
by the project management in order to ensure that 
the plant complies with the requirements. The 
utility has presented action plans concerning the 
development needs found in the operations, and 
STUK will monitor their realisation during the 
project. In conclusion, however, it can be noted that 
the utility is attempting to improve the efficiency 
of project management. Examples of this include 
the systematic personnel training activities and 
the increase in the resources supervising the plant 
vendor’s operation, assessing design and supervis-
ing construction and manufacturing.
The assessment of the plant vendor by STUK 
is based on the assessment of operation in connec-
tion with oversight on the construction site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises, reviews of 
the documents drawn up by the plant vendor, the 
review of the plant vendor’s quality management 
system and plans and the review of the project 
manuals, as well as inspections of operation and 
interactions with the plant vendor at meetings. 
co-ordinating the project schedule and design as 
well as construction pose challenges to the plant 
vendor. STUK’s experiences show that the plant 
vendor is, however, prepared to repair the detected 
design and quality defects in accordance with the 
original quality requirements. STUK expects the 
management of subcontractors and the construc-
tion project to improve further as a result of the 
inspection observations, such as those related to 
the manufacturing of the steel liner. 
Based on the results of oversight, STUK is able 
to state, despite the modifications to design and the 
deficiencies detected in construction and manufac-
turing, that the original safety and quality objec-
tives for the plant can be achieved. So far, the plant 
vendor has been able to take the design modifica-
tions into account in construction, and the deficien-
cies detected in manufacturing have been repaired 
so that the original quality requirements are met. 
The deficiencies in the operation of the various par-
ties and quality have caused additional delays in 
project implementation and resources have been 
occupied in processing the problems. STUK will 
continue project oversight according to the current 
policies. On the basis of the results of oversight 
in 2007, STUK has decided that the key areas for 
oversight in 2008 will be the quality management of 
the various parties and design and construction site 
modifications. The interfaces between the project 
schedule, design and simultaneous construction, 
and the component installations that will begin in 
2008 pose increasing challenges to oversight. 
4.3.2 Oversight and observations
During 2007, STUK reviewed the detailed design 
of Olkiluoto 3 and oversaw component manufactur-
ing at manufacturers’ premises and plant construc-
tion at Olkiluoto.
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Review of design documents 
Conceptual plant design
Of the conceptual design documentation of 
Olkiluoto 3, the utility submitted the general de-
sign objectives in case of internal and external 
threats, among other things, to STUK for review. 
The documentation presents the separation princi-
ples applied to minimise the consequences of inter-
nal threats, such as flooding and fire, between the 
safety system subsystems (divisions). In addition, 
the concept of monitoring leaks outside the con-
tainment was described. The document review re-
vealed issues that the utility and the plant vendor 
must clarify in more detail. 
An updated plan for the separation and loca-
tion principles for electrical and I&c cabling was 
submitted to STUK for review. Among other things, 
the plan presented modified solutions for the sepa-
ration of the cabling of different subsystems. The 
modifications will improve the fire safety of the 
plant. In 2007, STUK reviewed documents on the 
electro-technical dimensioning of electrical systems 
and made remarks concerning the clarification of 
the behaviour of the plant’s electrical systems dur-
ing design basis electromagnetic disturbances. 
In 2007, STUK reviewed the additional test-
ing plan drawn up to prove the electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMc) of the electrical and I&c 
system components. The testing aims to show that 
the portable DEcT phones to be used at the plant 
will not interfere with electrical and I&c compo-
nents important to safety. STUK required that the 
phones of the authorities’ radio network virve can 
be used indoors at the plant.
Transient and accident analyses 
Teollisuuden voima Oy submitted to STUK for ap-
proval accident and transient analyses concerning 
the plant’s behaviour related to a break in a large 
reactor coolant line and piping breaks in the steam 
generator heat exchanger. The review of these 
analyses will continue in 2008. The preliminary 
review by STUK did not give rise to any significant 
observations with an impact on plant design. To 
support the review, STUK commissioned independ-
ent assessments related to accidents from vTT, the 
Technical Research centre of Finland. STUK com-
missioned vTT to further develop the models nec-
essary for analysing the plant’s behaviour. In 2007, 
the models were developed to reflect the detailed 
design of the plant. Through model development, 
STUK is preparing for the review of the analyses 
at the operating licence phase. 
Probabilistic risk analyses
In 2007, STUK assessed how the principles influ-
encing reliability are implemented in the detailed 
design documents on systems and structures. The 
objective was to ensure the adequate reliability 
of preparation for local events (such as fires and 
flooding on-site), in particular. Accordingly, the as-
sessment focused on interdependencies between 
systems and possible tendencies for common-cause 
failures. The review of I&c system design focused 
on the adequate application of the diversity princi-
ple against common-cause failures.
The third update of the PRA model was submit-
ted to STUK for information. Of the PRA applica-
tions, STUK reviewed the update of the method 
description of the risk-informed periodic testing 
programme. In addition, STUK is reviewing the 
method description of the risk-informed periodic 
piping testing programme, the risk-informed regu-
lar inspection programme for Safety class 2 pip-
ing, the method description of flood risk analysis, 
and the method description of the use of PRA when 
drawing up the Technical Specifications.
Fire and flood analyses
STUK reviewed the deterministic fire and flood 
analyses for Olkiluoto 3 buildings and rooms. 
Studies on the fire properties of the novel-type 
fire retardant non-corrosive (FNRc) cables to be 
used at the plant were commissioned from vTT. In 
relation to this, STUK commissioned an analysis 
of fire in a large cable room from vTT. According 
to the results of the analyses, the structural fire 
protection at the plant is adequate. The review of 
the parts of the flood analyses is still incomplete. 
however, the results make it possible to state that 
the design provides adequate provision for leakage 
situations inside the plant.
Analyses concerning buildings
STUK reviewed analyses of aircraft impact aimed 
to show that impact will not cause vibrations fatal 
to the components and structures of the build-
ing. The reviewed analyses concerned the reactor, 
fuel and safeguard buildings. STUK also reviewed 
strength and stress analyses concerning aircraft 
impact walls and other key structures.
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Radiation safety
The utility submitted the updated requirements 
specifications and the quality plan for radiation 
measurement systems to STUK for approval. The 
review of the documents will continue in 2008. 
STUK reviewed compliance with the radiation 
protection requirements for the structures of the 
reactor, fuel and safeguard buildings. The radia-
tion protection of the fuel pools was improved by 
adding a steel lining to the concrete surrounding 
the pools.
The independent comparative analysis of radio-
active releases in connection with severe accidents 
at Olkiluoto 3, commissioned by STUK from vTT, 
was completed. STUK employed the analysis when 
reviewing the corresponding analyses submitted 
by the utility. STUK also reviewed the report on 
radiation protection at Olkiluoto 3 in accident con-
ditions submitted by the utility and made remarks 
on it. 
STUK reviewed the requirements for systems’ 
radiation safety, such as radiation protection, dis-
tances between components, accessibility and de-
contamination. This review was part of the pre-
inspection of process systems.
Systems planning
STUK continued the review of the detailed design 
of process systems in 2007, and the process design 
of the systems most significant to safety was ap-
proved. In addition to systems planning, STUK 
reviewed the load specifications related to system 
piping planning. These will function as initial data 
for the detailed piping design. The review of the 
I&c and electrical design of process systems will 
continued in 2008. 
STUK reviewed the updated power supply sys-
tem designs for the reactor plant and the turbine 
plant. The majority of the designs to be updated 
on the basis of STUK’s remarks will be submitted 
in 2008. STUK continued to review the frequency 
and voltage limits to be applied in process plan-
ning. No significant deficiencies were found in the 
reviews. In addition, STUK continued the review 
of the fault analyses for programmable electrical 
components on the basis of the report submitted 
to STUK, justifying the differences between the 
components. 
The utility submitted the technical and func-
tional requirement specifications, quality plans 
and system descriptions for the main I&c systems 
to STUK for review. It was found, based on the 
review, that some of the documents are too gen-
eral, and STUK required that they be made more 
specific. STUK reviewed the design requirements 
for the electrical isolation of the main I&c systems 
and required electrical isolation of protection I&c 
from other I&c systems. STUK assessed the soft-
ware design, the lifecycle of I&c systems design 
and the scope of testing. Regular inspections of 
the in-service inspection programme pertaining 
to the comissioning of mechanical components at 
Olkiluoto 3 are to be made using methods qulified 
in accordance with Guide yvL 3.8. with regard to 
the testing procedure for I&c systems, STUK re-
quired extending the tests to ensure the working of 
the I&c systems as a whole, instead of individual 
I&c systems. In addition to the review of the main 
I&c systems, STUK reviewed individual I&c sys-
tems, such as those of the fuel handling systems.
Design of components and structures
In 2007, the reviews of the detailed component 
design focused on the manufacturing plans for the 
main components (the reactor pressure vessel and 
steam generators with their internals, the pres-
suriser, reactor coolant pumps, main coolant piping 
and control rod drive mechanisms). Reviewing the 
construction plans of other mechanical components 
was continued by STUK and inspection organisa-
tions authorised by STUK. STUK reviewed the 
plans for components such as the emergency cool-
ing system pumps, fuel handling equipment, the 
refuelling machine and the polar crane and the 
most important valves. The review of the plant 
piping planning was also started. STUK reviewed 
the material and manufacturing documents of the 
most important piping and the isometrics of piping. 
Due to the large amount of piping documentation, 
STUK employed consultants for assistance in its 
review. No significant design deficiencies were re-
vealed in the review. 
In 2007, STUK reviewed the specifications of 
components related to safety-classified electrical 
systems that provide the basis for component pro-
curement and manufacturing. STUK put forward 
the inclusion of requirements mainly related to the 
components’ capability to withstand electromag-
netic disturbances. STUK reviewed the structural 
plans of process pump motors. STUK made re-
marks on the content of the structural plans, relat-
ed to such issues as the environmental conditions 
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of the motors and supervision and tests during 
their manufacturing. In addition, the structural 
plans of the diesel motors and generators intended 
for power supply in external grid loss situations 
were reviewed. The review will continue in 2008.
No component-level documents for I&c compo-
nents were submitted to STUK for review in 2007.
The handling of fuel licensing documents con-
tinued with the review of fuel fabrication docu-
ments. 
Ageing management
The ageing management of the main components 
and other safety-significant mechanical compo-
nents is based on the choice of structural compo-
nent materials and high-standard manufacturing 
technology. STUK has paid attention to this issue 
in connection with the oversight of structural plans 
and the manufacturing of the main components. 
During plant operation, the ageing of the compo-
nents will be controlled through periodic inspec-
tions. STUK approved the summary programme 
for the in-service inspections according to Guide 
yvL 3.8 submitted by the utility. The plant ven-
dor and Teollisuuden voima Oy have launched the 
qualification of inspection methods, and STUK has 
reviewed initial data documentation for the quali-
fications.
In connection with the review of the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report, STUK required that a pre-
liminary ageing monitoring programme be drawn up 
for electrical and I&c systems and components dur-
ing the construction of the plant unit. component 
procurement is still in progress, and the programme 
has not yet been submitted to STUK. 
Component qualification and 
proving feasibility
The utility submitted to STUK updated reports on 
the qualification of mechanical, electrical and I&c 
components for accident conditions. STUK proc-
essed the reports and substantially approved the 
presented pressure and temperature conditions 
during accidents to be used for component qualifi-
cation. STUK required the utility to clarify further 
such issues as the radiation conditions during acci-
dents in certain buildings and the conditions in se-
vere accidents. The utility submitted more specific 
reports to STUK towards the end of 2007. Their 
review will continue in 2008.
Design modifications
Documentation on the handling of steam generator 
heat exchanger tube break accidents was submit-
ted to STUK. The modification in accident manage-
ment aims at preventing the dilution of primary 
circuit water and ensuring the nuclear criticality 
safety of the reactor and minimising releases. The 
review of the documentation related to the modifi-
cations by STUK will continue in 2008.
The plant vendor proposed modifications to 
the power supply systems. The modifications con-
cerned securing uninterrupted power supply so 
that power may be supplied to consumers through 
another route in addition to the inverter supply. 
The malfunction at the Forsmark nuclear power 
plant in 2006 is behind the modification.
STUK required electrical isolation between I&c 
systems to prevent potential electromagnetic dis-
turbances in lower safety class systems from caus-
ing disturbances in the higher safety class systems. 
The utility and the plant vendor submitted a pro-
posal on the separation of the protection I&c from 
other systems. The review of the documentation 
will continue in 2008.
The utility submitted a conceptual description 
of the installation of room-specific leak monitoring 
in safety-significant rooms to STUK. The modifica-
tion aims at accelerating the detection of potential 
leaks, the identification of leak routes and the stop-
ping of the leak to minimise releases. The review of 
the documentation will continue in 2008. 
STUK discussed the securing of the nuclear 
criticality safety during refuelling with the utility 
and the plant vendor. The plant has been designed 
based on the assumption that essential fuel charg-
ing errors in terms of nuclear criticality safety can 
be precluded by administrative procedures. STUK 
required structural safety in addition to adminis-
trative procedures. The handling of this issue will 
continue in 2008.
Oversight of design and construction
The oversight of component manufacturing focused 
on the inspections of the main components. STUK’s 
inspector supervised by regular monthly visits the 
manufacturing of the reactor pressure vessel at the 
factory of Mitsubishi heavy Industries in japan 
and the manufacturing of steam generators at the 
plant vendor’s factory in St. Marcel in France. The 
manufacturing of other components, such as the 
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pressuriser and reactor coolant lines, was also wit-
nessed in connection with the visits. The manufac-
turing of the reactor coolant pumps and the control 
rod drive mechanisms was supervised by regular 
visits to the plant vendor’s factory in jeumont, 
France. The manufacturing of the internals of the 
reactor pressure vessel was supervised at Skoda’s 
Pelzen factory in the czech Republic, and the man-
ufacturing of the steel liner ensuring the leak-
tightness of the containment was supervised at 
Energomontaz Polnoc Gdynia’s premises. Through 
its oversight, STUK aims to verify the operation of 
the manufacturers, the plant vendor and the util-
ity, and ensure the compliance of the products with 
the requirements.
The manufacturing of the new batch of re-
actor coolant lines was a particular focus for 
manufacturing oversight. Towards the end of the 
year, Teollisuuden voima Oy and the plant vendor 
presented preliminary results concerning the line 
properties to STUK. The results showed that the 
grain size of the line material was more uniform 
and the lines could be inspected using ultrasonic 
methods. The availability of a suitable inspection 
method for the line material was also assessed by 
STUK together with its consultant at the manu-
facturer’s premises. The results were in line with 
the plant vendor’s results. The review of reports 
related to this issue will continue in 2008. 
construction oversight focused on the manufac-
turing and installation of Safety class 2 steel and 
concrete structures. STUK inspected the readiness 
to start the concreting of Safety class 2 concrete 
structures and authorised the start of concreting. 
The concreting was successful. Installations impor-
tant to safety also started at the construction site. 
For example, parts of the steel liner to be installed 
on the surface of the inner containment were weld-
ed in the summer of 2007. The first tanks and pip-
ing were installed in the containment. STUK also 
inspected the elements inserted into the concrete 
casting, such as steel structures, grip plates and 
piping prior to their installation. 
Repairs of components and structures
Some items requiring repair have been observed 
in connection with the manufacturing of the main 
components (e.g. welding and manufacturing de-
fects). welds have been repaired in accordance with 
approved repair plans, and the original quality re-
quirements have been met. The heat treatment of 
a repair related to the feed water assembly of one 
steam generator failed, due to which the entire 
assembly had to be replaced. The manufacturing 
of reactor coolant lines was resumed after STUK 
approved the line manufacturing programme. The 
first new lines were completed towards the end of 
2007. 
In the summer of 2007, quality defects were de-
tected in the weld between containment steel liner 
parts, as well as defects in the form of the steel liner. 
The root causes for the failure of the weld were 
found to include that the diameters of the large 
cylinders with thin walls joined together by weld-
ing were slightly different, the welding conditions 
changed during the operation and errors were made 
in the welding. The defects in the form of the welded 
structure were repaired by cutting off the erroneous 
parts and welding on new parts to replace them. 
To ensure the quality of the weld, it was X-rayed in 
its entirety in a post-repair inspection. corrective 
action to ensure the quality of other similar welds 
included the modification of the welding method 
and the development of supervision.
Oversight of the preparations 
for plant operation
Teollisuuden voima Oy continued the recruit-
ment and training of personnel needed to operate 
Olkiluoto 3. In 2007, more than 200 people par-
ticipated in training to prepare for plant operation. 
STUK inspected the utility’s training activities. 
The inspection did not reveal any substantial defi-
ciencies in training activities. The utility managed 
to maintain a good learning atmosphere and to 
ensure information dissemination between the dif-
ferent parties involved in the training of operating 
staff.
STUK approved the general structure of the 
plant’s Technical Specifications, and the plant ven-
dor started the detailed writing work. STUK con-
trolled the preparations for operating manuals and 
reviewed the structure of the manuals. The struc-
ture also included instructions for disturbance 
and emergency situations. STUK required more 
detailed clarifications on the scope of the operating 
instructions and the additional analyses to be con-
ducted to support the drafting.
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Oversight of organisational operations 
and quality management
STUK assessed the operation of the organisations 
taking part in the Olkiluoto 3 project in accordance 
with the periodic inspection programme during con-
struction. In addition, operations were observed by 
participating in audits conducted by Teollisuuden 
voima Oy and in connection with document re-
views, construction inspections of components and 
structures, and construction site rounds. STUK’s 
observations showed that the problems detected 
previously in the course of the project in terms 
of the co-ordination of the progress of plant de-
sign, manufacturing and construction, compliance 
with the set quality requirements and guidance of 
subcontractors continued. Problems with the co-
ordination of work and a feeling of haste hampered 
working.
There were still deficiencies in the content 
of the plant design documentation submitted to 
STUK. As the deficiencies passed the review of 
both the plant vendor and the utility, there is still 
room for improvement in the review activities of 
both of them. Due to the deficiencies, STUK could 
not approve the submitted documents as such, but 
requested additional clarifications to design infor-
mation. common deficiencies in the documentation 
included using imprecise expressions in the defini-
tion of design requirements, references to wrong 
reference documents and ignoring or responding 
superficially to STUK’s requirements. The plant 
vendor also had to modify the designs due to ne-
glecting to take some safety requirements into ac-
count. The utility increased the resources needed 
for reviewing the design and manufacturing docu-
mentation due to the feedback from STUK. 
The management of modifications is critical 
in the project as the construction design and con-
struction of the plant are proceeding at different 
phases compared with the other fields of engineer-
ing. Modifications were necessary on the construc-
tion site in terms of the support of process system 
components, for example, as the requirements of 
the process were not fully anticipated in previously 
designed structures.  STUK has required that 
timely information dissemination, decision-making 
and co-operation between the different fields of 
engineering (construction, process, electrical and 
I&c engineering) is ensured more efficiently in the 
project. In 2008, STUK will focus its oversight on 
modification management during the installation 
phase.
The adequate supervision and guidance of sub-
contractors was still challenging for construction 
and manufacturing on site. One indication of this 
was the welding failure in the steel liner of the in-
ner containment, mentioned above. The guidance 
and supervision of subcontractors was deficient; 
the co-ordination of work was inadequate, which 
led to unfavourable welding conditions, the work 
supervisors were not aware of the nuclear safety 
requirements underlying the quality requirements 
for the work, and the supervision of the work was 
inadequate. Due to the event, STUK paid special 
attention to welding operations and their supervi-
sion on the construction site during the summer. 
As a result, room for development was found in 
terms of compliance with welding instructions, the 
management of welding instructions and materials 
and the supervision of welding, as well as quality 
inspections. In addition, STUK required that clear 
requirements for acceptable work be made known 
to all parties and that the utility and the plant 
vendor ensure that subcontractors understand the 
safety significance of their work in order to achieve 
a high-quality outcome. The utility and the plant 
vendor increased the resources for construction 
site supervision, developed the supervision instruc-
tions and provided training on the significance of 
supervision.
component manufacturing mostly proceeded 
well, and any problems and quality defects in man-
ufacturing were detected by the manufacturer, the 
plant vendor or the utility. In some cases, the rush 
in component assembly led to situations where the 
manufacturer and the plant vendor anticipated 
the times of STUK’s construction inspections so 
much that the prerequisites for inspection were not 
present and the inspections had to be rescheduled. 
STUK required the utility to ensure in the future 
that the prerequisites for inspection are present. 
In early 2007, it was detected that the manufac-
turing of the diesel generators was started before 
the relevant plans had been approved. A similar 
observation concerning the start of manufacturing 
was made in the case of some electric motors. In 
both cases, the plant vendor interrupted manufac-
turing, which was not resumed until the plans had 
been approved. STUK required the utility to report 
on the component manufacturing situation and the 
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approval of plans. Early in the year, the utility en-
countered difficulties in acquiring information on 
the different phases of component manufacturing, 
which was due to the large number of components 
and problems related to the launch of reporting. 
The observations concerning the operation of 
organisations and quality management show that 
the difficulties in quality management in the con-
struction of Olkiluoto 3 continued. Even though 
the quality management of the subcontractors 
taking part in the construction and manufactur-
ing operations for Olkiluoto 3 was mostly of a high 
standard, the observed operational deviations and 
the defects detected and repaired in the products 
show that the situation was poorer with some of 
the subcontractors. The subcontractors’ work was 
hampered by deficiencies in the management of 
materials, documents and working methods, for ex-
ample. Several subcontractors improved their op-
erations due to the feedback, and quality manage-
ment developed positively. The inefficiency in the 
reporting and handling of quality deviations and 
their utilisation was a general deficiency that still 
affected both the utility’s and the plant vendor’s 
quality management. STUK required in 2006 that 
the utility and the plant vendor develop deviation 
processing. Teollisuuden voima Oy launched the 
systematic classification of deviations and moni-
toring of the deviation trend in 2007. The efficient 
processing of deviations and their systematic uti-
lisation will be key areas in STUK’s oversight of 
quality management in 2008.
As a positive observation, STUK found that 
the utility and the plant vendor are willing to 
develop their operations in order to supervise de-
sign, construction and manufacturing and make 
project management more efficient. For example, 
Teollisuuden voima Oy has a high-standard inter-
nal familiarisation programme, and the resources 
of design, manufacturing and construction supervi-
sion have been constantly increased. 
4.4 FiR 1 research reactor
The FiR research reactor continued to operate in 
2007 as in previous years.
There were no exceptional events affecting safe-
ty, and occupational radiation doses and radioac-
tive releases into the environment were clearly 
below the set limits. 
In 2007, radiation therapy sessions were pro-
vided twice a week as necessary at the research 
reactor. In addition, the operations included re-
search-related isotope irradiation commissioned by 
external enterprises and basic training in reactor 
physics.
STUK regularly assesses and reviews the doc-
uments on the FiR 1 reactor required by the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. In 2007, vTT, the Technical 
Research centre of Finland, revised the nuclear 
safeguards manual and the changes were approved 
by STUK.
STUK carried out inspections on the opera-
tional safety, physical protection and emergency 
preparedness, nuclear material safeguards and 
radiation protection of the FiR 1 reactor. In its 
inspections, STUK set requirements concerning 
physical protection, among other things, whose 
implementation will be monitored.
vTT must pay special attention to the renewal 
and training of the research reactor staff. The 
personnel and training plan drawn up on the key 
duties of the reactor operating staff concerns the 
training and transfers of the production manager, 
the persons responsible for physical protection, nu-
clear material issues and emergency preparedness, 
as well as fire and radiation protection tasks over 
the next few years. An additional person is needed 
for supervisory reactor operation duties. One of 
the current operators will take up this task after 
further training. The regular renewal of operator 
licences applies to several operators in 2008.
The nuclear safety of the FiR 1 reactor, the con-
dition of its structures, systems and components, 
as well as the human resources and the related 
operating plans are sufficient for continued opera-
tion.
4.5 Preparation for new projects 
Environmental safety assessments 
for new nuclear power plants
STUK submitted statements to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry on the environmental safe-
ty assessment plans of new nuclear power plant 
projects: Teollisuuden voima Oy’s Olkiluoto 4 reac-
tor in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the Loviisa 3 reactor 
in hästholmen, Loviisa.
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Feasibility studies for new nuclear 
power plant projects started 
In 2007, Teollisuuden voima Oy started feasibil-
ity studies on different power plant alternatives 
for an application for a decision-in-principle. From 
the nuclear safety perspective, the purpose of the 
feasibility study is to assess how the plant alter-
natives comply with the Finnish nuclear safety 
requirements. A key objective for the work is to 
identify those design features in the plant types 
that must be developed to achieve compliance 
with the Finnish requirements. At the request of 
Teollisuuden voima Oy, STUK has participated in 
the technical discussions between the utility and 
plant vendors. Fennovoima Oy (Fv), the new actor, 
contacted STUK in order to start similar feasibility 
studies, and requested STUK to begin giving pre-
liminary instructions in accordance with section 55 
of the Nuclear Energy Act. Discussions on the fea-
sibility study with Fennovoima Oy started towards 
the end of the year. Fortum Power and heat Oy 
presented a request to begin discussions on prepar-
ing an application for a decision-in-principle at the 
end of the year. 
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5 Nuclear waste management regulation
STUK’s regulatory control of nuclear waste man-
agement covered the following spheres in 2007:
•	 management of low- and intermediate-level 
waste generated in power plant operation (mi-
nimisation of waste generation, collection, tre-
atment and conditioning, segregation, decon-
tamination, volume reduction, solidification, 
packing, measurements, storage, transfers, final 
disposal, clearance from regulatory control, ac-
counting and reporting, the quality system; see 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 above)
•	 storage of spent fuel (see sections 4.1 and 4.2 
above)
•	 the spent nuclear fuel disposal project
•	 other nuclear waste management programmes.
5.1 Oversight of the spent nuclear 
fuel disposal project
From the perspective of nuclear energy legislation, 
the spent nuclear fuel disposal project may be bro-
ken down into five main stages: 
1. research stage: from the 1970s to the Govern-
ment decision-in-principle
2. site verification and research construction stage: 
from the decision-in-principle to the construc-
tion licence
3. construction stage: from the construction licence 
to the operating licence
4. operating stage: from the operating licence to 
decommissioning
5. terminal stage: from decommissioning to the 
termination of the licensee’s waste manage-
ment obligation. when the final disposal of nu-
clear waste has been carried out acceptably, the 
licensee’s waste management obligation ends 
and the responsibility for the nuclear waste dis-
posed of is transferred to the State.
In 2007, the final disposal project and the related 
oversight activities by STUK were at stage 2, the 
“site verification and research construction stage”. 
The reorganisation, reallocation and refocusing of 
the oversight continued with high priority in ac-
cordance with STUK’s strategy and the nuclear 
waste management operating plan.
In 2000, the Government issued the decision-in-
principle, as required in the Nuclear Energy Act, 
stating that the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
in the bedrock at Olkiluoto is in line with the over-
all good of society. Parliament ratified the decision 
in May 2001. The decision-in-principle states that 
the spent nuclear fuel disposal project may proceed 
to the construction of an underground rock charac-
terisation facility and more detailed investigations. 
This statement indicates how far the implemen-
tation of the final disposal project may proceed 
pursuant to the decision-in-principle, taking into 
account that the underground research facility re-
ferred to in the decision-in-principle is intended to 
be used as a part of the final disposal facility to be 
constructed later. 
In addition to the construction of the under-
ground rock characterisation facility, the decision-
in-principle specifically mentions more detailed 
investigations; in other words, the Government 
and Parliament have required that research, devel-
opment and design activities should be continued 
in order to specify the safety case further. 
The actions taken by Posiva Oy, the applicant 
for the decision-in-principle, to implement the deci-
sion are governed by the Nuclear Energy Act and 
fall under STUK’s regulatory control. In 2007, the 
final disposal project progressed in accordance with 
the decision-in-principle. In the year under review, 
the control of the final disposal project comprised: 
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•	 oversight	of	the	underground	rock	characterisa-
tion facility construction (ONKALO oversight),
•	 review	and	assessment	of	the	R&D	and	techni-
cal design activities to further specify the safety 
case for final disposal (R&D and design over-
sight), and 
•	 regulatory	control	related	to	nuclear	non-proli-
feration pertaining to the research facility (the 
regulatory control of nuclear non-proliferation 
that ensures that in the implementation of 
the ONKALO project, there is no room for 
doubt that Finland fulfils her duties concerning 
nuclear safeguards, now and in the future, see 
chapter 6).
5.1.1 Oversight of rock characterisation 
facility construction (ONKALO oversight) 
Overall safety assessment
The construction of Onkalo is proceeding on sched-
ule. The construction may affect the long-term 
safety of final disposal by changing the proper-
ties of the bedrock and groundwater surrounding 
the repository. The safe implementation of final 
disposal activities also requires that the facility is 
designed taking into account occupational safety 
aspects. The impact of the construction of Onkalo 
has been monitored by means of various meas-
urements, and the criteria derived from long-term 
safety assessment have not been exceeded. No fac-
tors compromising safety have been detected in the 
design and implementation of the structures and 
systems important to safety. 
Oversight and observations
STUK oversaw the construction of the underground 
rock characterisation facility (Onkalo) by review-
ing Posiva’s design documentation and performing 
inspections on the construction site. In 2007, the 
oversight focused on rock sealing, the management 
of inflows that could change the groundwater con-
ditions, and foreign materials (e.g., concrete) used 
in the excavation of Onkalo that could have a det-
rimental impact on chemical conditions and thus 
impair long-term safety. The operation of organisa-
tions was also assessed by means of inspections in 
2007, and the inspection of Posiva’s management 
and quality system was started. 
Oversight of design and construction
STUK revised the oversight of the construction 
of Onkalo in 2007. The construction inspection 
programme (RTO) provided a framework for the 
oversight activities. STUK reviewed and approved 
Onkalo’s safety classification document, submitted 
to STUK for the first time. The document presents 
the classification of systems, structures and compo-
nents in accordance with their safety significance. 
As a result of the review, STUK required Posiva to 
submit a revised document, which must provide a 
more extensive description of the analysis of safety 
significance on which the classification is based, 
and be supplemented in other regards to comply 
with STUK’s requirements.
The construction of Onkalo involves many de-
sign and as-built documents at different phases 
that STUK reviews. In 2007, STUK laid down 
requirements related to these and their delivery, 
covering organisational issues, the regulations, 
guidelines and standards to be applied, the initial 
data used in design, design drawings, construction 
documents and as-built documentation, and the 
related schedules and notification of deviations to 
STUK. 
During the year under review, STUK completed 
the review of the basic construction documen-
tation referred to in section 35 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, concerning the preliminary safety 
analysis report, the classification document, qual-
ity assurance, physical protection and emergency 
preparedness and safeguards of nuclear materials, 
and found them sufficient in terms of scope and 
content. 
STUK reviewed the geological mapping data on 
Onkalo’s access tunnel from 1,300 metres to 2,350 
metres. The aim of the review is to ensure suffi-
cient scope and correctness of the mapping data. 
Oversight of the organisation 
and procedures
STUK’s oversight of Posiva’s organisation com-
prised inspections on project management, han-
dling of safety issues and construction procedures. 
Based on the inspections, STUK required improve-
ments in the instructions and written procedures 
concerning the construction of the rock characteri-
sation facility, concerning, e.g., procedures for han-
dling deviations, action thresholds in the quality 
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assurance guidelines and ensuring the competence 
of personnel.
STUK started the inspection of Posiva’s man-
agement system in the autumn of 2007, which is to 
be completed in May 2008. The content and imple-
mentation of this inspection was revised to corre-
spond to the inspection of the management system 
of an organisation responsible for the construction 
of a nuclear facility.
STUK also oversees Posiva’s subcontractors 
based on the safety significance of their work. 
STUK observes their activities through inspections, 
by participating in audits conducted by Posiva, and 
in connection with document processing, meetings, 
construction inspections of components and struc-
tures, and construction site and laboratory rounds. 
5.1.2 Assessment and review of research, 
development and design activities to 
further specify the safety case for final 
disposal (R&D and design oversight)
The oversight of R&D and design activities com-
prises independent assessment of Posiva’s activi-
ties and their results, forming an opinion of them 
and, as necessary, guidance and formulation of re-
quirements as well. STUK attempts to ensure that 
as good a result as possible is achieved as certainly 
as possible. This objective and ultimately the qual-
ity of Posiva’s performance determine how STUK 
acts in terms of the oversight of R&D and design 
activities at any given time.
STUK’s oversight of R&D and design activities 
comprise reviews of the current documentation for 
the safety case of the final disposal facility, com-
parative analyses, identification of open safety is-
sues and inspections of Posiva’s and its subcontrac-
tors’ management and quality systems. In 2007, 
STUK reviewed more than 100 reports delivered 
by Posiva. STUK also initiated four extensive as-
sessments supported by external expert teams, two 
of which were completed in 2007.
Encapsulation and final disposal
STUK’s internal and external resources in this 
field were both increased substantially during the 
year, based on the principle that key expertise 
must be available in STUK’s own organisation and 
that independent external expertise and techni-
cal support for conducting safety assessments and 
practical inspections will be acquired as necessary. 
During the year, STUK recruited experts e.g. on 
encapsulation techniques and the bentonite buffer, 
and set up an international team of experts fo-
cussing on final disposal technology to support the 
processing of safety issues.
The design of Posiva’s encapsulation and fi-
nal disposal facilities has progressed based on 
long-term planning. The plans of the preliminary 
design stage were completed towards the end of 
2006. STUK reviewed the plans and documenta-
tion included in more than twenty reports. The 
objects of review included the design and construc-
tion of the repository, the systems monitoring 
how the construction of the repository affects the 
safety-significant properties of the bedrock, the 
encapsulation and final disposal process, systems 
planning, systems’ safety classification, the layout 
of the facilities, rock and concrete construction, fire 
compartmentalisation and fire safety, radiation 
protection design, radiation classification, radia-
tion monitoring, the closing of the repository and 
waste treatment. The review was mostly carried 
out in 2007, and the assessment was finalised in 
early 2008. 
In 2007, STUK held two meetings with Posiva 
concerning technical barriers to deal with the safe-
ty issues brought up by STUK. The follow-up list of 
safety issues was revised towards the end of 2007. 
STUK prepared a review of the waste canister 
design report and its background reports, pub-
lished in 2005, which was submitted to Posiva and 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry for informa-
tion. The review raised issues whose resolution 
STUK will follow while Posiva’s development work 
progresses. 
STUK’s oversight also covered Posiva’s develop-
ment work on waste canister manufacturing tech-
niques, which Posiva has continued in co-operation 
with the Swedish nuclear waste company SKB. 
Using the pierce-draw method, which is Posiva’s 
responsibility, two copper canisters were manu-
factured in Germany in 2006. The objective of the 
manufacturing tests was a sufficiently small cop-
per grain size and a homogenous microstructure 
in the canister’s walls and bottom. These objectives 
were attained. 
STUK also oversees the development work on 
copper canister welding. Posiva has continued cop-
per canister lid electron beam welding tests in 
co-operation with Patria at the Linnavuori factory 
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in Nokia, and has made distinct progress in weld-
ing technology development. In 2007, the electron 
beam welding tests focused on developing new 
electron beam control and measuring equipment, 
improving and characterising the quality of weld-
ing, the preparation of preliminary welding in-
structions and welding modelling (heat transfer). 
In 2007, STUK oversaw the development of 
waste canister inspection techniques, which Posiva 
has performed in co-operation with vTT Research 
centre of Finland and SKB, among others. Posiva 
has also continued planning the inspection quali-
fication procedure. In 2007, issues related to non-
destructive testing methods (NDT) included the 
drafting and development of inspection guidelines, 
the definition of preliminary approval criteria (ac-
ceptable defect sizes), and the reliability and mod-
elling of NDT methods.
STUK also oversaw the R&D and design activi-
ties related to the bentonite buffer. Posiva contin-
ued the planning of the BENTO project, the devel-
opment project begun in 2006 to investigate issues 
related to the performance of bentonite and to 
develop manufacturing and installation techniques 
as well as domestic expertise in the field. In 2007, 
Posiva began developing manufacturing methods 
for bentonite blocks, which heretofore has been 
carried out under SKB’s lead in Sweden. The R&D 
work on tunnel backfilling techniques is being car-
ried out in co-operation with SKB within the Baclo 
project, which has progressed to its third phase.
Posiva, together with SKB, completed the KBS-
3h project developing the horizontal disposal of 
waste canisters in 2007. Posiva will finalise the 
report on the development project in early 2008. 
Posiva and SKB will then decide on the further 
development of this alternative disposal concept on 
the basis of the results. STUK will review the KBS-
3h documents in 2008.
Verfying site investigations
Posiva delivered to STUK the extensive “Site 2006” 
documentation concerning the repository site at 
Olkiluoto, which STUK reviewed with the assist-
ance of both Finnish and international experts. 
The aim of the site investigations pertaining to the 
documentation is to investigate and describe the 
current state of the bedrock, its development to the 
current state, and the impact of the construction 
of Onkalo on the bedrock and its safety-significant 
properties and their preservation. The documenta-
tion provides some of the essential bases for a site-
specific safety analysis.
STUK’s safety assessment dealt with the issues 
important to safety, such as: 
•	 research and data acquisition methods and re-
search materials
•	 geology: descriptions of rock types and their al-
teration, the volumes and shapes of rock types, 
fault and fracture zones, fracture minerals and 
the geological model
•	 rock mechanics: rock stress, physical properties, 
thermal properties, the mechanical stability of 
the bedrock
•	 hydrogeology: groundwater salinity, hydrostatic 
pressure, hydraulic conductivities, groundwater 
level measurements, definition of the hydrogeo-
logical zones, groundwater flow models
•	 hydrogeochemistry: chemical parameters of 
groundwater, the representativeness of samples, 
microbial effects, buffer capacity, groundwater 
salinity, solute methane, groundwater mixing 
ratio, the groundwater chemistry model
•	 modelling of groundwater flow and salinity de-
velopment
•	 prediction of Onkalo’s properties and the impact 
of construction.
STUK’s concluded in its review that the repository 
site surveys and investigations described in the 
documentation have attained the objectives set for 
this stage. The review report delivered to Posiva 
also included a number of safety issues where ad-
ditional reports and work were considered neces-
sary.
Meetings with Posiva to comprehensively re-
view the safety issues concerning the repository 
site were held every six months. Members of 
STUK’s team of international experts also partici-
pated in these meetings. 
During the year under review, STUK updated 
the follow-up list of open safety issues related to 
the repository twice, with the assistance of an ex-
ternal team of international experts. 
STUK’s oversight also covered the four new 
deep holes drilled by Posiva in the research area, 
where geophysical and hydrological research was 
conducted. One research excavation was mapped 
for fractures, rock type distribution and degree of 
alteration.
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In 2007, STUK also oversaw the monitoring 
programme in the ONKALO area carried out by 
Posiva, aimed at monitoring what safety-signif-
icant changes the construction of Onkalo may 
cause in the bedrock (e.g., inflow of groundwater 
into Onkalo, excavation damage to intact rock, 
materials such as concrete, introduced to Onkalo 
due to excavation, that are potentially harmful to 
long-term safety, and rock movement). The first 
summary report subject to review was completed 
in 2006.
STUK’s oversight also covered bedrock re-
search methods used by Posiva in investigations 
made from the surface and research carried out 
in ONKALO. A comprehensive report on the re-
search methods was completed and reviewed. 
Other objects of oversight in 2007 included numer-
ous other interpretations of the investigations in 
Olkiluoto and geological background reports, pub-
lished in Posiva’s report series. Bedrock research 
in Olkiluoto continued both from the surface and 
through research carried out in Onkalo. 
Oversight of the development of 
safety analysis and the safety case
Posiva’s safety case for the final disposal facility 
will consist of a Safety case Portfolio containing 
reports and materials that are updated every few 
years. The portfolio covers the following main docu-
mentation items:
1. the repository site,
2. the properties of spent fuel,
3. the canister,
4. the final repository,
5. the processes (the internal and external phe-
nomena, events and natural processes affecting 
the operation of the final disposal system)
6. the long-term evolution of the site and the re-
pository,
7. the biosphere,
8. release of radionuclides (which is the actual nu-
merical safety analysis),
9. complementary safety analyses (e.g. natural 
analogies)
10. summary documentation.
The review of documentation items 1–4 in 2007 
has been discussed above. with regard to item 7, 
STUK received for review partial documentation 
concerning the biosphere, dealing with the con-
cept and guidelines for numerical safety analy-
sis, the biomass, activity, structure and functional 
variation of the microbe population at various sites 
in Olkiluoto, biosphere modelling, environmen-
tal monitoring, including its results, and types of 
vegetation, including the main processes affecting 
them. with regard to items 5, 6 and 8, the reviews 
will be conducted during 2008.
Other safety research
Posiva’s safety research is also based on long-term 
bilateral and multilateral collaboration projects. 
The majority of the bilateral research projects are 
included in the collaboration between Posiva and 
the Swedish SKB. The most significant multilat-
eral research projects are the integrated projects 
NF-PRO, FUNMIG, PAMINA and ThERESA with-
in the EU’s sixth framework programme, in which 
Posiva and Finnish research institutes participate. 
STUK considered Posiva’s research collabora-
tion in 2007 to be sufficiently extensive and of a 
sufficiently high standard. The collaboration with 
the Swedish SKB was particularly extensive. In 
addition to technical and scientific benefits, inter-
national collaboration helped to increase openness 
concerning Posiva’s activities towards the scien-
tific community, which STUK considers to have a 
significant impact by promoting safety and safety 
culture. 
To the extent that Posiva directly employs the 
results of R&D conducted by others in the ac-
tivities under STUK’s regulatory control, STUK 
reviews this work in the same way as the opera-
tion and outputs of Posiva’s other subcontractors. 
Depending on the safety significance, STUK fol-
lows the activities of the participating organisa-
tions through inspections, e.g. by participating in 
audits performed by Posiva.
5.1.3 Statements under the 
Nuclear Energy Degree 
In accordance with the policy approved by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Teollisuuden 
voima Oy (TvO) and Fortum Power and heat Oyj 
(FPh) must submit a comprehensive report on the 
situation and future plans for their research, de-
velopment and design activities (TKS activities) in 
the field of nuclear waste management every three 
years. The report functions as the key reference re-
port for the reporting referred to in sections 74–75 
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of the Nuclear Energy Decree. In the autumn of 
2006, the utilities published the comprehensive re-
port TKS-2006, Nuclear waste Management of the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa Power Plants, Programme 
for Research, Development and Technical Design 
for 2007–2009. STUK reviewed the report assisted 
by an international team of experts, and submit-
ted its statement to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. STUK stated that the plans show sig-
nificant progress since the previous period, but 
there are still considerable development needs in a 
number of areas. STUK also considered the sched-
ule for the construction licence application to be 
tight. In STUK’s opinion, conclusions on whether 
the schedule is realistic should not be made until 
the next TKS report is being reviewed, by which 
time Posiva must preliminarily deliver the safety 
reports required for the construction licence and, 
with regard to incomplete reports, submit a plan 
for their completion.
In September, Teollisuuden voima Oy and 
Fortum Power and heat Oyj delivered a report on 
future actions in the field of nuclear waste man-
agement for 2008 to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, which included a report on general plans 
for the next five years. According to the policy 
approved by the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
in 2002, this report, together with the R&D and 
technical design (TKS) programme report deliv-
ered at three-year intervals, covers the reports 
required under section 74 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree. STUK reviewed the documents related to 
the utilities’ waste management programme and 
gave a statement on them to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry according to section 78 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. 
STUK also reviewed the documents on the 
financial provision made for the costs of nuclear 
waste management referred to in section 90 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and submitted statements 
on them to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In 
its statements, STUK assessed the technical plans 
and cost estimates on which financial provision is 
based.
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6 Nuclear non-proliferation
Safeguards of nuclear materials constitute a re-
quirement for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Accordingly, Finland has in place a national system 
for nuclear material control, which is maintained 
by STUK. Provisions on the control system are laid 
down in section 118 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, 
and its purpose is to carry out the safeguards for 
the use of nuclear energy that are necessary for the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, 
STUK’s task is to attend to the control pertaining 
to international agreements in the field of nuclear 
energy signed by Finland. 
International safeguards are implemented by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European commission’s Directorate 
General for Transport and Energy, Directorates 
h and I (Euratom). IAEA safeguards are based on 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards 
Agreement, (INFcIRc/193) signed by non-nuclear 
weapon EU Member States, the European Atomic 
Energy Agency and the IAEA, as well as the 
Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement 
(INFcIRc/193/Add.8). EU safeguards are based on 
the Euratom Treaty and commission Regulation 
EURATOM 302/2005. According to section 63 of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK’s presence is re-
quired in inspections performed by the IAEA and 
Euratom in Finland.
The Additional Protocol to the Nuclear 
Safeguards Agreement gave the IAEA more exten-
sive rights to acquire information and carry out 
inspections to facilitate discovery of secret nuclear 
programmes. This new agreement entered into 
force in the EU on 30 April 2004. The Additional 
Protocol entitles the IAEA to gather more infor-
mation on activities in the nuclear field. States 
must notify the IAEA of research and development 
projects related to the nuclear fuel cycle, manufac-
turing of components in the nuclear field and their 
export. In addition, the IAEA gathers information 
from open sources, operates satellites and collects 
environmental samples. The Additional Protocol 
allows the IAEA more extensive access rights to 
inspect nuclear sector activities. Such complemen-
tary access visits may be carried out at very brief 
notice.
STUK’s nuclear safeguards activities apply to 
all nuclear commodities in Finland: supervision 
and accounting systems, imports, use, transport, 
storage, transfers, removal from use and final 
disposal. Nuclear commodities include nuclear ma-
terials (uranium, plutonium and thorium), cer-
tain other substances (deuterium and graphite), 
as well as nuclear devices, equipment and doc-
umentation; 99.8% of all nuclear materials in 
Finland are located in nuclear power plants. The 
most significant other nuclear material holder is 
the FiR 1 research reactor operated by vTT, the 
Technical Research centre of Finland. STUK, the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
helsinki, OMG Kokkola chemicals, the University 
of jyväskylä, The Geological Survey of Finland, and 
some other institutions also have small amounts 
of nuclear materials in their possession. A few 
consignments of nuclear materials are annually 
imported into Finland and transported here. The 
most significant ones are imports and transports 
of nuclear fuel. currently, only fresh fuel is trans-
ported in Finland.
STUK controls nuclear material holders through 
facility and transport inspections and document re-
views. At facilities, STUK verifies that the quantity 
of nuclear materials and their physical location 
comply with the accounting records. STUK reviews 
the documents on the facilities’ nuclear manage-
ment: reports, notifications and nuclear safeguard 
manuals, and grants the licences required for 
control. In addition, STUK deals with the authori-
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sation of international inspectors and submits to 
the IAEA the declarations concerning Finland 
and Finnish facilities required by the Additional 
Protocol. 
The quantities of nuclear materials in Finland 
by facility and material category are shown in 
Table 6. The licences according to the Nuclear 
Energy Act are listed in Appendix 4.
6.1 Nuclear safeguards activities 
and results in 2007
Licences and approvals
In 2007, STUK granted ten import licences and 
one export licence for nuclear commodities to 
Teollisuuden voima Oy, and three import licences 
and one export licence to Fortum. In addition, vTT, 
the Technical Research centre of Finland, was 
granted licences for exporting documentation and 
nuclear material. STUK submitted two statements 
related to licence applications to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, one concerning equipment ex-
port and the other concerning import of nuclear 
material.
In 2007, STUK granted one transport licence 
for fresh nuclear fuel and approved four transport 
plans for such fuel. Fresh fuel was imported by 
Finnish nuclear power plants from Sweden, Spain 
and Russia.
In 2007, STUK approved the updated nuclear 
material manual of the Loviisa plant, a second 
person responsible for nuclear safeguards at the 
Loviisa plant, the new substitute for the manager 
responsible for the Department of Radiochemistry 
at the University of helsinki, and the new man-
ager responsible for the accelerator laboratory of 
the Department of Physics at the University of 
jyväskylä.
In 2007, STUK approved nine new Euratom in-
spectors and 28 new IAEA inspectors to carry out 
inspections in Finland.
Declarations required under the 
Additional Protocol were submitted 
correctly and on time
Declarations pertaining to Finland, required under 
the Additional Protocol, totalled 18 in 2007, and 
all of them were submitted on time. STUK sub-
mitted to the IAEA annual declarations, the most 
significant of which are descriptions of plant sites. 
In addition, STUK submits to the IAEA quarterly 
information on exports according to the Additional 
Protocol. Euratom submitted to the IAEA the dec-
larations pertaining to Finland under its responsi-
bility.
Finnish nuclear safeguards functioned well
In 2007, STUK’s safeguards activities focused on 
both inspections of the known licensees and initi-
ating control of potentially undeclared operations 
throughout Finland, in accordance with the ob-
ligations and objectives of revised international 
safeguards. 
The technical analysis methods applied in the 
control contribute to ensuring that nuclear materi-
als and operations are in accordance with the noti-
Table 6. Amounts of nuclear materials in Finland 31 December 2007.
Location
Natural uranium 
(kg)
Enriched uranium 
(kg)
Depleted  
uranium (kg)
Plutonium 
(kg)
Thorium 
(kg)
Loviisa plant – 510 970 – 4 218 –
Olkiluoto 1 – 186 894 – 762 –
Olkiluoto 2 – 191 143 – 845 –
Olkiluoto, spent fuel storage 
(KPA)
– 960 786 – 7 983 –
VTT / FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 0.002 – –
OMG Kokkola Chemicals 1 486 – – – –
STUK 44.7 1,4 857 0.003 2.5
University of Helsinki, 
laboratory of radiochemistry
40.4 0,3 20 0.003 2.5
Other facililties ~0 ~0 ~817 ~0 –
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fications and that all operations are notified. STUK 
applies the methods to identify the materials and 
verify that the information notified by the facili-
ties, e.g. the degree of uranium enrichment as well 
as fuel burn-up and the cooling period, is correct 
and complete. The methods employed comprise 
non-destructive measurements used to verify spent 
fuel, and environmental sampling.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their ori-
gin and treatment. The environmental samples 
collected in nuclear safeguards activities are used 
to investigate these traces in order to determine 
whether the nuclear operations comply with the 
notifications. Samples are collected as wipe sam-
ples from surfaces at sites where nuclear materials 
are handled.
The results of inspections carried out in 2007 
show that Finnish nuclear safeguards function 
well. No materials or operations conflicting with 
the notifications were observed, and the inspected 
materials and operations corresponded to the noti-
fications submitted by the facilities. In its inspec-
tions STUK made remarks to two operators in 
2007, and required that they make their reports 
and method descriptions more specific. The IAEA 
and Euratom made no remarks concerning the 
inspections. All of the facilities operated in a way 
that facilitated STUK’s fulfilment of the obliga-
tions of the international agreements in the nu-
clear field signed by Finland.
In 2007, STUK carried out a total of 27 nuclear 
materials inspections at nuclear power plants, 
including 10 at Loviisa and 17 at Olkiluoto. Of 
these, Euratom participated in 20 and the IAEA 
in 21 inspections. In 2007, STUK verified by non-
destructive methods 227 spent fuel assemblies and 
two hermetic bottles used for storing fuel rods at 
the Olkiluoto power plant, and 253 spent fuel as-
semblies at the Loviisa power plant. 
During the year, STUK collected two wipe 
samples and sent six samples collected in 2006 for 
analysis. 
In addition, STUK inspected the transport of 
fresh fuel to Loviisa in 2007.
STUK, the IAEA and Euratom carried out one 
joint inspection of a nuclear material inventory for 
the FiR 1 research reactor operated by vTT, in con-
nection with which STUK made a remark to vTT 
concerning deficiencies in vTT’s accounting and 
reporting system. In a follow-up inspection, STUK 
found them to be appropriately corrected. STUK 
reviewed an update of vTT’s nuclear safeguard 
manual. In 2007, STUK, the IAEA and Euratom 
carried out inspections at STUK’s premises, the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of helsinki and OMG Kokkola chemicals, and 
complementary audits according to the Additional 
Protocol at the University of jyväskylä on 6 june 
2007 and at Metso’s premises in Tampere on 27 
September 2007.
Nuclear safeguards at Onkalo 
STUK has obliged Posiva Oy, which is examining 
final disposal and its implementation, to ensure 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards during 
the construction of Onkalo, as the underground 
research facility (Onkalo) is designed to become 
part of a final disposal facility. The aim of the obli-
gation is to ensure that all necessary information 
on the final disposal facility will be available in 
due course, and that it will be possible to show that 
no undeclared operations relevant to nuclear safe-
guards exist in the final repository area. Another 
aim is to ensure that the IAEA can be assured of 
Finland’s capability to implement adequate safe-
guards and plan cost-efficient future control and 
inspection procedures. The final disposal of nuclear 
fuel in an underground repository presents new 
challenges for safeguards planning and implemen-
tation since, after encapsulation, nuclear material 
verification will be impossible in practice.
In 2007, STUK carried out four nuclear non-
proliferation inspections on the Onkalo construc-
tion site to ascertain that the underground facili-
ties correspond to the notifications. Three of these 
were normal periodic inspections and one was 
organised for the IAEA’s and Euratom’s technical 
visit in order to familiarise these organisation’s 
representatives with the nuclear non-proliferation 
controls implemented by Posiva and STUK. STUK 
also inspected Posiva’s nuclear non-proliferation 
system in 2007, and prompted Posiva to update the 
non-proliferation procedures in its nuclear non-
proliferation manual. The IAEA participated as an 
observer in a total of three inspections of Onkalo in 
2007, and Euratom in two.
STUK and Posiva provided the European 
Union’s jRc Ispra with an opportunity to scan 
the underground premises with a digital laser 
scanner. The results were compared with Posiva’s 
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own measurements, which provided STUK with an 
independent verification of the excavated premises. 
STUK submitted a summary of the regulation of 
the construction of the underground research fa-
cilities to the IAEA and Euratom on 23 April 2007, 
and submitted a notification concerning the project 
as required by the Additional Protocol.
STUK controlled transfers 
of nuclear products 
In order to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and sensitive nuclear technology, STUK controlled 
transfers of nuclear products and provided expert 
assistance to the customs authorities, the police 
and other authorities in 2007. A licence granted by 
either STUK or the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
is required for imports and exports of nuclear prod-
ucts. STUK’s licence and a transport plan approved 
by STUK are required for the transport of nuclear 
materials. STUK participated in border control by 
providing expert assistance to the customs authori-
ties in terms of the action required for abnormal 
events detected by radiation monitors and the de-
velopment of radiation control at the borders, such 
as equipment acquisitions.
One of the abnormal radiation detections in bor-
der control in 2007 was related to nuclear materi-
als. A piece of depleted uranium was transported to 
Finland within a load of scrap metal. The uranium 
was delivered to STUK and included in nuclear 
material accounting.
6.2 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty
The comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(cTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It will enter into 
force after ratification by 44 separately designated 
states. Finland ratified it in 1999. Adherence to the 
Treaty is monitored by means of an international 
monitoring system (IMS), which, when complete, 
will comprise 321 monitoring stations. Of these, 80 
stations detect radioactive particles in the atmos-
phere and 40 are also capable of detecting radioac-
tive xenon gas. The measurement results of the 
monitoring stations are available to all Member 
States.
A special Preparatory commission, which con-
venes in vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s 
entry into force. All signatory states are represent-
ed in the commission. The Provisional Technical 
Secretariat, whose tasks include constructing and 
maintaining the international monitoring system, 
operates in vienna as well.
STUK contributed to the work of the Preparatory 
commission for the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organisation (cTBTO) in establishing 
a cost-effective organisation that is functional from 
the Finnish perspective. The automatic analysis 
software used for the STUK’s routine monitoring 
of IMS data analysed on average about 600 gamma 
spectra per day in 2007, which represents an in-
crease of almost 20% compared with the previous 
year. The increasing number of analyses is due to 
the fact that new stations are still being construct-
ed for the cTBTO’s network of monitoring stations. 
Routine monitoring is facilitated by an alarm sys-
tem transmitting data on unusual observations 
to STUK personnel. No abnormal activity levels 
relevant to the Treaty were observed in 2007.
In 2007, STUK also developed the software nec-
essary for analysing xenon gas measurements. The 
cTBTO’s xenon gas monitoring station network is 
developing rapidly, and it was possible to confirm 
the North Korean nuclear test carried out in 2006 
based on xenon gas measurements. 
STUK received notifications of abnormal seis-
mic events in the Kola peninsula area, sent by the 
Institute of Seismology on 20 August 2007 and 29 
October 2007. STUK participated in investigations 
of both cases. Neither of them indicated a nuclear 
explosion.
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7 Safety research
The purpose of safety research is to ascertain that 
the authorities have adequate expertise available, 
also concerning unforeseeable issues affecting the 
safety of nuclear facilities. Publicly-funded safety 
research is divided into two research programmes, 
of which SAFIR2010 focuses on nuclear power 
plant safety and KyT2010 on strategic analyses of 
nuclear waste management. The projects under the 
research programmes are selected annually on the 
basis of a public call for projects. The projects se-
lected for the programmes must be of a high scien-
tific standard and their results must be available 
for publication. The results must have a broader 
scope of applicability than the nuclear facility of a 
particular licensee. STUK controls this research by 
contributing to the work of the programmes’ steer-
ing and reference groups. The Ministry of Trade 
and Industry ascertains that the proposed group 
of projects for each year meet the statutory re-
quirements and STUK’s research needs related to 
nuclear safety. STUK issued its statement on the 
projects under the publicly-funded SAFIR2010 re-
search programme for 2007 in january, and a cor-
responding statement on the KyT2010 programme 
in February.
The final seminar of the predecessor of SAFIR 
2010, the four-year SAFIR research programme, 
was held in january. The new four-year SAFIR2010 
programme, similar to the previous one, was 
launched at the same time. The core areas of the 
new programme are fuel and reactor physics, 
structural safety of the reactor circuit, thermal hy-
draulics and accident analyses. A slightly lesser in-
put is directed at organisations and human factors, 
automation and control room, and the employment 
of probabilistic risk analysis in safety manage-
ment and control. As a new feature, construction 
safety is a separate area of research under the pro-
gramme. The funding of the SAFIR2010 research 
programme totalled €6.3 million in 2007, which 
represents about half of the nuclear facility safety 
research in Finland. The research programme pro-
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted 
by research institutions, universities and utilities 
operating nuclear power plants. In general terms, 
nuclear safety research comprises two distinct 
areas of research: nuclear power plant safety and 
nuclear waste management.
Public research programmes related to nuclear 
safety currently operational in Finland are the 
nuclear power plant safety research programme 
SAFIR2010 (2007–2010) and the national nuclear 
waste management research programme KYT2010 
(2006–2010). 
The purpose of these programmes is not only 
to provide scientific and technical results, but also 
to ensure the maintenance and development of 
Finnish expertise. The Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy provides information on the 
projects on its website at www.tem.fi.
Finnish actors contribute extensively to inter-
national nuclear safety research within the frame-
work of the following programmes and organisa-
tions: the European Union’s framework research 
programmes (both fission and fusion research), 
the Nordic safety research programme NKS, the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD, and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
within the UN family.
Finnish actors have also preliminarily 
charted issues related to the technology, safety 
and economy of new-generation GEN4 reactors. 
GEN4 research is financed within the four-year 
Sustainable Energy (SusEn) research programme 
of the Academy of Finland, launched at the begin-
ning of 2008. Research into generation IV reactors 
is part of energy technology research.
* The Ministry of Trade and Industry became the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy at the 
beginning of 2008.
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vided funding to 30 research projects in various 
areas of research. The areas of research under 
SAFIR2010 and their shares of the total funding 
are shown in Figure 12.
The safety research programme supports safe 
operation of the existing nuclear power plants, and 
also prepares for new plants. The expertise gen-
erated within the research programme has been 
utilised in the review and assessment carried out 
in 2007 related to the extension of the operating 
licences for the Loviisa nuclear power plants and 
when assessing the safety of the new plant under 
construction. Experts, calculating methods and 
test equipment have been employed in terms of is-
sues related to ageing management and the review 
Figure 12. Distribution of the costs of research and 
commissioned work pertaining to the safety of nuclear 
power plants.
Figure 13. Distribution of the costs of research and 
commissioned work pertaining to nuclear waste 
management and nuclear non-proliferation.
Organisation and human factors
Automation and control room
Fuel and reactor physics
Thermal hydraulics
Severe accidents
Structural safety of reactor circuit
Construction safety
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA)
5 %
9 %
16 %
13 %
13 %
23 %
13 %
8 %
Strategic clarifications
Engineered barrier systems 
Bedrock and groundwater 
Release and transport of radionuclides
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41 %
of accident analyses, and, with regard to the new 
plant, to assess the quality and manufacturing 
methods of reactor circuit piping, estimate the fire 
resistance of cables and ensure that requirements 
for aircraft impact are met.
Twenty applications were received for the KyT 
programme for 2007, 18 of which were accepted. 
Thirteen of them continued the work carried out 
the previous year. The total volume of the pro-
gramme in 2007 was €1.2 million, and it was di-
vided into four main areas: strategic analyses (3 
projects), technical barriers (5), the bedrock and 
groundwater (4), and the release and migration 
of radionuclides (6). Figure 13 shows the relative 
shares of these areas of the total funding.
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8 Nuclear facilities regulation and 
development of regulation
8.1 Processes and structures
8.1.1 Document review
A total of 3,770 documents were submitted to 
STUK for review in 2007. Of these, 1,969 con-
cerned the nuclear power plant under construction, 
and 62 were related to the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel. Document reviews totalling 3,447 
were completed, including documents submitted in 
Figure 15. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant .
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Figure 16. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2.
Figure 17. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 14. Number of documents received and 
reviewed as well as average document review time.
2007, those submitted earlier and licences granted 
by STUK in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, which are listed in Appendix 4. The average 
document review time was 71 days. The number 
of documents and their average review times in 
2003-2007 are shown in Figure 14. Figures 15, 16 
and 17 present the distribution of document review 
times for the different plant units. 
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8.1.2 Inspections on site and at 
suppliers’ premises 
Periodic inspection programmes
The 2007 periodic inspection programme (Appendix 
5) was planned to include 23 inspections at the 
Loviisa plant and 20 at the Olkiluoto plant. During 
the year, it was found that STUK did not have the 
resources to carry out all of the inspections and, 
accordingly, it was decided to omit four inspections 
at the Loviisa plant and five at the Olkiluoto plant. 
In addition, a total of four inspections were post-
poned to the beginning of 2008 due to co-ordination 
of schedules. Two additional inspections were car-
ried out at the Olkiluoto plant, concerning the im-
plementation of organisational changes and the 
personnel resources of the reactor physics office. 
The observations are presented in the chapters on 
regulation. 
In 2007, STUK carried out 11 inspections of the 
Olkiluoto 3 construction inspection programme 
(Appendix 6). In addition, STUK assessed con-
struction site supervision within the construction 
project in a separate inspection. The fire safety 
as well as the physical protection and emergency 
preparedness of the plant unit under construction 
were assessed in connection with the periodic in-
spections of the operating Olkiluoto plant units. 
Inspection programme during 
the construction of Onkalo
In 2007, STUK carried out six inspections accord-
ing to the inspection programme during the con-
struction of the underground rock characterisation 
facility (Onkalo), comprising a total of 20 person-
days. One inspection was postponed to 2008. In ad-
dition, STUK carried out 12 technical construction 
site inspections and participated in nine follow-up 
meetings between Posiva and STUK. These figures 
exclude the four safeguards inspections mentioned 
in chapter 6.
Other inspections on plant sites
A total of 937 inspections on site or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2007 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the safeguards of nuclear materi-
als and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground rock characterisation facility at 
Olkiluoto, which are discussed separately). An in-
spection comprises one or more partial inspections, 
such as a review of results documentation, an in-
spection of a component or a structure, a pressure 
or leakage test, a functional test or a commission-
ing inspection. Of the inspections, 433 pertained to 
oversight of the plant under construction and 540 
to that of the operating plants. Relevant documents 
are reviewed prior to on-site inspection.
The number of inspection days on site and 
at component manufacturers’ premises totalled 
2,321. This number includes not only inspections 
pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants 
but also those associated with nuclear waste man-
agement and safeguards and audits and inspection 
of the underground rock characterisation facility 
at Olkiluoto. In addition, a total of 199 inspection 
days outside normal working hours were spent at 
operating nuclear power plants, mostly during an-
nual maintenance outages, as well as 58 inspection 
days at the plant under construction. The number 
of days spent on inspection has increased due to 
the inspections relating to the construction of the 
new nuclear power plant. Four resident inspec-
tors worked at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
The Loviisa plant has one resident inspector. The 
number of on-site inspection days in 2003–2007 is 
shown in Figure 18.
8.1.3 STUK’s own development projects
The development of STUK’s own operation focused 
on completing the definition of nuclear safety-
related processes and the revision of the quality 
manual. The review of processes related to nuclear 
waste regulation was launched in 2007, and a plan 
was drawn up for the revision of the guidelines 
concerning safeguards of nuclear materials and 
Figure 18. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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nuclear waste management. Two new guidelines 
were approved, dealing with the regulation of the 
final disposal project for spent nuclear fuel gener-
ally, as well as the construction of Onkalo and the 
construction inspection programme. The overall 
aim is to update all of the old guidelines and to 
draw up seven new ones. One new guideline re-
lated to safeguards of nuclear materials and two 
other guidelines were updated. The new guideline 
deals with the nuclear safeguards required under 
the IAEA Additional Protocol.
On the basis of feedback acquired from the utili-
ties, inspection consistency was improved. As one 
means for increasing consistency, the contents of 
the inspection programmes were revised. The regu-
latory practices for the oversight of organisations 
were modified once its resources were increased. 
In 2007, KPMG carried out a review of the in-
ternal audit of the nuclear power plant regulation 
process. Alongside KPMG’s review, two external 
experts conducted their own review of the nuclear 
power plant regulation process, supplementing 
KPMG’s review. The purpose of KPMG’s review 
was to assess the functionality of an internal audit 
of the key processes of nuclear power plant regula-
tion. The processes reviewed were the licence proce-
dure, drawing up of guidelines, periodic inspections 
of operation and construction and the department’s 
decision-making process. As a positive observation, 
KPMG highlighted the motivation and profes-
sional skill of the personnel, among other things. A 
total of nine observations were made in the review, 
based on which KPMG made recommendations. 
Two of the observations were classified as promi-
nent and the others as important. The prominent 
observations were related to the identification 
and management of risks and resource manage-
ment. Based on the recommendations given, it was 
agreed to implement development actions in 2008. 
The observations of the external experts were very 
similar to those of KPMG.
Interactive groups improve the 
efficiency of the nuclear waste office 
The work of the nuclear waste management office 
was reorganised at the beginning of 2007. Posiva 
Oy’s final disposal project for spent nuclear fuel 
is a demanding subject for regulatory control, as 
the project includes many items implemented for 
the first time in the world. Posiva’s organisation 
and the safety documentation produced by it have 
expanded rapidly over the past few years, and the 
schedule in view of the construction license appli-
cation expected at the end of 2012 is tight. At the 
same time, the construction of the underground 
rock characterisation facility, Onkalo, is progress-
ing towards the final disposal depth, which is im-
portant for safety.
These underlying factors resulted in hiring 
new experts and changing the organisation of the 
nuclear waste management office. In terms of the 
regulation of the final disposal project, experts in 
various fields of technology and science must col-
laborate seamlessly. Five groups according to duty/
expertise areas were formed in the office:
•	 Final	 disposal	 technology,	 the	 main	 task	 of	
which is to assess whether the technical barrier 
system (fuel matrix, waste canister, bentonite 
buffer, and backfill and sealing structures) can 
be constructed according to the design bases 
and whether it preserves its long-term perfor-
mance.
•	 Final	repository,	the	main	task	of	which	is	to	as-
sess and control whether the bedrock conditions 
at the final disposal depth conform with the 
design bases and whether they will continue 
to do so in view of the construction of the final 
disposal facility and the impact of long-term 
climate changes.
•	 Safety	assessment,	the	main	task	of	which	is	to	
assess the safety case for final disposal to deter-
mine whether safety is ensured to a sufficient 
degree of certainty, how the uncertainties are 
managed and what are the most essential needs 
for further research.
•	 Regulation	of	operation,	the	main	task	of	which	
is to oversee the waste management of opera-
ting nuclear power plants and its implementati-
on.
•	 Regulation	 of	 construction,	 the	 main	 task	 of	
which is to oversee the design, extensions, 
construction and commissioning of all nuclear 
waste facilities. ONKALO is the most important 
nuclear waste facility under construction. Regu-
lation of construction is usually implemented as 
a project.
The groups have leaders and office personnel be-
long to more than one group. According to the 
experiences so far, the new organisational model 
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has increased self-direction, improved sharing of 
knowledge and increased co-operation and the ef-
ficiency of the work of the office.
The internal working group on security 
issues increases co-operation within STUK
An internal working group was established at 
STUK in 2007 to ensure that STUK’s operations 
to prevent illegal activities related to nuclear ma-
terials or radioactive substances are as efficient 
as possible. The purpose of the working group on 
security issues is to enhance co-operation within 
STUK, prepare guidelines and agree on the divi-
sion of labour between the different units. In ad-
dition, the group aims to contribute to ensuring 
that operators have in place appropriate physi-
cal protection of nuclear materials and radiation 
sources. 
control of the transport of nuclear materials 
and other radioactive substances was assigned 
to two people, one of whom focuses on transport 
in the nuclear field and the other on transport of 
other radioactive substances.
STUK’s own international 
operational experience feedback 
activities are being developed 
STUK’s own international operational experience 
feedback activities were reorganised and their pro-
cedures were developed to improve the efficiency of 
operations at the international level and to support 
development ideas concerning the activities. co-
ordination and maintenance was transferred to the 
management support functions of the Department 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, where they come 
under the responsibility of the Deputy Director 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The international 
operational experience feedback team (“the IRS 
team”), which includes representatives of all the 
expert offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, des-
ignated in 2007, reviewed IRS-reported events 
received via the IAEA and the lessons based on 
them from the viewpoint of Finnish nuclear pow-
er plants. The results of the review, including its 
justifications, were recorded in STUK’s IRS data-
base, which was developed to better correspond to 
STUK’s needs. The actions taken regarding each 
IRS report were systematically recorded in the da-
tabase, and a field for an English-language feed-
back report was added to the database. Such a 
report is drawn up for events for which it has been 
decided to require Finnish plants to take action or 
for which a good Finnish practice has been found. 
The utilisation of the summary reports (Topical 
Reports, Blue Books) jointly published by the IAEA 
and the NEA on the basis of IRS reports also takes 
place via the IRS team.
The indicator data system is being 
developed in parallel with its utilisation
Since the beginning of 2006, an INDI data system 
has been used in the maintenance and reporting of 
the indicators used for nuclear facilities regulation. 
The system has been developed in parallel with its 
utilisation. In 2007, quarterly and annual report 
templates were created, and the original English 
software was translated into Finnish. 
New indicators concerning fuel integrity and 
the accident risk of nuclear power plants were 
defined in the system. Software user rights were 
extended, an operating manual was compiled and 
training was organised for new users. 
A licentiate thesis related to the topic was com-
pleted at STUK, and the methods developed in its 
theoretical section and tested were employed to 
analyse STUK’s safety performance indicators. The 
results can be utilised in indicator trend analyses 
in the future.
Development of records management
The project to develop a comprehensive records 
management solution for STUK, spanning sever-
al years, was continued. The aim is that the RM 
(Records Management) system supplied by Affecto-
Genimap Oy will in the future replace STUK’s 
current separate records systems and registers. 
The new system also makes possible internal dig-
ital records management (workflow) at STUK. The 
system preliminarily provides for electronic serv-
ices to external clients. Introducing the records 
management solution also requires that STUK’s 
registry establishment plan (AMS) is reviewed and 
updated. 
Electronic inspection protocols
The Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
currently uses more than ten different inspection 
protocol forms. The manual procedures for these 
protocols in their current format do not allow opti-
mal information management. During the year, the 
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needs for developing each individual protocol form 
were analysed together with the inspectors draw-
ing up the protocols. The requirement specifica-
tion for the electronic system to be developed was 
almost completed. Modelling the process of using 
several different protocols that are completed at 
several phases in an electronic system has proven 
to be a more challenging development project than 
anticipated, and it has been necessary to assess 
the suitability and usability of different technical 
implementation options as part of the requirement 
specification. The project will proceed to the com-
petitive tendering phase in 2008.
8.2 Renewal and human resources 
Training was organised for inspectors concerning 
nuclear power plant systems and regulatory op-
erations, for example. Ten new STUK inspectors 
participated in the fourth national training pro-
gramme in the nuclear field (the yK course), which 
STUK organises together with other actors in the 
field. The duration of the fourth yK course was five 
weeks, three of which were held in the spring of 
2007. The yK5 course was launched in the autumn 
of 2007, where nine STUK inspectors participated 
among a total number of 50 participants. The en-
tire yK course concept was reviewed in 2007. The 
recommendations of the review report were consid-
ered in the planning of the yK5 course; the course 
programme was made more compact and it was 
agreed that new training material will be delivered 
in its entirety in Finnish. 
STUK’s inspectors also participated in training 
provided by external enterprises, such as the lead 
auditor training organised by Excellence Finland, 
and various domestic and international training 
events. In addition, supervisors in the nuclear 
safety field participated in leadership skills coach-
ing programmes.
One inspector participated in the “Nuclear 
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation” course organ-
ised by the European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association (ESARDA), and another 
in the “Training workshop for Net-Enabled waste 
Management Database” training event organised 
by the IAEA. 
Two STUK inspectors completed a doctor’s de-
gree, and both theses were related to nuclear waste 
management. The first thesis investigated the 
post-Ice Age seismic history of Olkiluoto and the 
surrounding sea by means of ice formation simula-
tions, acoustic-seismic sounding of the sea bottom 
and sediment research. The second thesis dealt 
with the thermal mechanics of porous substances 
using computational methods. The paper explored 
coupled modelling of the behaviour of one techni-
cal barrier included in the geological final disposal 
plans for high-level nuclear waste, namely buffer 
material fabricated from swelling clay.
On average, 10.8 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation and 6.1 
days per inspector in the field of nuclear reactor 
regulation were spent on developing the expertise 
of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2007.
Seven new inspectors were hired for nuclear 
reactor regulation in 2007. Two of them were em-
ployed in the oversight of organisational operation 
and management, two in the field of I&c technol-
ogy, two in inspections of mechanical components, 
and one in oversight of the radiation safety of 
nuclear power plants. Five new inspectors were re-
cruited in nuclear waste management regulation, 
whose areas of responsibility include oversight of 
low- and intermediate-level waste, the encapsu-
lation technology related to the final disposal of 
spent fuel, biosphere analyses, chemistry issues 
and bentonite and other backfilling materials. 
8.3 Finances and resources 
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to, and not subject to, a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
consisted of the regulatory control of nuclear fa-
cilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to control. Those basic operations not subject to a 
charge included international and domestic co-op-
eration as well as emergency response and commu-
nications. Basic operations not subject to a charge 
are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-making 
and support functions (administration, develop-
ment projects in support of regulatory activities, 
training, maintenance and development of exper-
tise, reporting as well as participation in nuclear 
safety research) were carried forward into the costs 
of both types of basic operation and of contracted 
services in relation to the number of working hours 
spent on each function.
In 2007, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were €12.0 mil-
lion. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
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were €13.2 million. Thus the share of activities 
subject to a charge was 90.9%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2007 was €12.0 million. Of this, €2.1 million and 
€8.4 million came from the inspection and review 
of Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, 
respectively. In addition to the operating plant 
units, the income from the Olkiluoto plant includes 
regulatory control of the new plant unit. The in-
come from the inspection and review of Posiva Oy’s 
operations was €1.4 million. Figure 19 shows the 
annual income and costs from nuclear safety regu-
lation in 2003–2007.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant was 11.1 person-
years, i.e. 9.9% of the total working time of the nu-
clear regulatory personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant’s operating units it was 9.8 person-
years, which accounts for 8.6% of the total working 
time. In addition to the oversight of the operation 
of nuclear power plants, the figure includes nuclear 
material control. The time spent on inspection and 
review of Olkiluoto 3 was 29.1 person-years, i.e. 
25.6% of the total working time. The time spent on 
nuclear waste management inspection and review 
Figure 20. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 19. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
Figure 21. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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was 5.7 person-years and that spent on the FiR 1 
research reactor was 0.06 person-years. The work-
ing time spent on small-scale users of nuclear ma-
terial was 0.02 person-years.
where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of regu-
latory decision making. Figures 20 and 21 show the 
costs of nuclear safety research in 2003–2007. In 
addition to technical support projects, the pre-2005 
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figures also reflect the costs of national nuclear 
safety research. The costs for 2007 mostly relate 
to reference analyses and independent assess-
ments made for the plant unit under construction. 
Appendix 7 lists STUK-financed technical support 
projects completed in 2007. 
The distribution of the annual working time of 
the nuclear regulatory personnel to duty areas is 
shown in Table 7. Figure 22 presents the distribu-
tion of working time spent on main functions in 
2003–2007.
Figure 22. Working time spent on main functions.
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Table 7. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Basic operations subject to a charge 29.2 44.7 47.1 53.6 55.7
Basic operations not subject to a charge 6.4 5.1 7.2 5.7 6.1
Contracted services 4.9 5.1 3.3 3.0 2.2
Rule-making and support functions 28.2 22.7 27.5 28.8 30.3
Holidays and absences 15.9 16.9 16.9 20.0 19.1
Total 84.6 94.5 101.9 111.0 113.4
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9 Emergency preparedness
Several emergency response training events and 
exercises were organised at STUK in 2007. The 
exercises test the operation of the emergency re-
sponse organisation, the functionality of the emer-
gency response guidelines and the usability of the 
emergency response premises in practice, and de-
velop these on the basis of the feedback received 
from the exercises. In addition, they familiarise 
new personnel with STUK’s operations in emer-
gency situations and their personal duties in the 
emergency response organisation. 
In 2007, two emergency exercises concern-
ing nuclear power plants were organised on the 
plant sites in Finland. The Loviisa plant exercise 
was organised on 23 November 2007 and that in 
Olkiluoto on 28 November 2007. The exercises 
were less extensive in terms of the number of 
participants than the rescue operation exercises 
organised every three years. The exercise par-
ticipants were the utility concerned and STUK; in 
the case of the Olkiluoto exercise, Rauma rescue 
services also participated with small-scale man-
ning. In both cases, STUK participants numbered 
about 50, some of whom were undergoing training. 
The aim was to test the initiation of activities, co-
operation between the authorities and the utility, 
assessment of accident situations and dissemina-
tion of information to the public and the media. 
Both nuclear power plants also organise fire 
training and drills, with the fire brigades of the 
plants and the fire and rescue services of the sur-
rounding municipalities participating. At Olkiluoto, 
drills were organised on the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion site on 18 june 2007 and on 26 November 2007, 
and at the operating power plants on 19 November 
2007. Senior officers of the Loviisa power plant’s 
fire brigade participated in the KESI exercise on 
co-operation with the authorities on 24 October 
2007, and an exercise in combating chemical spills 
was organised at the plant on 14 May 2007. 
STUK also participates in international emer-
gency exercises concerning nuclear power plants. 
In 2007, an emergency exercise was organised 
at the Leningrad nuclear power plant on 19–20 
September 2007, where 15 STUK personnel par-
ticipated. One of them followed the operation of 
Rosenergoatom’s emergency response organisation 
in Moscow and one that of the Leningrad nuclear 
power plant. The main objective was to test as-
sessment of accident situations and maintenance 
of the assessment, as well as dissemination of 
information between Russia and Finland. During 
the exercise, STUK received messages and posed 
additional questions to the Russian participants. 
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10 Communication
STUK informed about power 
plant malfunctions and furthered 
understanding of nuclear power 
and safety in local communities 
In 2007, STUK issued five press releases on nu-
clear safety issues. Two of these were related to 
quality deviations at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant under construction. In june, STUK provided 
information about a fire in the turbine building 
at the Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant unit. In 
September, STUK issued two press releases about 
the operational disturbance leading to a scram at 
the Olkiluoto 2 power plant unit and its investiga-
tion.
During the year, STUK’s experts answered ques-
tions posed by domestic and international media, 
in particular, questions concerning the Olkiluoto 3 
plant unit.
Fennovoima Oy’s nuclear power plant plans cre-
ated a lot of interest from journalists. 
Towards the end of the year, STUK’s experts 
also toured and gave talks on nuclear and radia-
tion safety in localities involved in Fennovoima’s 
plans. STUK representatives participated in public 
events organised by the municipalities in Pyhäjoki 
and Kristiinankaupunki. The debate and visits will 
continue in 2008.
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11 International co-operation
11.1 International conventions
The convention on Nuclear Safety requires the 
submission of a report on how its obligations have 
been met every three years. STUK was responsible 
for the Finnish national report, which was submit-
ted to the IAEA, functioning as the convention’s 
secretariat, according to the agreed schedule in the 
autumn of 2007. corresponding reports have previ-
ously been submitted in 1999, 2002 and 2004. This 
latest report will be reviewed by the contracting 
Parties in an extensive international conference in 
vienna in the spring of 2008.
11.2 Co-operation in international 
organisations and bilateral 
co-operation
Co-operation with the IAEA
The Director General of STUK acts as the vice 
chairman of the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group (INSAG), which provides informa-
tion and advice on nuclear safety issues to the 
Director General of the IAEA and gives recommen-
dations for safety improvements in the IAEA mem-
ber countries. In 2007 the INSAG worked on a new 
Table 8. IAEA safety standard committees in which STUK’s representantives participated.
Regulatory committee Subject
NUSSC, Nuclear Safety Standards Committee nuclear safety
WASSC, Waste Safety Standards Committee safety of the nuclear waste management
TRANSSC, Transport Safety Standards Committee safety of transport of radioactive material
RASSC, Radiation Safety Standards Committee radiation safety
Table 9. STUK acts as Finland’s liaison organisation for the below information exchange systems 
maintained by the IAEA.
Information exchange system Subject
IRS, Incident Reporting System events at nuclear power plants
IRSRR, Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors events of research reactors
INES, International Nuclear Event Scale classification of international nuclear events in terms of 
safety significance
PRIS, Power Reactor Information System nuclear reactors in electricity production
NFCIS, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System nucler fuel cycle
NEWMDB, Net enabled Waste Management Database nuclear waste
DRCS, Directory for Radioactively Contaminated Sites radioactively contaminated sites
ITDB, Illicit Trafficking Database illicit trafficking involving nuclear and other radioactive 
material
EVTRAM, Events that have arisen during the Transport of 
Radioactive Material
transport of radioactive material
DIRATA, Discharges of Radionuclides to the Atmospheric and 
Aquatic Environment
radioactive releases into the environment
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report, “Improving the International Operating 
Experience Feedback (OEF) System”.
STUK’s representative is also included in an-
other group invited by the Director General, the 
SAGSI dealing with nuclear material safeguards.
The IRS national co-ordinator designated by 
STUK changed. co-ordinator rights were also ap-
plied for from the IAEA for a second STUK repre-
sentative. Revision of the IRS Reporting Guidelines 
was started by the IAEA, involving the active 
contributions of STUK’s IRS co-ordinators, who 
participated in the first meeting of the group look-
ing into the revision in August 2007. STUK made 
a motion to grant IRS rights to four employees of 
the Institute for Energy, joint Research centre, 
IE-jRc Petten at the meeting of IRS co-ordinators. 
The justification for the motion was that STUK 
would use the research centre in Petten as a tech-
nical support organisation for drawing up and 
reviewing IRS reports. The rights were granted at 
the beginning of 2008.
STUK’s representative has acted as the chair-
man of the IAEA Nuclear Safety committee 
(NUSSc) for two terms. The terms of all of the 
committees expired at the end of 2007.
 STUK’s representatives took part in the IAEA’s 
expert groups that review national nuclear safety 
regulation in japan and Australia (International 
Regulatory Review Service, IRRS).
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
At its meeting in December 2006 the cNRA de-
cided to establish a wGOE Task Group, “Use of 
Operating Experience Feedback for Improving 
Nuclear Safety (IOEF)”. STUK designated its rep-
resentative to the Task Group, which assessed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current interna-
tional operational experience feedback processes 
and networks. The Task Group convened three 
times in 2007: in january, April and October. It 
drew up a report on its evaluation giving recom-
mendations for enhancement of practices, and sub-
Table 10. STUK was represented in all of the OECD’s main committees dealing with radiation and nuclear 
safety. STUK also participated the activities of the working groups of the main committees.
Subjects of the main committees Working groups
Safety research 
CSNI, Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations
STUK’s representative as a member of the steering CSNI Bureau
GAMA, Working Group on Accident and Analysis•	
WGRISK, Working Group on Risk Assessment•	
WGHOF, Working Group on Human and Organisational •	
Factors
WGFS, Working Group on Fuel Safety•	
Regulation of nuclear safety
CNRA, Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities 
The Director General of STUK acted as the chairman of CNRA in 
1998–2007. Since the meeting of June 2007 he was a member of the 
steering CNRA Bureau.
WGIP, Working Group on Inspection Practices•	
WGOE, Working Group on Operating Experience•	
WGPC, Working Group on Public Communication of Nuclear •	
Regulatory Organisations
Radiation safety
CRPPH, Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health
WPNEM, Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters•	
EGOE, Expert Group on Occupational Exposure•	
EGBAT, Expert Group on Best Available Technologies•	
Nuclear waste management
RWMC, Radioactive Waste Management Committee
IGSC, Integration Group for the Safety Case•	
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mitted it to the December meeting of the cNRA for 
approval.
Each cSNI working group holds at least one 
general meeting each year and the necessary topi-
cal meetings, in which STUK’s representatives par-
ticipated in 2007. The wGhOF organised a semi-
nar in chester in the spring of 2007 on the assess-
ment of licensees’ safety culture and the related 
regulatory inspections. The wGIP’s representative 
was also invited to take part in the workshop.
Co-operation with the EU
The Director General of STUK submitted an initia-
tive to the western European Nuclear Regulators’ 
Association (wENRA) to establish a clearinghouse 
for operational experience feedback on nuclear 
power plant events in Petten, the Netherlands, 
for example, in conjunction with the EU joint 
Research centre. During the year, STUK has ac-
tively presented concrete proposals concerning 
the organisation and content of this operation in 
various connections (wENRA, INSAG, wGOE). A 
project co-ordination meeting was held in Brussels 
towards the end of july. Representatives of regula-
tory authorities, technical support organisations, 
jRc-Petten, the IAEA, the NEA and the wENRA 
attended the meeting. The meeting discussed the 
main objectives, functions and forms of co-opera-
tion of the European clearinghouse project. Small 
nuclear power countries have perceived the impor-
tance of the project for experience exchange due 
to the limited scope of their own experiences and 
resources. Early in 2008 the nuclear safety regula-
tion organisations of the Netherlands, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland and hungary, as 
well as STUK, will conclude a co-operation agree-
ment with the European commission on their par-
ticipation in the operation of the European Network 
on Operating Experience for NPPs. The relevant 
co-ordination centre, the EU clearinghouse in NPP 
OEF, will be established in conjunction with the 
Institute for Energy, joint Research centre (IE-
jRc). The participating countries have the possi-
bility to post their own expert to the clearinghouse 
for a fixed term, the function of which is to assist 
the co-operating countries in producing high-qual-
ity operational event reports in the IAEA’s IRS 
database, conducting related investigations and 
drafting summaries, and maintaining an operat-
ing experience feedback database. In support of its 
analyses, the clearinghouse will also utilise nation-
al experts from regulatory and technical support 
organisations.
STUK’s proposal for a European clearinghouse 
for operational experience feedback on nuclear 
power plant events included a globally available 
Safety Issues database, where all internationally 
interesting operational experience feedback from 
areas significant for nuclear safety would be con-
centrated and where it would be available to all. In 
December 2007 STUK’s representatives participat-
ed in an Tecnical Meeting organised by the IAEA in 
Germany, where existing national databases were 
introduced and experiences were exchanged con-
cerning the models applied in different countries to 
resolve recent events and the new factors revealed 
by research to have an impact on safety.
In 2007 the European commission established 
a European high Level Group on Nuclear Safety 
and Radioactive waste Management aimed at de-
veloping and harmonising the safety practices in 
the nuclear energy field in the EU Member States. 
Both nuclear energy countries and non-nuclear 
energy countries are involved in the Group’s work. 
Table 11. OECD/NEA topical databases and data base projects for which STUK has nominated representatives.
Database Subject
ICDE, International Common-Cause Failure Data Exchange, CCFs
FIRE, Fire Data Exchange fires
OPDE, Piping Failure Data Exchange piping failures
IAGE, Integrity of Components and Structures structural integrity
*ISOE, Information System on Occupational Exposure occupational radiation doses
COMPSIS, Exchange of Operating Experience Concerning Computer-based 
Systems Important to Safety 
faults of programmable systems and equipment
SCAP, Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing stress corrosion and cable ageing 
* co-sponsored by the IAEA
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The Finnish members of the Group are a repre-
sentative of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
and the Director General of STUK. 
STUK contributed to the work of the advisory 
Expert Group A31, which assists in rule making 
in the field of nuclear safety in the European 
commission, and the advisory committee on ship-
ments of radioactive waste (the committee referred 
to in Article 21 of Directive 2006/117).
STUK attended the meetings of the Atomic 
Questions Group of the council of the European 
Union dealing with the renewal of the Euratom 
safeguard system.
11.3 Other forms of co-operation
MDEP
STUK’s representatives contributed to the work of 
the Steering Technical committee (STc) and work-
ing groups of the Multinational Design Evaluation 
Programme (MDEP). Nine countries participate in 
the MDEP: the United States, canada, France, 
japan, china, Korea, Russia, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom and Finland. In practice, china 
has not sent representatives to the meetings.
The function of the MDEP STc is to assess 
regulatory practices and requirements related to 
Table 12. Bilateral co-operation.
Country/organisation Form of co-operation with STUK
Sweden/SKI, the Swedish nuclear safety authority STUK’s representative is a member of the advisory committee on 
nuclear safety supporting SKI.
Regular meetings with SKI to discuss topical issues concerning nuclear 
power plant safety regulation and emergency preparedness.
Belgium STUK’s Director General is the chairman of the advisory committee 
supporting the Belgian regulatory control organisation.
Lithuania/VATESI, the Lithuanian nuclear safety authority STUK’s representative acted as a permanent member of the advisory 
committee supporting the Lithuanian nuclear safety authority.
France STUK’s representative was a member of Group Permanent chargé des 
Reacteurs Nucléaires (GPR), the French advisory committee on nuclear 
safety.
Co-operation in terms of the regulation of design, construction and 
manufacturing for the new plant project. Information on design 
solutions, the construction situation, oversight of construction, 
experience of the manufacturing of the main components and accident 
analyses were exchanged at the meetings.
USA Co-operation in terms of the regulation of design, construction and •	
manufacturing for the new plant project. Information on design 
solutions, the construction situation, oversight of construction, 
experience of the manufacturing of the main components and 
accident analyses were exchanged at the meetings.
Russia Co-operation in the field of nuclear safety with nuclear power plants in 
neighbouring areas and the Russian safety regulatory authorities in 
projects financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Support to the Russian nuclear safety authorities in terms of •	
nuclear safeguards.
Safety improvements at the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear power plant.•	
Safety improvements at the Kola nuclear power plant.•	
Co-operation with the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear safety •	
authorities.
Accident preparedness and environmental radiation monitoring at •	
Sosnovyi Bor, in St. Petersburg and the Kola peninsula.
Nuclear waste management co-operation in the neighbouring areas•	
Australia/ASNO, Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office Co-operation in the field of nuclear safeguards. STUK provides ASNO 
with information as agreed about nuclear materials of Australian origin 
imported to Finland.
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the licensing of new plants in different countries, 
focusing on the licensing basis, inspection practices 
and safety objectives. Another aim is to define ar-
eas where different regulatory organisations could 
co-operate when granting licences to new plants. 
The project mainly deals with third-generation 
light-water and heavy-water reactors. In addition, 
STc’s task is to issue recommendations for contin-
ued MPED operation.
The programme was launched with a pilot 
phase, on which a preliminary final report was com-
pleted based on summary reports by five working 
groups. The working groups dealt with the follow-
ing topics: manufacturing standards and inspec-
tions of primary circuit components (wGcMOP, 
working Group in component Manufacturing), 
severe accidents, the requirements related to emer-
gency cooling system design, programmable I&c, 
and generic issues concerning all of the above, such 
as the licensing process, documentation and the 
management system.
The preliminary final report presents areas 
with similarities and differences concerning regu-
latory requirements and practices, also describing 
the nature, importance and justifications of the 
differences. In addition, the report looks at areas 
of co-operation and the potential for harmonising 
regulatory practices. The report contains ten rec-
ommendations for continued operation. continued 
operation of the programme will be decided on at a 
Policy Group meeting to be held in early 2008.
The wGcMO, the most active of the working 
groups, held three meetings in 2007 and vis-
ited factories manufacturing heavy components 
in France, South Korea and japan. The working 
group submitted its final report according its 
mandate to the STc in the autumn of 2007. The 
working group’s primary conclusions were to rec-
ommend establishing a multinational plant ven-
dor inspection programme and launching prepa-
rations to harmonise standards for plant design 
and quality assurance.
The STc’s final report based on the summary 
reports of the different working groups presents 
areas with similarities and differences concern-
ing regulatory requirements and practices, and 
describes the nature, importance and justifications 
of the differences. In addition, the report looks at 
areas of co-operation and the potential for harmo-
nising regulatory practices. The report contains ten 
recommendations for continued operation. The con-
tinuance of the programme will be decided on at a 
Policy Group meeting to be held in early 2008.
WENRA, Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association
STUK participated in the work of the western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 
(wENRA, www.wenra.org), the co-operative 
body between the nuclear safety authorities of 
EU Member States using nuclear energy and 
Switzerland. In 2000 a working group on harmoni-
sation was set up to develop a method for drawing 
up uniform nuclear safety requirements. According 
to the recommendations contained in the work-
ing group’s final report, an extensive development 
project on requirements for nuclear safety and nu-
clear waste management was launched at the be-
ginning of 2003. For this purpose, wENRA estab-
lished two working groups:
•	 The	 Reactor	 Harmonisation	 Working	 Group	
(RhwG), whose task is to draw up reference 
requirements for existing nuclear power plants.
•	 The	Working	Group	 for	Waste	and	Decommis-
sioning (wGwD), whose task is to draw up 
reference requirements in the areas of decom-
missioning and storage of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste.
In 2006 the RhwG completed the harmonised ref-
erence levels applicable to reactor safety at operat-
ing plants (600 requirements). In 2007 the RhwG 
updated the requirements on the basis of comments 
from the industry and carried out benchmarking 
for management systems with regard to both regu-
lations and operating nuclear power plants. Thus 
the RhwG has completed its mission, except for 
the follow-up of development in member countries, 
which is scheduled to be completed by the end of 
2011. The objective for development is to bring the 
safety requirements applied in all of the countries 
in line with the reference levels.
The wGwD has outlined harmonised reference 
levels applicable to the storage of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste, and the decommissioning of 
nuclear power plants. In 2007 the wGwD compared 
national regulations with the reference levels to 
determine their correspondence. Based on the com-
parative experience and comments from the indus-
try, the reference levels will be revised in 2008.
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Nordic co-operation in nuclear safety
The four-year research programme of NKS, Nordic 
co-operation in nuclear safety, commenced in 2002. 
The programme comprises two project areas: re-
actor safety research and research into emergen-
cy preparedness and environmental safety. The 
projects are headed by programme managers. 
STUK’s experts participated in projects under the 
research programme on emergency preparedness 
and environmental safety. STUK played an active 
role in the work of the NKS steering committee.
The nuclear safety programme includes projects 
relating to Finland’s publicly funded SAFIR2010 
research programme. The emergency preparedness 
and environmental safety programme includes fo-
cus areas important to Finland, such as the devel-
opment of information management and commu-
nication during emergencies. The steering commit-
tee approved amendments to the framework pro-
gramme in 2007. The objectives of the programme 
remain mostly unchanged. New topics for research 
include threats related to the use of radioactive 
substances, the environmental impact of uranium 
excavation and fourth-generation reactors. The 
programme’s content in its entirety serves the co-
operation between the Nordic authorities, which is 
a permanent objective of NKS co-operation.
NERS
STUK participated in the work of the Network of 
Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS). It 
is a channel via which information on the operat-
ing methods and experiences of colleagues work-
ing on similar-sized nuclear energy programmes 
can be exchanged. Nuclear safety authorities from 
countries outside Europe, Argentina, South Africa 
and Pakistan are participating in the co-operation. 
Three topics were dealt with in 2007: the MDEP, 
ensuring expertise and preparing for the construc-
tion of new plants, as well as safety culture when 
the structure of ownership changes. 
VVER
STUK participated in the co-operation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with vvER 
power plants via the vvER Forum. The annual 
meeting of the Forum deals with a few previous-
ly agreed topics and discusses the results of the 
Forum’s working groups. Two working groups oper-
ated in 2007, which:
•	 exchanged	 operational	 experience	 feedback	 on	
vvER plants
•	 exchanged	 information	 on	 probabilistic	 risk	
analyses on vvER-440 plants and their results.
